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Tout ce qui existe est situé.  
Max Jacob, Preface to A Dice Cup (1916) 
 
She looked up at him, and her eyes were sparkling,                                             
her lips moist and tender. She was a beautiful woman in that moment,        
truly beautiful, filled with the beauty that only comes to a women                                            
in one or two perfect moments in a lifetime, and to most not at all. 
William Alfred McKinley III, French Girl (1973)  
 
In this thesis, I take an interpretive approach to the situatedness of organizational practices 
and knowledge to study their adoption. From an interpretive perspective, situatedness  is not 
an objective phenomenon, but situations, i.e. “concrete places at specific times" 
(Czarniawska, 2001: 254) are socially constructed  "under the constraints present in those 
times and places” (ibid.) . In this view, studying organizational phenomena foregrounds the 
situatedness of social action and knowledge as they are the main “subjects” of social 
construction in organizational contexts (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Cook & Brown, 1999). In 
this sense, the thesis focuses on the situatedness of knowledge, i.e. the "individual capability" 
(Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001: 971) to enact "experiences [...], contextual information, and 
expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences 
and information" (Davenport & Prusak, 1998: 5) as well as practices, i.e., the socially shaped 
activities of human actors (Bourdieu, 1977). Because of their situatedness, knowledge and 
practices are meaningful to a particular context and can thus not be directly transferred from 
one context to another. Against this background, this thesis examines the adoption of situated 
organizational knowledge and practices.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured into six sections. First, I review the 
conceptualizations of situatedness of "systemic-discursive" theories and of theories of social 
practices as the main schools of thought of the interpretive approaches to situatedness. In the 
second section, I draw on studies on the adoption of organizational knowledge and practices 






thesis relate to the situatedness and adoption of organizational knowledge and practices. In the 
fourth section, I summarize each of the three studies, and in the fifth section, I delineate their 
major contributions. The chapter concludes with specifying avenues for future research. 
1.1 Situatedness 
Organization studies have a long-standing tradition in studying the situatedness of 
organizational phenomena. The idea that organizations provide a context and are themselves 
embedded in an outside world has already been depicted, for example, in the contingency 
theory, developed in the 1950s. Criticizing previous organization theories, such as Weber's 
theory of bureaucracy (1947), for ignoring the influence of the environment on organizational 
structures and management style, adherents of contingency theory argued that the best way of 
organizing is contingent upon the internal context of an organization and its situatedness in 
the external environment (Thompson, 1967; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969).  
 
By examining the contingencies that determine which organizational structure is most 
efficient for the functioning of an organization in a given situation, such as technology, 
consumer and supplier relations, contingency theory, like other functionalist organization 
theories (Burrell & Morgan, 1979), conceptualizes situatedness as an objective phenomenon 
to which the organizational structures, i.e. organizational knowledge and practices, have to be 
adapted. However, this conceptualization has been criticized for disregarding the interpretive 
nature of situatedness (e.g. Benson, 1977). From an interpretive perspective, contingent or 
contextual factors do not exist objectively but are socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966). In this sense, it is not the situatedness of an organization as such that matters but the 
meaning that is attached to a situation by those actors, institutions or organizations affected by 
the situation.  
 
These assumptions about the ontological nature of situatedness are mainly reflected in 
organization studies drawing on the constructivist approach of "systemic-discursive" theories 
(Astley, W. Graham & Zammuto, 1992; Hendry & Seidl, 2003; Seidl, 2007; Seidl & Becker, 
2006; Zbaracki, 1998) and on the culture-theoretical approach of theories of social practices 
(e.g. (Hendry, 2000; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Miettinen, Paavola, & Pohjola, 2012; Orlikowski, 
2000; Whittington, 2006). Although systemic-discursive theories and theories of social 






“situation” in which they are enacted they differ in their view on the “texture” of situatedness, 
the analytic level of situatedness and the role of agency in the formation of situatedness. 
 
While systemic-discursive theories, such as those developed by Wittgenstein, Lyotard and 
Luhmann1
 
, have different theoretical underpinnings, they share the idea that social action and 
the knowledge inherent in these actions (conceptualized as communication, speech acts and 
phrases) are bound up with the specific social context (conceptualized as communication 
system, language game or genres) in which they are embedded. Following Wittgenstein 
(1953), the situatedness of social events refers to different linguistic contexts that he calls 
"language games", which condition the ways humans act and experience the world. Different 
language games contain particular conventions or rules that pertain how we communicate but 
also how we behave and act. Depending on the particular language game in which humans 
take part, social events are experienced differently. Thus, understandings of social actions and 
the knowledge are determined by particular language games. In other words, the conventions 
of a particular language game define the particular meaning of words, knowledge and actions 
in which they are used. They cannot be understood independently of the language game in 
which they are used. Where Wittgenstein speaks of speech acts that are intentionally produced 
by subjects, Lyotard (1988) speaks of "phrases" whose meaning is not "given through the 
intention of a speaker but through the context of other phrases in which it becomes 
embedded" (Seidl, 2007: 200). Similarly to Wittgenstein's language games, Lyotard talked 
about "genres" that obtain different rules for linking phrases. In contrast to language games 
however, genres are incommensurable as there are no rules for linking phrases across 
different genres. A similar line of reasoning is taken up by Luhmann (1995) with his concept 
of autopoietic, i.e. self-reproducing, communication systems or networks of communication. 
Every communication, i.e. "the unity of utterance, information and understanding" (Seidl, 
2007: 201) is produced by a particular communication system and cannot enter other 
communication systems. Communication can be triggered by other communication systems 
but it will be produced according to the internal logic of the communication system to which 
the communication belongs.  
Despite the different theoretical underpinnings of these systemic-discursive approaches, 
Wittgenstein, Lyotard and Luhmann regard situatedness in terms of multiple discursive 
                                                             
1 While some scholars would argue that Luhmann's system theory is a functionalist theory, it has been 
shown that the functionalist aspects of his theory have been turned into a method (Seidl and 






contexts (conceptualized as language games, communication systems or genres), each with a 
different internal logic that affects the meaning of social action (conceptualized as 
communication, speech acts and phrases). According to Lyotard and Luhmann, these 
discursive contexts are operatively closed or incommensurable, i.e. no speech act (or 
communication) can be transferred from one context to another as each speech act has a 
particular meaning in a context and thus constitutes a different speech act. 
 
In line with systemic-discursive theories, theories of social practice, such as those developed 
by Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens (who rank among the main practice theorists), share 
the idea that human action is situated in specific social contexts (conceptualized as social 
systems or social fields). In this sense, society is composed of different social contexts that 
impact meaning on knowledge and social action. Yet, in contrast to the systemic-discursive 
approaches of Lyotard and Luhmann, different social contexts are not treated as "operatively 
closed" systems (Kieser & Leiner, 2009; Seidl, 2009) but as semiautonomous or permeable 
contexts. From a systemic-discursive perspective, actions are part of a social context because 
they function according to the logic of this context. From a practice-theoretical point of view, 
actions function according to the logic of practice, which is homologous across social 
contexts. Hence, all social contexts share the same underlying logic but they differ in the 
particular structures, in which knowledge and social practices are situated. 
 
Giddens refers to structures in terms of "rules and resources", i.e. "the structuring properties 
of social systems" (Giddens, 1984: 17), which condition the way humans act. He defines rules 
as "generalized procedures applied in the enactment of social life" (Giddens, 1984: 7), e.g. a 
dress code or incest taboos; and resources as allocative power, i.e. power over things, like 
economic resources, and authoritative power, i.e. power over actors, like knowledge 
resources. Rules are needed to activate resources and are only observable in the enactment of 
resources. Social structures, i.e. rules and resources, allow actors to exercise power and to 
legitimize actions but also define the meaning of social action in which rules and resources 
are used. For Giddens, structures are located in human minds but only "exist" in the 
generating moment of the "instantiation" of social practices (Walsham, 2002). 
 
Similarly to Giddens, Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977) argues that social structures give rise to 
socially shared interests, beliefs and assumptions that enable and constrain social practices. In 






with different structural possibilities and constraints, i.e. they are guided by field-specific 
interests, beliefs and assumptions. This implies that even if the same individuals participate in 
different spheres they cannot transfer meaning from one sphere to another because moving 
from one field to another implies a shift in the meaning of the structural conditions of their 
actions. 
 
In addition, Bourdieu (2001) refers to the concept of "illusio" of the social fields to describe 
actors’ unconsciously shared recognition of interest, beliefs and assumptions. Thus, illusio 
allows members of one field to share an understanding that makes the practices of other actors 
in the field meaningful and deemed appropriate. By acknowledging specific interests, beliefs 
and assumptions, illusio provides actors with incorporated, generalized perceptions 
(conceptualized as habitus) to assign meaning to other agents’ actions. Consequently, all 
practices receive their specific meanings from being enacted in that particular field. In other 
words, social actions are only meaningful in relation to a particular social field. 
 
In contrast to Giddens’ more narrowly conceived notion of social structures (Sewell Jr, 
William H, 1992; Stones, 2005), Bourdieu (1977) conceptualizes social structures as power 
relations among actors. Thus, social practices are situated in social structures that reflect the 
current power relations among actors. From a Bourdieusian point of view social contexts, 
conceptualized as social fields, are composed of power structures, because resources, 
conceptualized as different forms of “capital” (like monetary assets, knowledge and social 
networks) are unequally distributed in society. Thus, in contrast to Giddens, capital do not 
constitute the social structure as such. The differentiation between structures and resources 
allows Bourdieu to differentiate between dominant and dominated actors, whose actions are 
directed at acquiring capital and thus increasing or maintaining the power position in a social 
field. As dominant actors are able to unconsciously define the rules according to which the 
pursued capital is conducted and thus, the struggle for power is played out, the Bourdieusian 
approach allows to explain that structures "operate differently, affecting unevenly various 
groups of individuals [within one field] whose categorization depends on certain assumption 
about social structures" (Thompson, 1984: 159). This implies that although actors’ practices 
are situated in a social field, this situatedness unevenly affects actors’ knowledge and 







Both the social practice theory of Giddens and Bourdieu assume situatedness in terms of 
multiple social contexts (conceptualized as social system or social field) each with a different 
social structure that affects the meaning of social action (conceptualized as social practice). 
Even though theories of social practice focus on  the situatedness of social action, they do not 
disregard the situatedness of language as "saying is a kind of doing" (Seidl & Whittington, 
2014: 8)2
 
. However, in contrast to the systemic-discursive theories of Luhmann and Lyotard, 
theories of social practice share the view that not all human action is reducible to 
communication and speech acts. Moreover, in contrast to systemic-discursive theories, both 
theories of social practice consider the recursive relation between structure and agency 
(conceptualized as duality of structure or praxeology). Practices are situated in social spheres, 
which give rise to particular structures that are guiding rules for human action. However, 
structures do not only shape social practices but are also the outcome of these practices. As 
Giddens describes "society only has form, and that form only has effects on people, insofar as 
structure is produced and reproduced in what people do" (Giddens, 1984: 157). Thus, unlike 
Althusser's notion of agents as "Träger" (the bearer or carrier) of structures, agents are active - 
but unconscious - producers of social structures. Hence, from a practice theoretical 
perspective the situatedness is not abstracted from human action but necessarily comprises 
both structure and agency. While disregarding the focus of systemic-discursive theories on 
detached structures, which lack regard for agency, theories of social practice equally deny 
subjectivism's exclusive attention to individual agency without consideration of the socio-
structural context. In this sense, the socio-structural context is not a "mechanical outcome, 
[but rather] an active constituting process, accomplished by, and consisting in, the doings of 
active subjects" (Giddens, 1993: 121).  
Despite their different conceptualizations of situatedness, systemic-discursive theories, and 
theories of social practice share the view that social spheres (conceptualized as language 
game, communication system, social system and social field) give rise to different meaning 
systems (conceptualized as rules and conventions, logic, social structure or illusio) according 
to which actions and knowledge (conceptualized as communication, speech act or social 
practice) are interpreted. Although systemic-discursive theories and theories of social 
practices view all knowledge and actions as situated, this dissertation focuses on the 
situatedness of knowledge and practices related to organizational phenomena. Situatedness 
                                                             
2 Seidl & Whittington (2014) also note that theories of social practice can be differentiated by the 
extent to which they stress "doings or sayings" (Schatzki, 2002). The Bourdieusian theory of social 






can thus be conceptualized as the embeddedness of organizational practices and management 
knowledge in an organizational sphere that determines their meaning. Within the scope of this 
thesis, an organizational sphere extends a single organization's boundary and may include all 
actors who play a role in light of a particular organizational phenomenon. 
 
The situatedness of organizational practices and knowledge within organizational fields does 
not imply that spheres are closed off from the external world. Organizational spheres might be 
affected by knowledge and practices from other social spheres, such as other organizational 
spheres, or the broader social spheres of education or science. In contrast to a functionalist 
view (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Szulanski, 2000; Winter, 1998), knowledge and practices 
from one sphere cannot easily be transferred to another sphere as knowledge and practices are 
only meaningful in a particular organizational sphere. In this sense, organizational spheres 
have to be treated as different contexts between which a direct transfer of meaning is 
impossible. Thus, the situatedness of knowledge and practices has important implications for 
the ways in which organizational spheres can be influenced by other spheres and their 
respective environment. 
1.2 Adoption 
Several studies have discussed the implications of the situatedness of organizational 
knowledge and practices on their adoption3
                                                             
3 It is not within the scope of this introduction to discuss the implications of the different 
conceptualizations of situatedness on the adoption of knowledge and practices. Therefore, I 
will refer to the studies that draw on systemic-discursive theories and theories of social 
practice to discuss the adoption of knowledge and practices in general. 
. Drawing on the conceptualization of different 
organizational spheres, they argue that the meaning of knowledge and practices inevitably 
changes as a consequence of being adopted by a new context (Jarzabkowski, 2005; 
Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; Orlikowski, 2000; Rasche & Behnam, 2009; Seidl, 2007, 
2009). Knowledge and practices developed in one sphere can stimulate other spheres, but this 
knowledge and these practices will be understood differently because knowledge and 
practices have different meanings in different organizational spheres. Thus, when knowledge 
and practices are adopted to organizational contexts they are subject to translation, editing or 
reinterpretation (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996; Geertz, 1977; Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008; Seidl, 








Seidl (2007: 206) calls this phenomenon "productive misunderstanding", meaning that 
knowledge and practices from other spheres are used "as an external provocation to create 
internally something new". Knowledge and practices are reconstructed according to the 
meaning system or logic of an organizational sphere. However, this internal reconstruction is 
different from the original knowledge or practice (Seidl, 2007; Astley & Zammuto, 1992). In 
other words, actors in one sphere try to make sense of new knowledge or practices on the 
basis of existing social structures, thereby creating new meaning. To adopt is then not just to 
imitate but also to change and innovate as meanings evolve differently in different settings 
(Czarniawska & Sévon, 1996). Hence, in different contexts, organizational practices and 
knowledge have to be treated as different organizational practices and knowledge. This 
implies that the knowledge and practices in one organizational context are never identical 
with knowledge and practices in another organizational context even though "different 
organizations might use the same labels [for knowledge and practice], but the concrete 
practices behind the labels are different" (Seidl, 2007: 206). 
 
In addition, the situatedness of organizational knowledge and practices implies that they do 
not "diffuse in a vacuum but are actively transferred and translated in a context of other 
knowledge, practices, actors, traditions and institutions" (Sahlin & Wedlin, 2008: 219). 
Because knowledge and practices are interpreted in the context in which they are situated, 
they will be transformed, adapted or changed according to the principles and conventions that 
the adopting context holds in stock. Thus, the particular ways in which organizational 
knowledge and practices will be transformed or changed is ultimately determined by the 
adopting context itself. However, these particular ways are not completely random. Rather, 
the range of possible meanings of knowledge and practices is restricted by the adopting 
organizational sphere (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996; Seidl, 2007). 
 
In contrast to an instrumental view on adoption, which assumes that the more powerful and 
efficient knowledge and practices are the more organizations adopt them, the situatedness of 
organizational knowledge and practices calls into question that there are intrinsic factors to 
practices and knowledge that will contribute to its adoption (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996). 
Thus, it is not a question of the properties of organizational knowledge and practices as such 
whether they will be adopted but whether they can be meaningfully adapted to the structure or 






only possible if there is a point of reference between the knowledge or practice and the 
adopting sphere (or more specifically, the frame of reference of the actors who enact a 
practice in the adopting sphere). In this sense, it has been shown that the reasons to adopt 
organizational knowledge and practices depends on the degree to which they resonate with 
the assumptions of organizational members and conform to their interests (Beyer & Trice, 
1982; Nicolai & Dautwiz, 2010). In the case of the adoption of knowledge, the ambiguity of 
knowledge can increases the chance of being adopted because the plurality of meanings of 
knowledge allows a wide variety of interpretations in light of the respective context to which 
knowledge is adopted (Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010; Astley & Zammuto, 1992). 
 
1.3 Adoption of CSR practices and academic knowledge 
Against this backdrop, this dissertation draws on different conceptualizations of situatedness 
of knowledge and practices to study the adoption of a particular kind of social practice, 
namely pro-social practices (first study), and a particular type of knowledge, namely 
academic knowledge (second and third study). The first two studies are based on the practice 
theory of Bourdieu, while the third study is based on the above-mentioned literature on the 
adoption of knowledge and practices. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the 
conditions, i.e. the socially shaped causes of actors' thinking and acting (Merton, 1968), and 
the mechanisms, i.e. the "cogs and wheels" that generate social relationships (Elster, 1989: 3, 
cited in Hedström & Swedberg, 1996), that explain4
 
 how management practitioners adopt 
pro-social practices and academic knowledge.  
The first study of this dissertation focuses on the adoption of pro-social practices, i.e. the 
socially shaped activities of corporate actors that address social and ethical values beyond 
legal requirements. Corporations face a dramatic rise in the concern for corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), which has been well documented in the academic literature (Carroll & 
Shabana, 2010; Crane, Andrew, Dirk Matten, and Jeremy Moon., 2008; Palazzo & Scherer, 
2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Vogel, 2010). In this sense, pro-social practices lend 
themselves particularly well to the study of the adoption of organizational practices. This 
study draws on the practice theory of Bourdieu, which is particularly suited to study the 
                                                             
4 In this thesis, I refer to the hermeneutic tradition of "explaining", which accounts for the subjectivity 
of the research "object" by trying to comprehend actors' social construction and the meanings of their 






adoption of pro-social practices for two reasons. First, in contrast to prevalent theoretical 
approaches to CSR that focus either on the micro-level of analysis (such as the economic 
approach or managerial utility approach) or on the macro-level of analysis (such as the 
resource-based view or the institutionalist approach) to explain the adoption of pro-social 
behaviour, the Bourdieusian approach allows researchers to grasp the link between micro-and 
macro level of analysis by conceptualizing pro-social behaviour as a form of social practice 
that is shaped by broader societal structures and individual perceptions. Second, the 
Bourdieusian approach allows researchers to explore an unexplored aspect of the adoption of 
pro-social practices, namely, the interplay between different types of motivation for the 
adoption of practices. From a Bourdieusian perspective, pro-social practices are enacted by 
individual managers in their efforts to attain economic, social and cultural (e.g. knowledge) 
capital.  
The second and third study of this dissertation examine the adoption of academic 
management knowledge by management practitioners. According to these studies, academic 
management knowledge can be defined as statements for which an explanation exists that has 
been methodically approved  by management science5 (Schreyogg & Geiger, 2003), The 
adoption of academic management knowledge by management practice as an applied science 
has fuelled a long-standing debate in the academic literature (Gopinath & Hoffman, 1995; 
Jarzabkowski, Mohrman, & Scherer, 2010). In this dissertation, two particular aspects of this 
debate are further examined. The second study explores the epistemological consequences of 
the situatedness of academic knowledge for its adoption by management practitioners. As 
management research can be said to generate knowledge by observing practice to inform or 
improve practice (Cheng & McKinley, 1983), it is of particular concern to examine the way in 
which scholars can generate6
                                                             
5 As organizational scholars do not share a common understanding of what constitutes valid academic 
knowledge, they do not agree upon the method according to which explanations are validated 
(Scherer, 2003). Academic knowledge differs from lay or practical knowledge in the criteria according 
to which knowledge is validated but not in the requirement of a method as such (Schreyögg & Geiger, 
2003).  
 academic knowledge that will be adopted by management 
practice. To account for the situatedness of academic knowledge within the academic system, 
this study draws on the practice-theoretical approach of Bourdieu. In contrast to the first 
study, this second study mainly draws on Bourdieu's concepts of social field and participant 
objectivation (a particular form of reflexivity) to elaborate how the situatedness of knowledge 
6 As scholars "are also practitioners - of scholarly pursuit" (Jarzabkowski, Mohrman, Scherer, 2010: 







can be taken into account in the production of knowledge in order to make it meaningful to 
another context (i.e., management practice). The Bourdieusian approach lends itself 
particularly well to study the adoption of knowledge as Bourdieu himself applied his theory to 
the field of social science (Bourdieu, 1988, 2004). However, the implications of this 
application for the adoption of academic management knowledge by management 
practitioners have not been systematically explored.  
 
While the third study also examines the adoption of academic management knowledge, it 
takes another angle on the debate by examining the conditions under which individual 
managers consider academic knowledge as worth adopting  to their concrete organizational 
contexts. To account for management practitioners' situatedness, in terms of their professional 
organizational contexts and previously acquired knowledge, this study draws on a qualitative 
method (Langley & Abdallah, 2011; Patton, 2005b) to examine practitioners'  construction of 
practical relevance. A qualitative method is well suited to study the situative conditions under 
which practitioners consider academic management knowledge as worth adopting to their 
organizational contexts because it allows to capture actors' perceptions and interpretations 
(Maitlis, 2005a; Silverman, 2006). This study shows that managers consider academic 
knowledge as worth adopting, if it resonates with their particular organizational context, 
extends their situated knowledge and is considered valuable for their organizational contexts 
and professional practices.  
 
Each of the three studies of this dissertation foregrounds a particular aspect of situatedness 
and thus offers a different answer to the overarching question of how management 
practitioners adopt academic management knowledge and pro-social practices. The first study 
discusses the mechanisms through which management practitioners adopt pro-social practices 
within organizational spheres. It shows that the adoption of pro-social practices depends on 
the features of the particular organizational sphere, but also on management practitioners’ 
situated dispositions and stock of capital. The second study discusses the implications of the 
knowledge generated in the academic sphere for its adoption by management practitioners. 
This study demonstrates that academic knowledge production, which takes the situatedness of  
knowledge into account, fosters the adoption of academic management knowledge by 
management practitioners. The third study discusses the conditions under which management 
practitioners consider knowledge generated in the academic sphere as worth adopting. It 






situated knowledge, extend their knowledge by academic management knowledge and 
consider it as valuable for their contexts and practices, they consider it as worth adopting it. In 
sum, this dissertation draws on different conceptualizations of the situatedness of knowledge 
and practices to unravel the conditions under which and the mechanisms with which academic 
management knowledge and pro-social practices are adopted by management practitioners.  
 
1.4 Summary of Studies 
The first study, a conceptual work, co-authored with Dominik van Aaken and David Seidl, is 
published in the Journal Organization. In this study, we draw on the practice theory of Pierre 
Bourdieu to examine why corporate actors adopt pro-social behaviour. We focus on pro-
social practices because corporations face a dramatic rise in the concern for corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (Caroll, 2008; Vogel, 2005; Palazzo & Scherer, 2008). Despite the 
pervasiveness of pro-social behaviour, the motivations to adopt pro-social practices are not 
fully understood. Most theoretical approaches to CSR focus either on the economic 
motivations (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), the non-economic motivations (Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2011) or different types of motivation simultaneously (Hemingway and Maclagan, 
2004; Campbell, 2007), disregarding the interplay between economic and non-economic 
motivations to adopt pro-social practices. 
 
Applying a Bourdieusian perspective to study the motivations to adopt CSR practices, we 
show that pro-social practices are influenced by the interplay of economic, social, cultural and 
symbolic elements. We refer to pro-social practices as socially shaped activities that address 
social and ethical values beyond legal requirements. The study shows that the enactment of 
pro-social practices depends on the features of the particular organizational field, in which the 
pro-social practice is enacted, the social dispositions of individual managers who enact the 
pro-social practices and their stock and quest for  (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) 
capital for which actors in a field compete to attain power. Combining these theoretical 
concepts, the Bourdieusian perspective on CSR reveals the mechanisms through which the 
economic and non-economic motivations interrelate and change over time. In addition, a 
Bourdieusian perspective takes into account various influences on the micro- and macro-level, 







The first paper contributes to two different streams of literature. First, it enhances the 
literature on CSR by taking a new theoretical perspective that provides a novel understanding 
of the interplay between economic and non-economic explanations of pro-social behaviour. 
Moreover, by conceptualizing pro-social behaviour as a form of social practice, the 
Bourdieusian perspective shifts attention to the aspect of individuals' ability to reflect on their 
pro-social behaviour and broadens the scope of research to include examining CSR on 
multiple levels of analysis. Second, it contributes to the studies propagating the application of 
practice-theoretical lenses to studying organizations (e.g. Whittington, 2003) by showing how 
the practice-theoretical lens of Bourdieu can be extended to the academic literature on CSR, 
which creates new possibilities for collaborating across different research streams.  
 
The second study, a conceptual work co-authored with David Seidl, is published in the 
Journal of Applied Behavioural Science. In this study, we examine the adoption of academic 
knowledge in the field of strategy-as-practice research. Strategy-as-practice is concerned with 
the daily activities of strategy practitioners and the way these relate to strategic outcomes 
(Johnson, Melin, & Whittington, 2003). Strategy-as-practice scholars claim that the 
examination of practitioners' daily activities and what people "really do in strategy" has the 
potential for considerable practical value. Despite this claim, the conditions and possibilities 
of strategy-as-practice research for generating knowledge that will be adopted are not 
examined. 
 
Based on Bourdieu's theory, we argue that the irrelevance of academic strategy knowledge 
cannot be resolved by focusing on the activities of strategy practitioners. In addition to 
focusing on strategy practitioners’ activities, strategy scholars need to take into account their 
"scholastic view", i.e., researchers' detached view of the object of research. If strategy-as-
practice scholars do not take their scholastic view into account, they generate knowledge that 
is neither practically relevant nor rigorous. We argue that only by deploying a particular kind 
of reflexivity, which Bourdieu (2003) referred to as "participant objectivation", are 
researchers able to produce rigorous research that is also practically relevant to management 
practitioners. Thus, from a Bourdieusian perspective, practical relevance can only be achieved 
through a particular form of rigor. 
The second study contributes to two sets of literatures: first, it contributes to the strategy-as-
practice literature by suggesting participant objectivation as a reflective tool for researchers to 






Second, our study contributes to the literature on the practical relevance of management 
practice by introducing a Bourdieusian approach on relevance, which shows that, in contrast 
to previous literature (Kieser & Leiner, 2009; Rasche & Behnam, 2009; Seidl, 2007), 
practical relevance can be achieved through (a particular form of) rigor. 
 
In the third study, an empirical work that will be submitted to the Journal of Management 
Studies, I examine under which conditions management practitioners consider academic 
management knowledge as practically relevant. Although the literature on practical relevance 
acknowledges the constitutive role of the adopting system to achieve practical relevance by 
discussing the forms of relevance that management research can provide (Pelz, 1978; Nicolai 
& Seidl, 2010), the adoption and adaptation of academic knowledge (Rasche & Behnam, 
2009; Seidl, 2007; Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010), and the role of the ambiguity of academic 
knowledge in increasing practical relevance (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Benders & 
Bijsterfeld, 2000), it disregards the particular ways in which management practitioners 
perceive academic management knowledge as relevant. This perceived gap is particularly 
striking because these studies stress that the particular ways in which research output affects 
management practice is ultimately determined by practice itself (Kieser, Nicolai, & Seidl, 
2015).  
 
To examine the conditions under which management practitioners consider academic 
knowledge as relevant, the third study draws on practitioners' accounts of the relevance of 
academic concepts based on data from fifty-three semi-structured interviews. Applying a 
qualitative method to examine management practitioners’ individual interpretations and 
perceptions (Patton, 2005a; Maitlis, 2005b), a theoretical model of practitioners’ relevance 
construction is developed, which shows that practitioners construct academic knowledge as 
relevant if  practitioners match academic knowledge against their contextual problems and 
previous knowledge,  if academic knowledge extends their knowledge by new instruments, 
constructs and scientific framing and if they consider academic knowledge as valuable for 
their organizational contexts and professional practices. 
This study contributes to the literature on practical relevance in two main ways: first, in 
contrast to the commonly held assumption that the ambiguity of academic knowledge 
increases the likelihood that practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant (Astley, 
W. Graham & Zammuto, 1992; Benders & van Veen, 2001; Rasche & Behnam, 2009), this 






knowledge increases the likelihood of being considered as relevant by facilitating the 
compatibility to a range of contexts and practices. On the other hand, ambiguous academic 
knowledge decreases the likelihood of being considered as relevant if it provides multiple 
meaningful courses of action, which overwhelm management practitioners with choosing the 
course of action that is most meaningful to them. Second, the study contributes to the 
literature on practical relevance by offering an understanding of the conditions under which 
management practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant before they apply this 
knowledge to their organizational contexts.  As practitioners consider academic knowledge as 
relevant if it is compatible to their contexts and knowledge, practitioners' relevance 
construction tends to reproduce existing organizational structures in which practitioners' 
contextual problems and needs might be embedded. In this sense, practitioners' matching of 
academic knowledge against their existing organizational contexts might lead to reproducing 
these structures regardless of whether these structures are beneficial or obstructive to the 
functioning of the organization. 
 
1.5 Contributions  
Acknowledging the situatedness of social practices and knowledge, this thesis illuminates 
three specific areas related to how practices and knowledge are adopted: (1) the influence of 
the relation between social contexts on adoption, (2) the mechanisms of adoption within 
organizational contexts and, (3) the role of actors in the adoption of  knowledge and practices. 
 
First, this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the ways in which the relation 
between management science and management practice, conceptualized as different 
organizational fields characterized by different social structures (Bourdieu, 1990; Splitter & 
Seidl, forthcoming), affects the adoption of academic management knowledge. In particular, 
the second paper focuses on the relation between management research and practice from the 
perspective of management scholars, whereas the third paper focuses on this relation from the 
perspective of management practitioners. The second paper reveals that although management 
scholars and managers are both practitioners (Jarzabkowski et al., 2010; Scherer, 1998), they 
face different structural possibilities and constraints. Because of this difference, management 
scholars generate knowledge that will not be adopted by management practice. However, 
scholars can generate knowledge that will be adopted if they apply a particular kind of 






practice is particular in the sense that management science generates knowledge about 
practice for practice, this phenomenon could also be observed if, for example, an R&D 
department generated knowledge for other units of an organization. In this sense, the second 
study reveals the importance of reflexivity in adopting management knowledge generated in 
other fields. 
 
In turn, the third study contributes to understanding the ways in which the relation between 
management science and management practice affects the adoption of academic management 
knowledge by focusing on the managers’ perspective. Referring to the situatedness of 
academic management knowledge, this study shows that management research cannot 
determine whether practitioners consider academic knowledge as worth adopting to their 
organizational contexts. Instead, practitioners actively construct the value of adopting 
academic management knowledge in light of their particular contexts and knowledge. In 
addition, it is shown that management research generates ambiguous academic knowledge, 
which facilitates management practitioners' consideration  to adopt academic management 
knowledge, while simultaneously preventing practitioners from considering adopting it. As 
ambiguous knowledge can be observed  in various other organizational contexts, such as 
strategy reports (Denis, Dompierre, Langley, & Rouleau, 2011; Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 
2006), the finding is relevant to other organizational members who make sense of ambiguous 
knowledge. 
Second, this thesis reveals the conditions for adoption within organizational contexts. In 
particular, the first study shows that the adoption of social practices, like CSR practices, 
depends on the particular features of the adopting field, such as actors' unconsciously shared 
evaluations, the individual managers socially shaped dispositions as well as their stock and 
amount of resources or capital. Because individual organizational members strive for the 
legitimation of their capital to maintain or enhance their power positions, they might adopt 
practice because of economic and non-economic reasons. Thereby, the first study accounts for 
the interplay between economic and non-economic motivations and the adoption of social 
practices to organizational contexts as well as for the influence of the macro- and micro level 
on this adoption. 
 
Third, the dissertation addresses the role of actors in adopting knowledge and practices. The 
role of individual actors is particularly prominent in the third study focusing on the practical 






affect whether they consider to adopt academic management knowledge. The first study 
approaches the role of actors from yet a different angle focusing on the adoption of CSR 
practices enacted by individual managers. While there are structural constraints on the 
adoption of practices, this study emphasizes that it is individual managers’ dispositions and 
their amount and stock of capital that drive the adoption of social practices. In turn, the 
second study focuses on individually deployed social practices in the field of management 
research and management practice. It shows that scholars instantiate structural conditions of 
the field of management research, such as their shared interest in the publication of academic 
journals, by enacting social practices, such as writing, reviewing or generating academic 
knowledge.  
1.6 Future Research 
In emphasizing different aspects of the adoption of pro-social practices and academic 
management knowledge, this dissertation opens up specific avenues for future research. In the 
following, I will highlight three themes that can advance the understanding of the overarching 
question of how pro-social practices and academic management knowledge are adopted: (1) 
the role of material objects in the adoption of  practices and academic  knowledge, (2) the 
implications of the unstable situatedness for adoption, (3) the role of pluralistic contexts for 
the adoption of social practices and academic management knowledge. 
 
First, future research could take a socio-material perspective that investigates the role of 
material objects in the process of adopting. Generally, a socio-material perspective "makes a 
distinctive move away from seeing actors and objects as primarily self-contained entities [ .. . ]  
to examining how materiality is intrinsic to everyday activities and relations" (Orlikowski & 
Scott, 2008: 455). Related to the second and third study, the adoption of academic knowledge 
mostly involves a material object, in which the academic knowledge is displayed. Such 
objects can be, for example management tools and techniques (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 
2006). Thus, future research may investigate the role of material objects as mediators or 
boundary objects (Carlile, 2002; Star, 2010) between the social spheres of management 
research and practice in order to examine the adoption of academic knowledge. 
 
A particular stance on socio-materiality that theorizes the relationship between humans and 






from ontological separation of actors and objects to ontological equivalence or symmetry, i.e., 
there are no "independently existing objects with inherent characteristics" (Barad, 2014: 816), 
Latour instead speaks of a network of "actants", i.e. humans and non-humans. Drawing on 
Latour's theoretical framework, future work could thus investigate how the adoption process 
(or, in a Latourian terms, the translation from actor to actor) takes place if management 
practitioners and materialized academic knowledge are not analytically differentiated.  
 
Second, another area for future research could investigate the implications of the unstable 
situatedness of knowledge and  practice for their adoption. As situatedness can be conceived 
as a "dynamic process that unfolds over time" (Van de Ven, Andrew H, 1992: 215), 
knowledge and practices are not situated in one way but are exposed to a situating process. 
Relating to the second and third study, this suggests that academic knowledge could be 
adopted in different ways depending on the momentary situatedness of the adopting context. 
By acknowledging the changing situatedness that organizational members face (Kaplan & 
Orlikowski, 2013), future research could investigate how the adoption of academic 
knowledge is affected by the constantly changing situatedness of the adopting context. 
Relating particularly to the second study, future work could examine the preconditions for 
adopting academic knowledge to changing contexts. 
 
A third area that could be explored further is the role of pluralistic contexts for the adoption of 
practices and knowledge. Relating to the first study, the situatedness within a single social 
context becomes somewhat problematic in the era of globalization and with the prevalence of 
multinational corporations operating in pluralistic contexts (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). 
Thus, future research could explore the implications of the "co-existence" of pluralistic 
contexts or hybrid contexts (Powell, 1987; Denis, Langley, Rouleau, 2007) on the adoption of 
practices. Relating to the second and third paper, future research could investigate how the 
pluralistic situatedness of organizational actors influences the adoption of academic 
knowledge. In particular, it could be explored how the difference between multiple 
organizational settings could be reflexively integrated in the production of academic 
knowledge in order to be adopted by management practice and the conditions under which 
individual actors consider adopting  academic knowledge when they face multiple, or even 
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2 Why do corporate actors engage in pro-social 
behaviour? A Bourdieusian perspective on corporate 
social responsibility  




Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social practice, this paper develops a novel approach 
to the study of corporate social responsibility (CSR). According to this approach, pro-social 
activities are conceptualized as social practices that individual managers employ in their 
efforts to attain social power. Whether such practices are enacted or not depends on (1) the 
particular features of the social field, (2) the individual managers’ socially shaped dispositions 
and (3) their stock of different forms of capital. By combining these theoretical concepts, the 
Bourdieusian approach we develop highlights the interplay between the economic and non-
economic motivations that underlie CSR, acknowledging influences both on the micro- and 
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Over the last two decades the corporate world has witnessed a dramatic rise in the concern for 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Carroll, 2008; Vogel, 2005). Corporations engage 
increasingly in pro-social behaviour, such as supporting healthcare systems, fighting 
corruption, and eliminating child labour. In the academic literature, the pro-social behaviour 
of corporations is well documented and examined from a range of different theoretical 
perspectives (Crane et al., 2008). While this has led to a host of insights into different aspects 
of CSR, the diverse motivations behind pro-social activities are still not fully understood. 
Most theoretical approaches to CSR focus either on the economic motivations or on the non-
economic motivations behind CSR – the economic approach (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) 
and the political approach (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011) are prominent examples of each 
category. As a consequence, very little is known about the interplay between the economic 
and non-economic motivations that underlie CSR. Of the two approaches that do address 
different types of motivation simultaneously, i.e. the managerial utility approach 
(Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004) and institutional theory (Campbell, 2007), neither 
examines specifically or sufficiently the interplay between economic and non-economic 
motivations. 
Against this background, the aim of this paper is to develop an approach to CSR that allows 
researchers to explore how the different types of motivation for pro-social behaviour interact 
and develop over time. For this purpose we will draw on the practice theory of Pierre 
Bourdieu. As we will show, his idea that human activities are influenced by the interplay of 
economic, social, cultural and symbolic elements is especially suited to studying the diverse 
motivations behind CSR activities. From this perspective, we will conceptualize CSR 
activities as social practices that are employed by individual managers in their efforts to attain 
social power. Whether such practices are enacted or not depends on (1) the features of the 
particular social field (2) the individual managers’ socially shaped dispositions and (3) their 
stock of and quest for (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) capital. By combining these 
theoretical concepts, our Bourdieusian approach brings to the fore the mechanisms through 
which the economic and non-economic motivations behind CSR interrelate and develop over 
time; moreover, it takes into account various influences on both the micro- and the macro-
level, as well as deterministic and voluntaristic aspects of human behaviour. This lends our 






This study contributes to two different streams of literature: first, it enhances the literature on 
CSR by adding a new theoretical perspective that makes it possible to address important 
aspects of the CSR phenomenon that other theoretical approaches have not been able to 
capture. Although the world view that our perspective provides is inevitably partial, we 
believe that it has the potential to offer decisive insights into motivations behind CSR 
avtivities. Second, it contributes to the burgeoning number of studies that propagate the 
application of a practice lens to understanding and studying organizations (Whittington et al., 
2006; Whittington, 2003) by showing how this can be extended to the field of CSR – which 
may create new opportunities for collaboration across different areas of research. 
The remainder of this article is structured into four sections. We will begin by reviewing the 
existing theoretical approaches to CSR and pointing out their assumptions and limitations. 
Against this background, we will go on to explain how Bourdieu’s practice theory can be 
applied to the study of CSR; for this purpose we will draw particularly on Bourdieu’s 
concepts of capital, habitus, the social field including the field-specific illusio. Following 
that, we will discuss the explanatory power of the Bourdieusian approach in the context of 
existing approaches to CSR and outline the areas in which our approach can be further 
developed. We will conclude with a short summary of our argument. 
2.2 Review of the prevalent approaches to CSR 
A wide variety of definitions of the term CSR can be found in the existing literature. For 
example, McWilliams and Siegel (2001: 117) describe CSR as ‘actions that appear to further 
some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law’, while 
others emphasize altruistic or ‘other-regarding’ motivations as key to understanding the 
concept of social responsibility (Roberts, 2003). For the purposes of this paper we define CSR 
broadly as the actions of corporate actors that address social and ethical values beyond legal 
requirements. This definition abstracts from the specific motivations of corporate actors and 
focuses on the outcomes of their actions. For instance, when corporate actors provide funding 
to a theatre, their action is a token of CSR, independently of whether they had strategic 
motives for doing so or felt morally obliged to favour the social good. Here, we refer to the 
activities that individuals carry out in order to materialize such endeavours as ‘pro-social 
behaviour’. Thus, pro-social behaviour includes, for example, volunteering, philanthropic 






A review of the CSR literature reveals a host of different theoretical approaches (for an 
overview see Table 1). Arguably most research in the field of CSR takes an instrumental view 
of this concept (Lockett et al., 2006; Windsor, 2006). That is, any expenditure that results 
from pursuing a socially beneficial goal is conceptualized not as a sacrifice of profit but as a 
corporate investment that helps maximize (future) corporate cash flows. One perspective that 
propagates such a view is the economic approach, according to which pro-social behaviour is 
a tool for optimizing corporate profit (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Husted and De 
Jesus Salazar, 2006). This approach presupposes that managers analyse CSR activities 
without any ‘pre-conceived ideas or normative commitments [because] only by correctly 
analysing supply and demand conditions can managers hope to make CSR decisions that are 
strategically or economically sound’ (Orlitzky et al., 2011: 10). Accordingly, changes in 
corporate activities that indicate a more pro-social orientation are explained as results of 
changes in the economic conditions under which corporations operate in their markets, rather 
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A second approach, which is related to this economic perspective, is based on instrumental 
stakeholder theory. According to this approach corporations are expected to satisfy their 
stakeholders’ demands, however, taking stakeholder interests into account is seen as rooted in 
firm performance (Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995; Pajunen, 2006). Indeed, stakeholder theory 
defines and identifies stakeholders according to their relevance to economic success. Because 
stakeholders are considered to provide important resources, satisfying their needs becomes a 
precondition for achieving sustainable business success (Hill and Jones, 1992). Consequently, 
corporations are expected to satisfy the needs of those groups of stakeholders that may have a 
significant influence on the ability of corporations to survive and make profit. Conversely, 
without an economic incentive, corporations are expected not to respond to stakeholder 
demands (Berman et al., 1999). The same logic applies to approaches that are based on 
Porter’s model of competitive advantage or on the resource-based view of the firm. The 
former argues that pro-social behaviour serves both business and society (Porter and Kramer, 
2006). This model assumes that there is no trade-off between profits and social goals, such as 
‘philanthropic investments’; consequently, the antagonism between profit and ethics can be 
resolved (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Even governmental regulation is said to enhance the 
competitiveness of corporations, as regulations may trigger innovations (Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995). Similarly, the resource-based view argues that pro-social behaviour can 
contribute to the development of rare, valuable and non-substitutable resources that provide 
the basis for competitive advantage. In his natural-resource-based view of the firm, Hart 
(1995) suggests, for example, that companies have to follow three interconnected strategies 
(pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable development) to sustain a 
competitive advantage.  
All of the above perspectives conceptualize CSR activities as a means of sustaining or 
furthering economic wealth. Many empirical studies support such an instrumental view by 
showing that pro-social behaviour may favour business prospects in many respects (e.g., 
Borck and Coglianese, 2009; Stites and Michael, 2011). However, the idea of the ‘virtuous 
circle’ (Porter and Kramer, 2002) through which economic profit and the social good 
reinforce each other does not grasp the whole story. For instance, Margolis and Walsh’s meta-
analysis (2003) has undermined belief in the empirical validity of the positive relationship 
between social responsibility and economic profit. Thus, explaining pro-social activities as a 
form of enlightened value maximization seems to be too simple. In the existing literature 
there are many examples of companies that have engaged in pro-social activities in the 






demonstrate the limitations of approaches that assume profit maximization as the sole 
explanation for corporate actions. 
There are, however, other theoretical approaches to CSR, which transcend purely economic 
explanations of corporate activities and do not assume that all pro-social behaviour 
necessarily benefits the corporation itself. One prominent example is the political approach to 
CSR, which emphasizes the political role of corporations because of their power to influence 
social life inside and outside the firm (Davis, 1976). This approach goes beyond the 
instrumental view of corporations in that it puts forward ‘a new understanding of global 
politics where […] corporations […] play an active role in the democratic regulation and 
control of market transactions’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011: 3; see also Bottomley, 2007; 
Deetz, 1991). In that view, corporations are not only economic but also political actors that 
have the duty to engage in political processes in order to fill the regulatory vacuum in 
contemporary societies (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). This political role broadens the scope of 
corporate activity significantly, as corporations are not expected simply to serve markets but 
also to fulfil political functions, which may include supporting healthcare systems, fighting 
corruption, providing education or preserving peace (Logsdon and Wood, 2002). To cope 
with such tasks, corporations have to restrain the economic calculus and install a mode of 
governance that is in line with democratic principles (Gilbert et al., 2011; Steinmann and 
Scherer, 1998).  
Another approach that transcends purely economic explanations is normative stakeholder 
theory, which claims that the purpose of business is value creation for various stakeholders 
and that each stakeholder group merits consideration for its own sake (Freeman et al., 2004; 
Bowie, 2012; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Managers should not try to satisfy the interests 
of stakeholder groups in expectation of profitability in the long term, but because it is their 
fiduciary duty to do so. This duty becomes most obvious in moral and economic trade-offs, 
where satisfying one group of stakeholders comes at the price of dissatisfying another 
stakeholder group. In order to give greater guidance in such situations, scholars have 
combined stakeholder theory with various ethical approaches such as those developed by 
Rawls (Phillips, 1997), deontologists (Bowie, 1999), critical theorists (Reed, 2002), and 
libertarian scholars (Freeman and Philips, 2002).  
The integrative social contract theory (ISCT) follows a similar line of argument. This 
approach focuses on two kinds of contracts that managers have to adhere to in order to fulfil 






The former is a hypothetical contract among economic agents that defines the normative 
ground rules for creating the latter. Whereas the macro-social contract demands the informed 
consent of the contracting parties, the micro-social contract reflects the social and cultural 
embedding of the contracting parties in local communities. However, Donaldson and Dunfee 
assume that the informed consent that the macro-social contract stipulates is not a satisfactory 
restriction on corporate contracting in real life, as it virtually allows companies to draft a 
contract any way they please. To address that shortcoming, they introduce the notion of 
‘hypernorms’, which reflect the convergence of ‘religious, political, and philosophical 
thought’ (Donaldson and Dunfee, 2000: 441). The purpose of hypernorms is to impose 
additional restrictions on the activities of managers, who ought to ‘respect the dignity of each 
human person’ even if this implies economic loss (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994: 267).  
Clearly, all three perspectives – the ISCT, normative stakeholder theory and the political 
approach – have the potential to give guidance on moral issues in the business world. Indeed, 
there are many firms that use ‘social criteria as a basis for actions that are right, good, and just 
for society’ and engage in pro-social behaviour ‘for the singular goal of helping others’ 
(Sánchez, 2000: 364). However, as these three theories are primarily normative they do not 
explain why some corporate actors accept their moral duty by engaging in pro-social activities 
while others do not. While they argue for the primacy of non-economic motives over 
economic ones, they do not explore under which conditions the behaviour of corporate actors 
is prompted by the former rather than the latter. 
The managerial utility approach appears more successful in explaining why managers behave 
in a pro-social manner. This approach rests on the basic insight that their personal values 
affect not only the way in which managers perceive and interpret the world but also the 
choices they make. Consequently, it conceptualizes pro-social behaviour as a manifestation of 
managerial preferences (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004; Swanson, 2008). Starting from the 
assumption that these preferences are not entirely determined by organizational structures and 
available resources, it posits that managers use their discretion to express their personal values 
in their decisions (Wood, 1991). Several empirical studies support this view. For example, 
Agle, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld (1999) found a significant relationship between the values of 
CEOs and corporate social performance, while Graafland et al. (2007) compiled evidence that 
the religious beliefs of corporate leaders are reflected in corporate business conduct. Overall, 
the managerial utility approach explains quite persuasively differences in the degree to which 






Nevertheless, although this approach allows addressing both economic and non-economic 
motivations in relation to CSR, it does not explore how they interact and develop over time, 
which limits its ability to explain changes in pro-social behaviour. 
In contrast to the micro-level focus of the managerial utility approach, the institutional 
approach concentrates on the macro-level, which includes the market, local communities and 
state regulation (e.g., Campbell, 2007; Marquis et al., 2007). From that perspective, the 
various forms of pro-social behaviour are explained through the embeddedness of 
organizations in different formal and informal institutions, such as laws and religious norms 
respectively (Brammer et al., 2012): in order to preserve their legitimacy and ensure their 
survival, organizations conform to institutionalized expectations of pro-social behaviour. 
While corporations that operate in the same institutional field are considered to be subject to 
the same institutional pressures and to adopt the same pro-social practices, pro-social 
behaviour is expected to vary across institutional fields (Doh and Guay, 2006; Kang and 
Moon, 2012).  
The institutional approach clearly highlights the importance of the institutional environment 
in explaining pro-social behaviour. It thus addresses both economic and non-economic 
motives by relating them to CSR expectations within institutional contexts such as economic 
and legal systems or geographical regions. However, like the managerial utility approach, the 
institutional approach does not address the interplay between economic and non-economic 
motivations in the context of CSR. In addition, it is not able to explain differences in pro-
social behaviour between organizations in the same institutional field, i.e. organizations 
confronted with the same institutional pressures. 
As this overview has shown, the existing literature comprises a wide range of different 
theoretical approaches that can be used to explore the phenomenon of CSR. While each of 
these has helped to shed light on various important aspects of pro-social behaviour, they all 
have their limitations when it comes to explaining different categories of motivations that lead 
to such behaviour. Most commonly, they either overemphasize one category but disregard 
others, or they fail to explore the interplay between different categories. Against this 
background we will now introduce the central building blocks of the Bourdieusian approach 






2.3 A Bourdieusian perspective on pro-social practices 
Bourdieu puts social practices, i.e., socially shaped activities performed by individual actors, 
at the centre of his analysis (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). Actors, such as members of an 
organization, enact many different kinds of practices, including pro-social practices such as 
giving donations, attending courses on green technologies or organizing charity dinners. 
These practices are enacted in various social arenas – which Bourdieu termed ‘social fields’ – 
where people compete for different kinds of economic, social, cultural and symbolic assets 
that he referred to as ‘capital’. According to Bourdieu (1986), an individual’s motive for 
enacting any particular practice is the chance to increase his or her capital and thus attain 
power. According to this rationale, actors are expected to employ pro-social practices 
whenever they assume that this will increase their capital and thus improve their relative 
power position in the social field. This, however, does not mean that actors employ pro-social 
practices strategically. On the contrary, such practices are more likely to be enacted without 
conscious reflection. In this sense, pro-social practices follow a ‘practical’ – not a rational – 
logic. In the following we will introduce a Bourdieusian perspective on CSR by elaborating 
on his concepts of capital, habitus and field including the field specific illusio. 
2.3.1 Pro-social practices as a means of transforming individual capital 
According to Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 2005) all practices are directed towards the acquisition 
and transformation of an individual’s (monetary or non-monetary) capital. By enacting 
practices, actors invest the capital they have acquired through former practices, in order to 
acquire more of the same capital or to transform it into other types of capital.  
Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes between three general forms of capital: economic capital refers 
to monetary income as well as other financial resources and assets. Actors such as 
shareholders possess economic capital in the form of shares in the firm, whereas in the case of 
managers or employees capital takes the form of budget control and wages. Cultural capital 
exists in two different forms: incorporated cultural capital, which consists in experiences and 
habits acquired during the socialization process and manifested in an actor’s knowledge, and 
institutionalized cultural capital, which consists in formal educational qualifications. 
Institutionalized cultural capital in the form of a job title, such as ‘CEO’ or ‘chairman’, can be 
conferred. What is conferrable here is the title itself – the institutionalized cultural capital – 






the means of ‘being CEO’ or practicing it as this entails the incorporated cultural capital. 
Social capital is the sum of resources that can be mobilized through membership in or access 
to important networks. Of particular importance here are ‘strong ties’ to other individuals, 
which promote trust and reciprocity and facilitate the transfer of private information and 
critical resources (Gulati et al., 2002). In the context of organizations, the social capital of 
different actors may thus differ in regard to the strength and reach of their ties to other actors 
within and outside their organization. 
Like all other practices, pro-social practices have to be understood as attempts to acquire or 
transform capital. For example, the description by Jennings (2006) of how Dennis Koslowski 
as CEO of Tyco, a global leader in fire safety and security solutions, sponsored a travelling 
museum show can be interpreted as an account of the transformation of Koslowski’s 
economic capital (i.e., the budget of 4.5 million dollars at his disposal) into social and cultural 
capital: through this sponsorship he probably developed relationships with impresarios and 
directors of theatres (social capital) and additionally gained specific knowledge on e.g. 
funding theatres and the arts in general (cultural capital). In this and similar examples, pro-
social practices can be understood as attempts to transform an individual actor’s economic 
capital into other forms of capital. From this perspective, pro-social behaviour can be 
understood not as a sacrifice of economic capital for the social good, but as a transformation 
of the amount and structure of an individual actor’s capital into other forms of capital. Thus, 
the voluntary sponsorship of museum shows in particular, and engaging in pro-social 
behaviour in general, can be regarded as an ‘anti-economic economy’ (Bourdieu, 1993: 54): 
economic resources are transformed into other forms of capital, which in turn can be invested 
so that other practices can be enacted. 
Bourdieu argued that, in order to appreciate fully how capital functions and how it is 
converted from one type to another, it is necessary to take into account an important 
characteristic of all types of capital, namely, that they are based on mutual cognition and 
recognition among actors (Bourdieu, 1980, 1986, 1996). This is what lends capital a symbolic 
character and function. Symbolic capital cannot be regarded as another form of capital; 
economic, cultural and social capital are transformed into symbolic capital if they are 
accorded positive recognition, esteem or honour by other actors. Thus, in order to understand 
why an organizational member engages in pro-social practices it is vital to take into account 






To elucidate symbolic transformations two points have to be highlighted. The first point is 
that individuals might enact practices that function as ‘representatives’ of other practices. 
Thus, we have to distinguish the practice of publicly documenting (that is, the representation 
of) pro-social practices from the pro-social practices themselves. For example, actors might 
describe on their corporate websites and in their reports how they apply pro-social practices. 
While people often assume a direct relation between the practice of description and that of 
application, this might not be the case. One potential problem with representations is that 
actors may anticipate the perceptions and evaluations of others and, as a result, mask the real 
motivation for engaging in pro-social behaviour. To return to the example we used above, 
managers at Tyco might have engaged in pro-social activities such as sponsoring museum 
shows in order to increase Tyco’s brand reputation. However, as other actors such as 
consumers and members of NGOs might evaluate this as ‘narcissistic’ investment (Roberts, 
2001) and, consequently, deny its symbolic recognition, the PR managers of Tyco might 
choose not to communicate the economic motivation that underlies the act of sponsoring. 
Instead they might present this investment as Tyco’s authentic attempt of promoting the social 
good. In this way, representational practices may mask the real motivations of actors to 
engage in pro-social behaviour. Thus, reports may function as ‘self-presentational devices’ 
that are ‘self-laudatory’, rather than as accurate accounts of pro-social activities 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000). 
The second point is that representational practices might function as a kind of ‘simulacra’ 
(Deleuze and Krauss, 1983). Whereas in the case we have just described individuals enact 
certain practices but mask the underlying motivation, simulacra represent practices that do not 
exist. In that sense they are not representations of real practices but of illusions. That is, 
managers report that they enact their moral duties with regard to the social good, but do not 
enact the respective practices: their reports function as simulacra that aim to deceive other 
actors. Roberts (2003: 250) described such behaviour as a ‘sort of prosthesis, readily attached 
to the corporate body, that repairs its appearance but in no way changes its actual conduct’. 
Others have described such practices as ‘green-washing’ or ‘blue-washing’ – i.e. painting 
over a corporation’s image with the veneer of environmental or social responsibility 
respectively (Laufer, 2003). The reason behind such practices is, again, the effort of 
individuals to acquire and transform capital. As long as the deceived actors perceive 
simulacra as representations of real practices, simulacra are transformed into symbolic capital 






2.3.2 Habitus as producer of pro-social practices 
According to Bourdieu (1977), the engagement of actors in pro-social practices depends not 
only on the possibility and legitimacy of transforming capital but also on the individual 
actors’ disposition, their so-called habitus. The concept of habitus emphasizes that practices 
are engendered and regulated by incorporated, generalized, transposable perceptions and ways 
of thinking, rather than just by cultural roles, by norms or by conscious intentions, meanings 
or calculations (Swartz, 2002). Habitus provides actors with a kind of generative grammar, 
i.e. with cognitive frames and preferences that direct their actions (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). 
Bourdieu defines habitus as ‘systems of durable, transposable dispositions’ (1977: 72), which 
actors have acquired during the process of their personal socialization. Thus, the members of 
an organization are more likely to behave pro-socially if they have acquired the corresponding 
disposition through past practices. For example, the manner in which pro-social behaviour is 
taught – if at all – at universities, influences an individual’s future practices via the 
dispositions of which that individual’s habitus consists. For example, in their meta-analysis of 
more than fifty studies, Schaeffli, Rest and Thoma (1985) found that moral reasoning 
increased through moral education, particularly in the case of participants in their twenties 
and thirties. Given that most students are in this age group, Trevino and Nelson (2010: 15-17) 
concluded that courses in business ethics clearly have the ability to change an actor’s 
disposition towards pro-social behaviour. 
Since dispositions are tied to individuals, whether organizations engage in CSR or not 
depends on their individual members. In the light of this, it is not surprising to observe that 
areas of corporate funding often shift when the organizational members change (Roschwalb, 
1990). When members of the organization employ pro-social practices, this reflects their 
unique dispositions. Thus, these members’ dispositions – their cognitive frames and 
preferences – are key to understanding whether and in which manner they engage in pro-
social practices. In this vein, the preferences of managers are ‘significantly associated with 
the direction of foundation charitable activities for certain causes’ (Werbel and Carter, 2002: 
56).  
Another aspect of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus is that action tends to be less consciously 
reflective than commonly assumed. Bourdieu writes that ‘agents never know completely what 
they are doing’ (1990: 69) because their practices are largely reflective of their habitus. 
Consequently, pro-social practices largely occur tacitly. That does not mean, however, that 






that, for example, certain members of an organization may consciously fund museum shows 
to achieve some instrumental end. However, as Bourdieu argues, most of the time actors are 
not aware of how their practices are driven by dispositions that have been ‘formed through 
past experience’ (Dewey, 1988: 33). In this sense, pro-social practices do not follow a rational 
but a ‘practical’ logic as actors do not ‘generally adopt the theoretical attitude of seeing action 
as a choice among all other possibilities; they usually see one or a few possibilities’ (Calhoun, 
1999: 145). Pro-social practices are thus immanent in a certain habitus and reveal themselves 
as a process of everyday practical coping. Practical coping occurs in the broader context in 
which the members of an organization enact their practices (Chia and Holt, 2006; Garsten and 
Hasselström, 2003). Bourdieu refers to this broader context as the ‘social field’, which we 
will introduce in the next section. 
2.3.3 Pro-social practices as a struggle for power in organizational fields 
Whether individuals engage or not in pro-social practices depends not only on their habitus 
and the composition of their capital but also on the specific structures of the ‘field’, that is, the 
social contexts in which they are embedded. In other words, the conditions that must be 
fulfilled for a pro-social practice to be enacted ‘cannot be understood without addressing the 
context [i.e. the social field] within which it takes place’ (Dillard and Yuthas, 2002: 52). For 
Bourdieu (1996, 2005), the social field is constituted by the network of relations among 
different actors. More precisely, he relates the concept of social fields to the concepts of 
capital and habitus to show that social fields are structures of power relations among actors 
and that social action has a perpetuating or transforming effect on these relations. In other 
words, social fields are political arenas (Brint and Karabel, 1991). Because capital is not 
equally distributed, actors in social fields continuously strive to acquire (different forms of) 
capital, as bearers of different amounts and combinations of capital, some of which yield 
greater advantages within that particular field than others. Accordingly, it is possible to 
distinguish between dominating and dominated positions, depending on the amount and 
composition of capital. The overall pattern of dominant and dominated positions constitutes 
(the objective structure of) the social field (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990, 2005). 
In our context, the relevant social field is the organizational field, which reflects the current 
power relations among different actors in and around the focal organization. The 
organizational field does not include only the actors of the focal organization – even though 






actors that play a role in a given activity, as power relations usually extend the organization’s 
boundary (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Thus, the organizational field may include some of 
the managers of other corporations, suppliers, customers, journalists, investors and members 
of governmental and non-governmental organizations. 
As the members of an organization continuously strive to acquire capital through their 
practices, the positions of all actors in the organizational field, and consequently its structure, 
are not stable. Thus, the structure of the organizational field is constituted by the actual power 
relations among actors, which are characterized by an ongoing power struggle for attaining a 
dominant position in the field. This implies that, within the organizational field, positions are 
negotiated, and also created, through the pro-social manoeuvrings of employees, investors, 
members of NGOs and so on. The aim of these manoeuvrings – or practices – is to transform 
capital in a way that will increase an actor’s power in the organizational field. Capital 
therefore plays a key role – as a weapon, constraint or stake – in determining the development 
and range of possible actions available to agents (Malsch et al., 2011). The acquisition of 
capital underlies all social actions as the different forms of capital can be employed as 
weapons to defend an actor’s position and as stakes to achieve a better position (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 98).  
In this sense, the members of an organization engage in pro-social practices if these can either 
enhance or stabilize their position. For example, in their case study of massive downsizing at 
a Swedish company, Bergström and Diedrichs (2011) showed how an actor’s position may be 
enhanced via pro-social practices. Although more than 10,000 people were dismissed, most 
actors, including the Swedish government, seemed to agree that the company had 
demonstrated social responsibility in the process of dismissal, as the discharged workers were 
supported through various voluntary programmes financed by the company. The managers 
who developed and implemented these voluntary programmes employed their individual 
capital in order to get promoted to spokespersons for the company’s social responsibility and 
thus enhance their respective field positions.  
At the same time however, actors who enact pro-social practices occasionally risk 
significantly their power position in an organizational field because their investment of capital 
might fail. In Drumright’s documentation (1994) of how an organization changed its policies 
to move towards greener purchasing, an actor judged the risk she took in fighting for greener 






It was scary.... What made it scary was the ‘what if’s’. What if I misjudge the 
intensity or the longevity of the issue.... I didn’t think I could lose my job, but I 
was concerned I could lose my credibility. Obviously, the downside was when 
this thing goes to the top; if they say, ‘No, we don’t agree’, it could be damaging 
to my career. (1994: 5) 
Through pro-social practices actors might also be able to stabilize their dominant positions. 
Top managers, for example, may engage in pro-social practices in order to acquire the 
symbolic capital that is needed to stabilize their power. Norbert Reithofer, the CEO of BMW, 
for example, financed the Institute for Advanced Study at the Technical University of Munich 
and was in turn awarded an honorary doctorate from the same university (TU-Munich, 2010; 
BMW-Group, 2010). In this case, the CEO’s economic capital, in the form of budget control, 
and his social capital, in the form of his personal relations to other dominant actors at this 
university, were transformed into an institutionalized form of cultural capital. An honorary 
doctorate is highly recognized in the organizational field and can thus be seen as a form of 
symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986) that legitimizes the capital owner’s dominant position. 
Thus, the willingness of actors to engage in pro-social practices depends on whether these 
generate capital that can enhance or stabilize their position, whereas their ability to act pro-
socially is determined by the capital that they hold or to which they have access (Lawrence, 
1999). Symbolic capital – and the means by which it is created – plays a central role in power 
relations among the relative positions of actors in a field because it provides a basis ‘for a 
non-economic form of domination and hierarchy’ (Gaventa, 2003: 6). 
In order to explain why particular (pro-social or other) practices are regarded as legitimate or 
not and how dominant actors might influence this perception, it is necessary to introduce the 
concept of illusio as a particularly important aspect of the social field. In Bourdieu’s practice 
theory, the concept of illusio stands for the field members’ unconsciously shared evaluations 
of the different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1997). That is, by determining what value the 
actors within a field attribute to different forms of capital, the illusio shapes the respective 
power struggles in the field (Bourdieu, 1984, 1988, 1990). At the same time, through their 
struggles for capital, actors acknowledge and reinforce the importance of specific forms of 
capital, which in turn reproduces the illusio. The transformation of resources within a 
particular field is thus related to the actors’ assumptions of what is of value in that field 
(Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011). Hence, illusio can also be described as an ideology that 
determines how actors in a specific field perceive the legitimacy of particular pro-social 






From that perspective, illusio can be said to function ‘like the imperial system – a wonderful 
instrument of ideology, much bigger and more powerful than television or propaganda’ 
(Bourdieu and Eagleton, 1992: 114) or as ‘legitimate violence’ (Bourdieu, 1993: 73), in the 
sense that it regulates the relationships between agents in a field in such a way that it favours 
those who have already the most established positions. For that reason, it serves the interests 
of the dominant actors, who in the organizational field might be the CEOs and large 
shareholders of corporations or activists from NGOs, as these have the capacity to determine 
which composition of capital will be the most influential and dominant in the field. Dominant 
actors, albeit largely unconsciously, are those who define activities as legitimate and 
formulate the policies of the organizational field; in other words, they shape the rules 
according to which the struggle for power is conducted. On the basis of the field’s illusio, 
they can largely control which, if any, pro-social practices are able to produce valuable capital 
that can enhance the positions of actors in that field. Consequently, in order to enhance their 
positions according to the field’s illusio, dominated actors conform to the pro-social 
perceptions of dominant actors. In that way, all members of the field unconsciously contribute 
to the formation and continuation of the ideology and thus limit the possibilities of resistance. 
Even though some members of the organizational field may privately disagree with the 
(positive or negative) evaluation of particular pro-social practices, they will nevertheless 
conform to the field’s illusio in their effort to enhance their power in the field. Because the 
habitus of actors is also shaped by the illusio of a given field, the alignment of habitus with 
the field’s illusio lends actors the practical ability to perceive their position as natural and 
their practices as the natural way to operate. 
A good example of how dominant actors determine the illusio and thus the legitimacy of pro-
social practices is the study of PackCo by Baker und Roberts (2011). They describe how the 
chairman of that company, for various reasons, was keen on engaging in environmental 
programmes, which he considered exemplary of PackCo’s ‘noble purpose’. However, when a 
survey revealed that the employees were not satisfied with the way the company dealt with its 
social responsibility, top managers did not change their perception of the company’s ‘noble 
purpose’. Instead, they reinterpreted the poll’s results as a failure on the employees’ part to 
appreciate properly PackCo’s social responsibility and tried by various means to ‘educate’ 
staff on employee responsibility towards the environment. Baker and Roberts concluded that 
‘responsibility was in this way turned into an obligation of staff; [the] management’s role was 






2.3.4 Changes in the legitimacy of pro-social behaviour as result of field 
changes 
The legitimacy of pro-social practices within a particular social field might change over time. 
Illegitimate practices might become legitimate and vice-versa. Zadek (2004), for example, 
described how Nike’s attitude to pro-social practices changed dramatically in the course of a 
few years. Such changes have to be conceptualized as the result of changes in the illusio of a 
particular field. According to Bourdieu, we can distinguish two central mechanisms of 
change. Both of these mechanisms rest on the interplay between habitus and field.  
The first mechanism results from changes in the dispositions of the dominant actors. As we 
have argued before, actors will only engage in pro-social practices if the dominant actors have 
deemed these practices legitimate i.e., if these practices conform to the field’s illusio. 
Whether or not dominant actors deem such practices legitimate ultimately depends on their 
individual dispositions, i.e., their habitus. However, the dominant actors’ habitus might 
change (Bourdieu, 1984; Navarro, 2006) and, as a consequence, their evaluation of pro-social 
behaviour might also change. For instance, to go back to the example of Tyco, the fact that 
the then CEO Dennis Koslowski became a member of the Whitney Museum’s board during 
his time as a CEO at Tyco may well have shaped his attitude towards certain pro-social 
practices (Jennings, 2006). Thus, his habitus might have been modified through the 
acquisition of new dispositions that he gained as a participant in another social field – that of 
fine arts. As the evaluation of pro-social practices depends on the preferences and interests of 
the dominant actors, Dennis Koslowski, as dominant actor, was in the position to determine 
that philanthropy (i.e., giving donations to institutions like theatres, museums, schools and the 
like) was to be considered a legitimate practice in the organizational field of Tyco. Thus 
dominant members are able to change the understanding of pro-social behaviour by 
controlling the illusio of a particular organizational field in that they determine whether 
particular pro-social practices are deemed productive and legitimate in that field.  
The second mechanism of change does not rest on the reproduction of the established power 
structures, but on revolutionary changes made to the established power structures that are 
induced by ‘newcomers’ (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). In other words, the system of authority 
within a field can change, including the very rules according to which the field operates 
(Bourdieu, 1984; Madsen, 2004). A change in the power structures typically results from a 
mismatch between the dominant actors’ habitus and the structures that are specific to a given 






can be clearly seen in all the situations in which [habitus is] not the product of the 
conditions of its actualization […]: this is the case […] when old people 
quixotically cling to dispositions that are out of place and out of time; or when the 
dispositions of an agent rising, or falling, in the social structure […] are at odds 
with the position that agent occupies. (Bourdieu, 2005: 214) 
Thus, when the habitus of the dominant actors is no longer in line with the field structures, an 
opportunity is created for other actors to challenge the existing positions of power. For 
example, when the habitus of a CEO becomes unaligned with the structures of the field, other 
members of the executive team might gradually edge the CEO out of his or her dominant 
position. If these executives have been socialized differently – for example as a result of their 
business education – they might also introduce new views on pro-social behaviour. In other 
words, because the CEO’s habitus no longer matches the new structure of the organizational 
field, the other executives are able to occupy positions that are no longer accessible to the 
CEO. When the habitus encounters a social field that is discrepant from the fields in which it 
originated, it triggers the transformation of the rules that are specific to the new field 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). In the above example, the habitus of the new executives 
might trigger the re-evaluation of and an increase in the value of pro-social practices within 
the organizational field. The executives’ influence on the field’s illusio will also trigger a 
reassessment of which capital is of value and consequently a change in the power structure of 
the organizational field. In this sense, new actors who enter an organizational field might 
reshape that field’s struggles and change the current understanding of pro-social behaviour. 
Through their habitus, the newcomers might endow with legitimacy their own composition of 
capital within the organizational field; as a result, they may shift the power structure by 
excluding the existing holders of legitimate capital from key positions. In this case a new 
structure of domination emerges in that field, with other rules, stakes and forms of capital, as 
well as a new illusio that will change the beliefs and values of actors in relation to pro-social 
behaviour. 
2.4 Discussion: Comparison and further development of a Bourdieusian 
approach to CSR 
The Bourdieusian approach to CSR developed here provides a new way of exploring why 
organizational actors engage in pro-social behaviour. In the following we will discuss and 
compare the merits of this approach with those of existing theoretical perspectives on CSR 






2.4.1 Comparison of the Bourdieusian approach to the prevalent 
approaches to CSR 
The Bourdieusian approach developed in this paper can be compared to other approaches in 
relation to three central aspects (see also Table 1). The first point of comparison concerns the 
reason for engaging in CSR, according to each approach. The Bourdieusian logic of the ‘anti-
economic economy’ has provided important insights into why corporate actors engage in pro-
social behaviour. According to Bourdieu, these decisions need not be driven by the economic 
impact they are expected to have on shareholder value, as instrumental approaches suggest 
(i.e., the economic approach, instrumental stakeholder theory and the resource-based view or 
Porter’s model of competitive advantage), nor by an ‘intrinsic rationale’ (Basu and Palazzo, 
2008) of managers or corporations that restrains the economic calculus (as suggested by the 
political approach, normative stakeholder theory, and integrative social contract theory). If 
managers invest their capital in CSR initiatives – such as participating in the Global Compact, 
voluntarily disclosing information about supply chains or engaging in political lobbying for 
mandatory regulations on global standards for social auditing (Zadek, 2004) – according to 
our Bourdieusian approach this should be interpreted as individual attempts to gain capital 
that will help these managers to sustain or enhance their position in the respective 
organizational field.  
Although in this respect our Bourdieusian perspective seems to be similar to instrumental 
perspectives on CSR two differences have to be highlighted: first, our Bourdieusian 
perspective expands the role of the calculus for maximizing capital, assuming that all 
organizational practices aim at the transformation and acquisition of different forms of 
capital, and not just of economic capital. In that sense, it makes no sense to speak of ‘costly 
philanthropy’ (Mackey et al., 2007: 818). Second, our Bourdieusian approach clearly extends 
simple instrumental understandings of the role of capital by highlighting the inextricably 
social and political nature of the process of capital acquisition and conversion (Everett, 2002), 
as well as the key role of symbolic mediation in this process. Consequently, our Bourdieusian 
perspective conceives the value of social and of cultural capital as independent of their 
economic impact. In that respect, the transformation and acquisition of these forms of capital 
can be regarded as independent of the possession of economic capital, in the sense that social 
capital can be transformed into cultural capital (and vice versa) without economic capital 
being involved in this transformation. Instead, the value of CSR practices and the likelihood 






field, the preferences of the actors in that field and the actors’ capital positions employed. The 
Bourdieusian perspective developed here allows for a wide range of motivations for engaging 
in CSR, including authentic concern for the social good (as assumed by normative 
approaches), as well as instrumental concern for economic profit (as suggested by the various 
instrumental approaches). Thus, it overcomes the limitations of one-sided treatments of the 
relationship between profit and pro-social behaviour. 
From the Bourdieusian perspective presented in this paper, the value of capital is determined 
by its symbolic transformation. Consequently, the role of economic capital in explaining pro-
social behaviour is not predetermined but contingent on the specific constellation of other 
factors. In that sense, it has certain similarities to the managerial utility approach and the 
institutional perspective, both of which assume that the role of economic capital is contingent 
either on the preference structure of individuals or the institutional structure. The difference 
from these approaches lies in the way the contingency is conceptualized: the managerial 
utility approach and the intuitionalist perspective allow for a disregard of the capital 
maximization calculus depending on the respective institutional structures or individual 
preferences. By contrast, our Bourdieusian perspective does not allow for the possibility that 
actors may altogether disregard the calculus of capital maximization as such. Bourdieu 
assumes that there is always an (implicit) attempt to maximize some form of capital so, in that 
sense, capital maximization is not limited to economic capital. Thus, the perspective presented 
in this paper offers a novel understanding of pro-social behaviour, based on Bourdieu’s notion 
of an ‘anti-economic economy’, which provides a framework for analysing and explaining 
systematically the interplay of economic and non-economic motivations in relation to pro-
social behaviour.  
The second point of comparison concerns the logic of action, that is, the extent to which pro-
social behaviours are treated as result of a conscious choice between alternative courses of 
action In the Bourdieusian approach presented here, action is based on a ‘practical logic’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990), i.e. actions are conceptualized as typically unreflective selections between 
alternatives and as part of a form of ‘practical coping’ (Chia and Holt, 2006). This 
distinguishes our approach clearly from the prevalent approaches to CSR. More specifically, 
according to the economic approach, managers act in an economically rational manner; that 
is, they calculate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and choose voluntarily between 
these alternatives. The political approach also assumes voluntaristic action but differs in its 






managers are assumed to resolve the potential trade-off between stakeholder interests by 
critically reflecting on the entitlements and potential influences of each group, while the 
integrative social contract theory posits that managers have the duty to reflect and ultimately 
change their contracting behaviour. The common point of all these approaches is that they 
assume that corporate actors can select between different courses of action and that they do so 
consciously. In other words, they argue that managers are able to decide to engage in pro-
social behaviour as a result of critical reflection, without being constrained by ‘objective 
structures’ (Bourdieu, 1990) that would determine their perceptions and evaluations.  
The managerial utility and the institutionalist approach make the opposite assumption about 
the logic of action. The latter does not explicitly clarify the extent to which personal values 
are accessible to critical reflection. However, because it assumes that individual values are 
determined by cultural and religious settings to which actors are exposed (Hemingway and 
Maclagan, 2004), one could argue that the managerial utility approach assumes that managers 
are largely determined in their choice of actions. Finally, the institutionalist approach 
conceives pro-social actions as the purely reactive responses of corporations to institutional 
pressures, leaving little room for manoeuvre. From that viewpoint, pro-social practices do not 
reflect the voluntary actions of managers but are induced by social structures. In relation to 
CSR, choices are highly institutionalised, and thus ‘beyond the discretion of any individual 
participant or organization’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 344). 
The Bourdieusian approach provides a different take on the concept of action which combines 
deterministic and voluntaristic elements. It assumes that the field structures and the habitus 
define a limited set of alternative courses of actions that the corporate actor can choose from 
both consciously and unconsciously. Under normal circumstances the selection will be done 
in the mode of practical coping, i.e. without critical reflection. Yet in cases of a practical 
breakdown, such as created by a mismatch between habitus and field, actors have the 
possibility of switching into a mode of conscious reflection. Thus, the Bourdieusian approach 
goes beyond the one-sided treatments of action in the existing approaches to CSR by allowing 
for a switching between different levels of consciousness in the enactment of pro-social 
behaviour. This novel angle allows the Bourdieusian perspective to call the researcher’s 
attention to two important questions that have hardly been addressed in the CSR literature so 
far: to what extent are pro-social practices consciously enacted and to what degree are actors 
able to critically reflect on them? These questions are crucial, particularly for normative 






which is typically thought to presuppose the possibility of individual choice (Dennett, 1984). 
Our third and final point of comparison concerns the level of analysis. In Bourdieu’s theory, 
practice is shaped through micro- and macro-level phenomena. The interplay between these 
two levels has to be taken into account in order to explain why actors engage in pro-social 
activities. In contrast to that, all existing approaches focus either on the micro- or on the 
macro-level. Whereas Porter (2002) and Hart (1995) do not address the individual level at all, 
the economic approach and the two stakeholder theories treat managers and organizations as 
identical entities; the terms ‘manager’ and ‘corporation’ become interchangeable (Orlitzky et 
al., 2011). On that basis these approaches assume that corporations act homologously, which 
leads to a conceptualization of CSR as a corporate activity. Apart from these two, other 
approaches also tend to focus on only one level of analysis. Both the integrative social 
contract theory and the managerial utility approach address only the individual level. The 
former explains pro-social behaviour on the basis of the duty of managers to adhere to 
hypernorms; the latter refers to managers’ individual preference structures. 
The only theories that systematically address more than one level of analysis are the political 
and the institutional approaches to CSR. The former focuses on the corporation’s role in 
society. Corporations are expected to become democratized and involved in political 
processes in order to fulfil their political function in a globalized world. Nevertheless, by 
concentrating on the organizational and societal levels of analysis, the political approach 
tends to neglect the level of individual actors. Similarly, the institutionalist approach focuses 
on the interplay between organizations and their institutional fields by drawing a complex 
picture of how pro-social practices are influenced by the wider institutional structures in 
which they are embedded. However, it overemphasizes the macro-perspective, reducing the 
influence of individual agency to a minimum (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007).  
In contrast to the above, our Bourdieusian approach examines how both the micro- and the 
macro-level influence pro-social behaviour: pro-social activities result from a combination of 
the micro-level dispositions of individual actors and the macro-structures of the field, which 
include illusio and the distribution of capital. This makes it possible to account for the 
structures of markets, politics and social identities without having to ignore the influence of 
individual preferences. In addition, the Bourdieusian approach shifts the attention to the 
interplay between micro- and macro-level forces, acknowledging that both levels have to be 






In sum, our approach can be seen as a fruitful addition to the existing approaches to CSR. Its 
strength lies particularly in its ability to provide a more holistic framework for analysing what 
prompts actors to engage in CSR activities by emphasizing the interplay between economic 
and non-economic motivations and acknowledging both micro- and macro-influences, as well 
as voluntaristic and deterministic aspects of human behaviour; in other words, by focusing on 
the ‘daily experiences and moral problems of real people in their everyday life’ (Tronto, 
1993: 79). 
2.4.2 Opportunities for further developments of the Bourdieusian 
approach to CSR 
In this paper we have described the key building blocks of a Bourdieusian approach to CSR. 
For the full potential of this novel approach to be unleashed, further research is necessary. In 
the following we will highlight three aspects in particular: (1) the relations between different 
fields, (2) pluralism and divergence in organizational fields and (3) the relations between 
different (pro-social and other) practices. 
First, in our description of the Bourdieusian approach to CSR we have focused particularly on 
the structures and dynamics within an individual field. The field was thereby portrayed as 
largely autonomous; i.e. as a relatively independent universe, characterized by unique stakes 
and distinctive dynamics. Nevertheless, as Bourdieu (1990) stressed, different fields might 
possess different degrees of autonomy. Some fields might be self-determined while others 
might be significantly influenced by other related fields. In view of that, future research might 
explore how the capital acquisition of actors in one organizational field might influence their 
position (i.e. their stakes and acquisition of capital) and thus their practices in another field. 
Similarly, it would be worth exploring how an actor’s practices in an organizational field are 
affected by that actor’s habitus when that is shaped by the structure, and especially the illusio, 
of other fields. Exploring these potential influences across field boundaries could provide 
additional insights into the mechanisms through which attitudes towards pro-social practices 
may change. This would allow us to capture the effects that, for example, social movements 
(Crossley, 2003) or political manoeuvres (Bourdieu, 1998) in adjacent fields might have on 
pro-social behaviour in a particular organizational field. Examples of key questions in this 
line of inquiry are: how do changes in related fields influence the power structures in a given 






organizational field undertake pro-social initiatives? Also, which factors determine whether 
and to what extent external changes affect the organizational field?  
Second, we based our Bourdieusian approach to CSR on the assumption that all practices 
within a particular field are subject to the same illusio. This suggests that in each 
organizational field there is only one mode of evaluating pro-social behaviours. However, in 
the era of globalization and with the prevalence of multinational corporations operating in 
pluralistic contexts (Scherer et al., forthcoming), the assumption of a single and consistent 
illusio that guides the evaluations of pro-social practices becomes somewhat problematic. For 
that reason, future research needs to explore the potential co-existence of several illusiones 
within the same field, as a result of which pro-social practices might be evaluated differently 
– for instance, while some dominant actors might regard particular pro-social practices as 
legitimate, other dominant actors might take a different view. Examples of key questions in 
this line of inquiry are: how can we conceptualize the co-existence of different illusiones 
within the same field? How do different illusiones relate to each other and how do they affect 
the structures of power? How do multiple illusiones affect the legitimacy and development of 
different pro-social practices? Finally, how does the co-existence of different illusiones affect 
the likelihood of false, rather than true, representations of pro-social practices? 
A third area that needs to be explored further is the way in which different (pro-social and 
other) practices relate to each other. As is fairly self-evident, an organizational practice is not 
enacted in isolation but in the context of other practices. Exploring the potential relations 
between different practices might provide important insights into the likelihood that particular 
pro-social practices may be adopted. We could distinguish crudely between neutral, 
complementary and conflicting relations between practices. For instance, practices that 
enhance the transparency of the organization with the aim of fighting corruption and practices 
that are aimed at defending the privacy of corporate members are likely to conflict. Similarly, 
auditing and inspection practices might undermine the practice of false representation that 
corporations may employ in relation to CSR. Examples of complementary practices are ISO 
standards for CSR. Typically there is an overlap between the various requirements for 
certification, so adopting several standards is easier for companies than adopting a single 
standard (see e.g., Corbett and Kirsch, 2001). Examples of key questions in this line of 
inquiry are: what types of relations can be distinguished between different practices? How 
does illusio affect the way in which different practices interrelate? How does the way in 






may be adopted? Also, how does the way in which practices interrelate affect the extent to 
which organizations misrepresent their pro-social behaviour? 
2.5 Conclusion 
We started this article by asking why corporate actors engage in pro-social behaviour and 
suggesting that Bourdieu’s theory of social practice is particularly well suited to exploring 
this question because it allows researchers to examine the interplay between the economic and 
non-economic motivations that underlie such behaviour. Our Bourdieusian approach 
conceptualizes pro-social behaviour as the transformation of economic capital into other 
forms of capital. Whether this transformation is likely to occur or not depends on which forms 
of capital are of value in a given field. In turn, the value of capital rests on its social 
recognition by dominant actors. Bourdieu understood social life as an ongoing struggle for 
power; in that respect, pro-social behaviour may function as a weapon or stake if it increases 
the corporate actors’ capital. Thus, overall, our Bourdieusian perspective contributes to a 
novel understanding of economic and non-economic explanations of pro-social behaviour.  
Furthermore, our Bourdieusian approach shifts the attention to two broader issues: first, in 
order to grasp the link between broader societal structures and habitually shaped perceptions, 
it suggests that pro-social behaviour should be seen as a form of social practice. In this sense, 
pro-social behaviour is neither deterministically prescribed by the organizational context nor 
is it free and autonomous; it is an artful interpretation of that context (Tsoukas and Chia, 
2002). This highlights the hardly discussed aspect of consciousness and of the ability of 
individuals to reflect on their pro-social behaviour. Second, our approach is in line with recent 
calls for examining CSR on multiple levels (Heugens and Scherer, 2010; Orlitzky et al., 
2011): focusing on a single level of analysis is not an adequate way of achieving a more 
realistic account of what drives CSR behaviour. Using Bourdieu’s theory as a conceptual 
framework inevitably broadens the scope of research to include the interplay between 
individual actors and organizational fields in the context of CSR. As Whittington (2011: 185) 
recently pointed out, ‘practice–theoretic research can never be purely “micro” or “macro”; the 
other is always present’. 
Although the Bourdieusian approach developed in this paper provides new insights into pro-
social behaviour, it is not meant to substitute other theoretical perspectives on this topic. Like 






assuming that the pursuit of capital can explain all pro-social behaviour, it possibly tends to 
overemphasize the role of power in human action. It should also be noted that this is certainly 
not the only way to apply Bourdieu’s theory to CSR as there are many different readings of 
his work (King, 2000; Schatzki, 1987). At the same time, we believe that, by shedding new 
light on the drivers of pro-social bahviour and thus triggering a host of exciting new questions 
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3 Does practice-based research on strategy lead to 
practically relevant knowledge?                      
Implications of a Bourdieusian perspective 




It has often been argued by scholars adopting a practice approach that by focusing on “what 
people do in relation to strategy” their research would be particularly relevant to practitioners. 
In response to this assumption, this paper draws on a Bourdieusian perspective to argue that 
most practice-based strategy scholars are unaware of their inevitably “scholastic view” which 
is the cause for the gap between strategy research and praxis. This unawareness leads to two 
related fallacies: epistemic doxa and scholastic ethnocentrism. In order to avoid these 
fallacies, strategy researchers need to develop a particular kind of reflexivity by engaging in 
what is known as “participant objectivation”. This enables the researcher to generate rigorous 
research that is conceptually relevant to practitioners – without dissolving the necessary 
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Over the last two decades, strategy researchers have increasingly voiced concern about the 
irrelevance of strategy research to management praxis (e.g. Bettis, 1991; Hafsi & Thomas, 
2005; Løwendahl & Revang, 1998; Lyles 1995). This is a particularly serious concern to most 
strategy scholars since strategy research – more so than many other areas of organization 
studies – has always put particular emphasis on its status as an “applied science”. In that 
respect, it can be argued that the “legitimacy” of strategy research also depends on its ability 
to demonstrate its practical relevance (Bower, 1982; Gopinath & Hoffman, 1995; Lyles, 
1995). One interesting response to this criticism has been the development of a practice-based 
approach to strategy that has been variously labelled “activity-based view”, “micro-strategy”, 
“strategizing perspective” or “strategy as practice” (Golsorki et al., 2010; Jarzabkowski et al., 
2007; Johnson et al., 2003, 2007). While the emergence of this new approach to strategy 
certainly cannot be attributed exclusively to the general concerns about the practical relevance 
of research, such concerns are a central issue in most discussions about this approach. For 
instance, in the seminal special issue on the practice-based approach to strategy, Johnson and 
his colleagues state that the pressure to generate knowledge that is relevant to praxis is a 
“strong instrumental reason for the importance of a more micro activity based view of 
strategy” (Johnson et al., 2003, p. 5). This claim has been iterated in various publications on 
the practice-based approach to strategy (e.g. Golsorkhi et al., 2010; Jarzabkowski & 
Whittington, 2008; Johnson et al., 2007; Whittington et al., 2003). 
The concept of strategy as something that managers do, rather than as something that firms 
have, is central to the practice-based approach to strategy (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Johnson 
et al., 2003, 2007). As such, practice-based research in strategy is concerned with the daily 
activities of strategy practitioners and the way these relate to strategic outcomes (Johnson et 
al., 2003). In this sense, the practice-based approach constitutes an attempt to get close to 
practitioners and their activities in order to gain a deeper understanding of what actually 
happens when people engage in practices such as strategic planning, strategy workshops, 
strategy reviews etc. (Whittington, 1996). 
According to the practice-based approach, it is this closeness to the strategy practitioner and 
his or her practices that holds the key to increasing the practical relevance of strategy 
research. As Orlikowski writes, practice-based research seeks to “bridge the gap” between 





organizational life on the ground” (Orlikowski, 2010, p. 24). In the same context, Whittington 
remarks: “It is hard to believe that rigorous research into what people ‘really do in strategy’ 
does not have the potential for considerable practical value” (Johnson et al., 2007, p. 220). 
Yet, despite the explicit concern for practical relevance, there are hardly any systematic 
epistemological reflections on the conditions and possibilities of generating practically 
relevant knowledge through this approach in the practice-based literature (with the notable 
exception of a small study by Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2006). Thus, it is unclear to what 
extent and under what conditions practice-based research would prove relevant to 
practitioners. 
This paper is a response to the perceived gap in the practice-based literature on strategy. In 
particular, it addresses the following research question: to what extent is the claim about the 
particular practical relevance of practice-based strategy research justified? In the course of 
answering this question we will discuss the epistemological presuppositions and preconditions 
of the claim that practice-based strategy research is relevant to management praxis. For this 
purpose, we will draw on the theory of Pierre Bourdieu, which will provide us with an 
epistemological framework for analyzing the relation between strategy research and praxis.  
Bourdieu’s theory of social practices – in particular his concepts of “skholè” (Bourdieu, 
1988), “social fields” (Bourdieu, 1990a) and “participant objectivation” (Bourdieu, 2003) – 
lends itself particularly well to our analysis for two reasons: firstly, Bourdieu himself applied 
his practice theory to the field of social science (Bourdieu, 1988) and its relation to other 
areas of human activity (e.g. Bourdieu 1996a, 1996b, 2005); secondly, practice-based 
research (e.g. Chia & MacKay, 2007; Gomez, 2010; Jarzabkowski, 2004) has already drawn 
extensively on the works of Bourdieu (who ranks as one of the main practice theorists 
together with Giddens, deCerteau and Foucault). Nevertheless, so far the epistemological 
implications of Bourdieu’s theory for the relation between strategy research and strategy 
praxis have not been systematically explored. 
Based on Bourdieu’s theory it can be argued that the gap between strategy research and 
management praxis cannot be resolved just by focussing on the activities of practitioners. In 
addition to such a focus, practice-based studies need to take into account their inevitably 
“scholastic view” (Bourdieu, 1975, 2001) – i.e. a particular point of view resulting from the 
researcher’s detached position towards the object of research. If that is not the case, practice-
based studies will produce knowledge that might neither be practically relevant nor contribute 





form of reflexivity, which Bourdieu referred to as “participant objectivation”, are researchers 
able to produce valid scientific knowledge about strategy praxis which may also prove 
relevant to strategy practitioners. From a Bourdieusian point of view, relevance to 
practitioners can thus only be achieved through a particular form of rigor. 
The remainder of this paper is structured into six sections. After this introduction, we first 
position our own paper within the different streams of argumentation in the debate on the 
possibilities and limitations of generating practically relevant knowledge in organization 
studies. In the second section we introduce Bourdieu’s practice theory as the theoretical 
framework that will underpin our analysis of the relation between strategy science and praxis. 
It will be shown that strategy research and strategy praxis can be conceptualized as two 
different social fields which are characterized by different structures. In the third section we 
discuss two typical fallacies which often result from the differentiation between the field of 
science and management praxis. In the fourth section we propose Bourdieu’s concept of 
reflexivity through “participant objectivation” as a way of avoiding these two fallacies. In the 
fifth section we discuss the possibility of conducting management research so that it has 
practical relevance despite the differences between the fields of strategy research and praxis. 
We conclude with reflections on the contributions of this study. 
3.2 Review of the literature on practical relevance 
The academic debate about the possibilities and limitations of producing practically relevant 
knowledge in management science has generated a large body of literature (the so-called 
“relevance literature”), in which we can discern three streams based on different 
conceptualizations of knowledge: a technical-linear approach, a systemic-discursive approach 
and a practice-theory approach. 
Authors who follow what can be termed the technical-linear approach (Rasche & Behnam, 
2009; Jarzabkowski et al., 2010) have a comparatively simple concept of knowledge. 
Knowledge is conceptualized as an abstract, objective representation of the external reality, 
which can be transferred directly from one context to another (Nicolai, 2004). Management 
scholars are perceived to be in a superior position to generate valid knowledge about 
management praxis, due to their specialization in research. The empirical fact that scientific 
knowledge is hardly taken notice of by managers is explained by ‘technical’ problems, which 
– in principle – can all be solved. These problems have to do with either the production of 





who focus on the knowledge transfer argue that research results need to be better 
communicated to practitioners, with relation to both the availability of scientific knowledge 
and the language in which it is encoded. Authors who take this view have made suggestions 
as to how scientific results should be presented in practice-oriented journals and 
recommendations to fellow authors, which include presenting more informative 
“implications” sections in research papers, changing their writing style or using researchers as 
translators (Baldrige et al., 2004; Mintzberg, 2004; Barley et al., 1988; Buckley et al., 1998; 
Cohen, 2007; Hambrick, 2005; Mohrman et al., 2001; Reynes et al., 2007; Starkey & Madan, 
2001). It is typically assumed by these authors that ‘knowledge produced by academics is 
relevant and valid but not perceived as such by practitioners’ (Rasche/Behnam 2009: 245).  
Those authors in the group who focus on the problems of knowledge-production argue that 
researchers either address the wrong problems or address them in a wrong way: researchers 
typically derive their research problems from critical discussions of the works of other 
researchers rather than from the concerns of practitioners (Bettis, 1991; Rynes et al., 1999). In 
order to ensure that research is focused on the practical concerns of managers, some scholars 
have called for reforms in business schools aimed at creating incentives for practitioner-
oriented research (Huff & Huff, 2001). Others have propagated various forms of collaborative 
research designs (such as “Engaged Scholarship” or “Mode 2”), in which researchers 
collaborate with practitioners in order to define and work on research problems (Gibbons et 
al., 1994; MacIntosh & MacLean, 2008; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). Even though the 
authors in this stream of literature for the most part do not discuss their concept of knowledge 
explicitly, a closer analysis clearly reveals that they assume a linear model of knowledge 
exchange (Kieser & Leiner, 2009). Consequently, they do not perceive any conflict between 
the pursuit of scientific rigor and practical relevance. Overall, they lack an “understanding of 
the entire complexity of the problem of relevance” (Rasche & Behnam, 2009, p. 245). 
In contrast to the technical-linear approach, the so-called systemic-discursive approach (Seidl, 
2007) emphasizes the dependence of knowledge on context. Drawing on the works of authors 
such as Luhmann or Lyotard, scholars in this stream of research argue that the lack of transfer 
of knowledge from management science to management praxis is the inevitable result of the 
differentiation between these as two communication systems, each functioning according to 
its own logic: the logic inherent in knowledge that is generated within science is different 
from that which underlies knowledge generated within management praxis (Astley & 





knowledge is seen as incommensurate with practical knowledge (Astley & Zammuto, 1992): 
management science cannot produce knowledge that is relevant to management praxis. In 
order to produce practically relevant knowledge researchers would have to adjust to the logic 
of management praxis: however, if they did so, their research would no longer be regarded as 
science (Kieser & Leiner, 2009; Rasche & Behnam, 2009; Seidl, 2007). From the system-
discursive perspective, the practical irrelevance of management science is not a problem to be 
resolved. On the contrary, only because of the differentiation between management science 
and praxis, and, thus, the impossibility of any direct transfer of knowledge, can science 
progress. Accordingly, there is a clear trade-off between scientific rigor and practical 
relevance (Nicolai, 2004). This is not to say that authors of this stream of literature dismiss 
the idea that scientific results might have an effect on management praxis, but maintain that 
such effects are based on a “misunderstanding”, even though these misunderstandings might 
be productive to some degree (Seidl, 2009). 
Over the last few years, a small stream of literature has emerged, which propagates a practice-
theory perspective on the issue of practical relevance. The authors (Golsorkhi et al., 2009; 
Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; Jarzabkowski et al., 2010; Sandberg & Tsoukas, forthcoming) 
draw particularly on practice theorists such as Heidegger, Bourdieu and Schatzki. Similarly to 
the systemic-discursive approach, the practice-theory approach treats management science 
and management praxis as different social spheres, which exhibit different structures 
associated with different types of knowledge. Yet, in contrast to the systemic-discursive 
approach, the spheres of the academics and practitioners are not treated as “operatively 
closed” systems (Kieser & Leiner 2009; Seidl 2007; 2009) but as permeable fields. In the 
former approach, scientific operations belong to the scientific system because they function 
according to the logic of this system and as such are part of this system (otherwise they would 
not constitute scientific operations). In the latter approach, scientific practices function 
according to the “logic of practice” which is the same for all social fields. Hence, both 
strategy science and strategy praxis share the same underlying logic but they differ in the 
particular structures according to which the respective practices are shaped. 
 
While the systemic-discursive approach is primarily focused on the macro-level of analysis, 
examining primarily the relation between the different systems, the practice-theory approach 
also emphasizes the importance of the micro-level of the individual actors and their practices 





merely treated as a reflection of the macro-logic or structures of the scientific system but are 
also understood as result of the specific intentions and abilities of the individual researchers 
within the field. Accordingly, scientific strategy knowledge does not reside in the scientific 
system as such, as the systemic-discursive approach would have it, but it is conceptualized as 
“part of the [particular] social practices in which strategic actors participate in order to 
communicate and construct meaning about strategy” (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006, p. 360).  
Because it recognizes agency, the practice-theory approach also explicitly acknowledges that 
researchers can actively reflect on, and take into account in their research, the different social 
conditions of management science and management praxis (Golsorkhi et al., 2009). However, 
the particular form this reflection should take and how it impacts on the kind of knowledge 
generated have not been properly explored so far. In this sense, the publications representing 
this stream of literature are more of a programmatic nature than providing a developed 
perspective. 
Overall, the practice-theory approach offers a fruitful yet largely unexplored theoretical 
perspective on the relevance problem. It transcends the somewhat simple view of the 
technical-linear approach and also goes beyond the mere acknowledgment of the necessary 
difference between theoretical and practical knowledge espoused by the systemic-discursive 
view. 
3.3 The social field of science and the scholastic view 
Like all practice theorists, Bourdieu puts social practices, i.e. the socially shaped activities of 
actors, at the center of social analysis. Social practices, performed by individual actors, are 
influenced not only by the actors’ individual dispositions (such as origin, education and 
identity) but also by supra-individual objective structures (such as socially defined interests, 
beliefs, assumptions and resources). Objective structures are not uniform but vary between 
different social spheres. Bourdieu in this sense speaks of different “social fields” such as 
politics, economy and academia (Bourdieu, 2002). Depending on the particular social field in 
which actors carry out their activities, they are faced with different structural possibilities and 
constraints: they are guided by different field-specific interests, beliefs and assumptions, and 
have at their disposal particular sets of resources (Bourdieu, 1984, 1996a; Golsorkhi et al., 
2009; Nahapiet & Goshal, 1998; Swartz, 2008). Consequently, moving from one field to 






Against this background, we can conceptualize management science (and strategy research in 
particular) and management praxis as different social fields characterized by different 
objective structures (Bourdieu 1990a; Bouty & Gomez, 2007; Golsorkhi et al., 2010). 
Although some objective structures may cut across the two fields (e.g. education as an area of 
interest and as a resource), most structures are specific to the particular field. For example, in 
the field of academia actors are guided by particular interests, e.g. publications in academic 
journals, while in the field of management praxis they are guided by managerial interests, 
such as increasing sales figures. The two fields also possess different resources, for which the 
actors in each field compete. The main resource in the academic field is scientific authority:  
‘Scientific authority [is] defined inseparably as technical capacity and social 
power, or, to put it another way, the monopoly of scientific competence, in the 
sense of a particular agent’s socially recognised capacity to speak and act 
legitimately [...] in scientific matters.’ (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 19) 
 
All scientific practices – for example the practice of publishing – are directed towards the 
acquisition of scientific authority (Bourdieu, 1975; Kieser & Leiner, 2009). As Jarzabkowski 
and colleagues (2010, p. 8) put it: “Academics are also practitioners – of scholarly pursuit. 
Their practices [...] reflect their interests and occur within an institutional setting that they 
shape and from which they derive meaning.” In this sense, the practices of academics (e.g. the 
production of scientific knowledge) are guided by different interests and resources from those 
that guide practices in other fields.  
The field-specific interests and resources are related to the actors’ assumptions of what is of 
value in the respective field (Sandberg & Tsoukas, forthcoming). Bourdieu terms the interests 
and resources considered to be of shared value as the “illusio” of that particular field, i.e. the 
tacit recognition of the unconsciously shared valuations of interests, resources and beliefs 
(Bourdieu, 2001). 
In the field of science, for example, the unconsciously shared understanding guides scholars – 
as members of the academic field – in their judgment of what is considered scientifically 
relevant. Scholars of one field, share an understanding which makes the practices of other 
members meaningful and deemed appropriate (Bourdieu, 2001; Golsorkhi et al., 2009). The 
resources that produce scientific knowledge are thus not abstract, but resources-in-practice 
embodied and enacted by a scholar’s practices (Chia, 2004; Chia & MacKay, 2007; Cook & 





field of managerial praxis all practices receive their specific meanings and intelligibility from 
being enacted in that particular field (Chia & Holt, 2006; Orlikowski 1997).  
Another central aspect of the field structure is “doxa” (Bourdieu, 1998b). Doxa describes the 
axiomatic assumptions that field-members share about their reality. Field-specific 
assumptions are perceived as self-evident and are not questioned as such (Bourdieu, 1998b, 
2004). In this sense, doxa determines the field-specific understanding of reality. Doxa 
therefore guides the members’ interpretations of the world by excluding any practice that 
would “go against the taken-for-granted assumptions” (Golsorkhi et al., 2009, p. 785). Like 
all others, the academic field possesses a particular doxa, because of which the structure of 
scholars’ practices and the conditions in the academic field are perceived as natural. As a 
consequence, the practices of scholars are only considered appropriate to the field of science 
if they conform to the field-specific structure. Similarly, while research that complies with the 
structure of the field of management science is likely to be recognized by members of that 
field as important and interesting, it is unlikely to be recognized as such by members of other 
fields – such as managers – because their practices do not comply with the structure of 
management science. This implies that research focusing on practical relevance rather than 
academic relevance addresses actors “outside the field [and therefore] cannot fail to incur 
discredit” (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 23). 
The particular structure of the academic field gives rise to a particular condition that Bourdieu 
terms “skholè” which he defines as the “time liberated from practical occupations and 
preoccupations of the world [which makes] a relation to the world possible that is liberated 
from practical urgencies” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 10). Thus, in contrast to actors in other fields, 
particularly in the field of management praxis, academics engaged in management research 
are freed from time pressure and pressure to act. According to Bourdieu (1988), it is this 
particular condition that allows researchers in general to conduct their studies, so, in a sense, 
it is skholè that makes science possible at all.  
In the context of management science and management praxis this particular condition also 
leads to a specific way of observing the world, which differs significantly from that of actors 
in other fields (Chia & MacKay, 2007). Bourdieu refers to this mode of observation as the 
“scholastic view” (Bourdieu, 1975, 2001), which applies to all knowledge produced in the 






‘Instead of grasping and mobilizing the meaning of a word that is immediately 
compatible with the situation, we mobilize and examine all the possible meanings 
of that word, outside of any reference to the situation. [...] The scholastic view is a 
very peculiar point of view on the social world, on language, on any possible 
object of thought.’ (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 127) 
 
To give an example, the term “strategy” is used in strategy research in a very particular way, 
which differs considerably from the way it is used by practitioners in strategy praxis (Grand et 
al., 2010; Paroutis & Heracleous, 2010). 
The scholastic view implies a distance between strategy research and strategy praxis. 
Bourdieu and Wacquant talk about “an abstraction of the world to think about the world” 
(1992, p. 78); in other words, about a social distance which originates in the difference 
between the social conditions of the academic field and those of praxis. Thus, the knowledge 
generated by scientists is mostly disconnected from the “meaningful totality into which 
practitioners are immersed, [its] situational uniqueness that is characteristic of the tasks 
practitioners do [and] from time as experienced by practitioners” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
forthcoming, p. 10). Scientific knowledge tends to be directed at universality and 
timelessness, which erases many conditions that are necessary to practical enactment 
(Golsorkhi et al., 2009; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011). As Augier and March assert: 
‘Knowledge derived from practical experience tends to emphasize immediacy and 
applicability in a specific context. It is ordinarily more focused in time and space 
than is academic scholarship. Conversely, the academic perspective tends to 
emphasize the timelessness and generality of its relevance.’ (Augier & March, 
2007, p. 130) 
 
In that sense, the generation of knowledge by academics often entails the neutralization of 
practical urgencies – such as the ability to identify problems for the sole pleasure of resolving 
them and not because they are posed by the necessities of life (Bourdieu, 2001; Brown & 
Duguid, 1991; Cascio & Aguinis, 2008). 
Against this background, the lack of practical relevance of large parts of strategy research can 
be seen to a great extent as a result of the scholastic distance of researchers from management 
praxis. At the same time, however, the field of management praxis can only be analyzed from 
a position outside itself. The scholastic abstraction is necessary to reveal the objective 
structures underlying managers’ practices. Ironically, the scholastic view, on the one hand, 
enables scientific knowledge and on the other hand, because of its distance to praxis, is 
inverse to praxis (Bourdieu, 1975, 1990b). The difference between management research (and 





observer and the observed – lies in the relationship between knowing and doing and between 
the objective structures and conditions of the two fields. At the same time, the difference 
between management science and management praxis is the sine qua non condition for the 
existence of the academic field. By examining managerial praxis from a scholastic point of 
view, practice-based research is necessarily detached from “what people do in relation to 
strategy” and thus from the practical logic of strategists. Ignoring the scholastic distance 
between researcher and strategy practitioner inevitably results in so-called scholastic fallacies, 
which we will discuss in the next section. 
3.4 The fallacies of epistemic doxa and scholastic enthnocentrism 
The implications of the scholastic view for the generation of knowledge have always been of 
central concern to Bourdieu (2004; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). As a consequence of not 
taking into consideration its distance from praxis, research tends to be both directed solely at 
other researchers and disconnected from practitioners and their concerns.  
The scholastic view tends to result in research that falls prey to two interrelated fallacies – 
epistemic doxa and scholastic ethnocentrism. The fallacy of epistemic doxa consists in the 
researchers’ unawareness of their scholastic view, whereas scholastic ethnocentrism is the 
projection of the scholastic view into the object of research. 
Bourdieu argues that most researchers are unaware of their scholastic view and their 
corresponding abstractions from “praxis” due to their doxa (Bourdieu, 2004; Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). The typical modes of academic interpretation and understanding of the 
world are taken-for-granted and not questioned (Bouty & Gomez, 2007; Golsorkhi et al., 
2009). Academics, it is argued, are inevitably “placed outside of the object [of their study 
and] observe it from afar and from above” (Wacquant, 1989, p. 37). The fallacy of epistemic 
doxa (Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 215) refers to the academics’ unawareness of the effect that this has 
on their studies. As Bourdieu says, scholars tend to display their doxa as they overlook the 
social presuppositions inscribed in the scholastic point of view (Bourdieu, 1990b,1998a; 
Golsorkhi et al., 2009); that is, when they fail to question the assumptions of their thoughts 
and thus the social conditions of the possibility of the scholastic point of view. 
Several practice-based studies have shown that practices are always embedded in contexts 
whose meaning is constituted by people, their actions and interrelated objects (Gherardi, 





action is important (Buchanan, 1999; Orr, 1996). Nevertheless, many of those who assume 
that their deep engagement with “what people do in relation to strategy” results in an 
improvement of strategizing praxis (Langley, 2010) leave their own presuppositions and 
assumptions unquestioned, and, consequently, become subjected to epistemic doxa. As long 
as the conditions of the scholastic view are not identified, it is impossible to capture the 
strategist’s logic of practice. Therefore, if researchers are genuinely concerned with 
identifying the social practices of strategists, they ought to reflect explicitly on their own 
conditions of conducting their studies (In the next section we will show some examples of 
practice-based studies that display such a level of reflexion.) For Bourdieu, the logic of 
strategists’ practices can only be understood through the researchers’ awareness of their own 
cognitive constructions related to doxa. As Bourdieu explains:  
‘The logic in which I reason is [...] that of epistemological questioning. This is a 
fundamental epistemological question since it bears on the epistemic posture 
itself, on the presuppositions inscribed in the fact of thinking the world, of retiring 
from the world and from action in the world in order to think that action.’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 129). 
 
In other words, according to Bourdieu, practice-based researchers who do not reflect on their 
scientific logic and the social conditions that make their research possible cannot gain an 
understanding of the logic of the practice they are studying. As a result, it is unlikely that 
practitioners will be able to make much sense of the respective research results. 
The abstraction from praxis is likely to result also in a second, related, scholastic fallacy, 
namely scholastic ethnocentrism (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 50). This occurs when researchers fail to 
analyze the scholastic point of view that they adopt towards their objects, i.e. the gap between 
their own social conditions and those which underlie the practices they study (Bourdieu, 
2004; Wacquant, 1989). Practice-based research on strategy is confronted with the difference 
between two socially constructed modes of comprehension of the world (Augier & March, 
2007; Bourdieu, 1998a; Weick, 1999): the scholastic one, which researchers, due to their 
doxa, tacitly set up as the norm that underlies their practices, and the practical one, which a 
researcher has “in common with men and women seemingly very distant from him in time 
and social space, and in which he cannot recognise the practical mode of knowledge [...] 
which is also his own in the most ordinary acts and experiences of ordinary existence” 
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 51). Scholastic ethnocentrism leads researchers to ignore the practical 





manner (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006) – that the observed practices are liable to the 
scholastic – in contrast to the practical – mode of knowledge.  
Practice-based researchers therefore risk attributing to their objects of research social aspects 
which are, in fact, just a result of their particular way of observing them (Golsorkhi et al., 
2009). This also applies to practice-based strategy research, which brings strategy down to the 
level of the activities of human beings interacting in observable situations (Chia & MacKay, 
2007; Langley, 2010; Whittington, 2006). Many researchers inadvertently project their own 
scholastic thinking into the heads of strategists assuming that strategists think in the same 
scholastic way as they do (Bourdieu, 1998a). As a result, researchers run the risk of regarding 
the scientific concepts through which they explain the activities of practitioners as the actual 
cause of these activities (Scherer, 2003). 
Unreflective practice-based research will just reproduce a scholastic view of practitioners. 
When practice-based research falls prey to the fallacies of epistemic doxa and scholastic 
ethnocentrism, its results are neither of relevance to practitioners nor do they constitute 
rigorous scientific knowledge. 
3.5 Participant objectivation as a means of avoiding scholastic fallacies 
Bourdieu argued that it is possible to avoid the fallacies resulting from the scholastic view by 
engaging in what he calls “participant objectivation” (Bourdieu, 1978, 1990c, 2003). 
Participant objectivation is a means of objectivizing the researcher’s subjective relation to his 
or her object of research and thus of conducting research that is grounded in the logic of 
practice. It incorporates the scholastic point of view in social analysis in order “to render 
explicit what is taken for granted” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 68). 
Participant objectivation goes beyond simple self-reference or self-consciousness; it is also 
clearly opposed to “narcissistic” reflexivity, which redirects the analytical gaze back onto the 
private person of the analyst (Bourdieu, 2002). 
‘This is to say, in passing, that the kind of [reflexivity] that I advocate has little in 
common with this kind of complacent and intimist return upon the private person 
of the sociologist or [...] with this self-fascinated, and a bit complacent, 
observation of the observer’s writings which has recently become something of a 
fad among […] anthropologists […] who, having become blasé with fieldwork, 
turn to talking about themselves rather than about their object of research.’ 






Moreover, participant objectivation is not about participating in the fields of praxis or merely 
reflecting on one’s fieldwork - if that were the case, it would result in relativism. Such 
reflections allow one to say ‘after all, this is only the opinion of a so-and-so, of the daughter 
of a teacher, etc.’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 203). Instead, since practices result from 
social conditioning, the kind of reflexivity that Bourdieu describes is aimed at acknowledging 
how the distance from and abstraction of the observed praxis influences the way scholars 
think (Cicourel, 1993; Jarzabkowski et al., 2010). To do this, practice-based academics have 
to observe the everyday practices of strategists 
‘with a scientific thought that is aware of itself and its limits to be capable of 
thinking practice without destroying its object. It is thus to understand what kind 
of understanding the scholastic thought has of this practical understanding and the 
difference between practical and scientific knowledge.’ (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 50) 
 
For Bourdieu research is only truly reflexive to the extent that scholars engage in participant 
objectivation: they need to understand, firstly, the social conditions of their own activities as 
social scientists (Bourdieu, 1990a; Lewandowski, 2000) and, secondly, the practical 
conditions of the social practices they study (Bourdieu, 1998a, 2001). In other words, they 
need to adapt the distinction between the scholastic and the practical modes of knowledge to 
research. In this sense participant objectivation consists of a “[...] process of objectivation of 
the subject of objectivation” (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 67) 
The process of objectivation is an analysis of both the object of research and the role of the 
researcher (Everett, 2002). In order to objectify the object of research, practice-based 
academics need to objectify their subjective relation to this object (Bourdieu, 1988). This 
means that researchers need to analyze their own relation to the object of research and reveal 
the social conditions that act as scholastic boundaries within which knowledge becomes 
possible. To overcome the scholastic distance and thus the inherent scholastic fallacies, the 
“objectivizing distance must be objectivized, theorized within the limits of knowledge itself” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 41). This requires that the researcher resists taking up the 
absolute point of view towards the object of study that is inherent in the scholastic point of 
view (Bourdieu, 1978, 2003; Byrne, 2005; Golsorkhi et al., 2009; Scherer, 2003). 
The researcher’s subjective relation to the object of research must undergo the same critical 
analysis as the object of research itself. This objectivation of the subjective relation to the 
object consists on the one hand of the analysis of the objective structures of the scientific field 





constitutive and correspondent) aspects determine the researcher’s subjective relation to the 
object of research (Wacquant, 2006). The researcher’s individual dispositions manifest 
themselves in personal identity and origins (gender, nationality, ethnicity, education, etc.), 
which affect a researcher’s individual “conceptions of social good and preferred ways of 
living” (Deetz, 1996, p. 204). The objective structures, in turn, concern the particular 
conditions, the illusio and doxa of the academic field; in particular, that is  
‘its national traditions and peculiarities, its habits of thought, its mandatory 
problematics, its shared beliefs and commonplaces, its rituals, values, and 
consecrations, its constraints in matters of publication of findings, its specific 
censorships, [...] and all the unconscious presuppositions built into the categories 
of scholarly understanding’. (Bourdieu, 2003, p. 283). 
 
In the field of strategy, this objectivation is the effort of creating an awareness of one’s own 
scientific relation to “what strategists do” and the decisive choices (of topic, method, theory 
etc.) that this relation entails. This means that the personal choice on how to analyze “what 
strategists do” and the theoretical and methodological orientations of this analysis are 
determined by the researchers’ social dispositions, in which the structures of the academic 
field express themselves in a transfigured form (Bourdieu, 2003). In other words, the 
structures of the academic field – including illusio and doxa – orientate the scientific choices 
within such an analysis. This is why Bourdieu calls for a critical dissection of the concepts, 
methods and problems the researcher inherits, which for him constitutes a central aspect of 
real scientific rigor (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Everett, 2002). 
In methodological terms, participant objectivation means that the construction of the object, 
as well as its subjective relation, requires “methodological polytheism” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992) – i.e. the confrontation of one’s research results with results obtained 
through different methods (Wacquant, 2006). In addition, it requires epistemic attention to all 
operations of research, including the theoretical framework that stipulates a relation between 
theory and method (Wacquant, 2006).  
Good examples of this proposed methodological stance include the practice-based study by 
Oakes et al. (1998) on organizational control and change, and that by Everett and Jamal 
(2001) on inter-organizational collaboration: They obtained their research results on the basis 
of different methods (methodological polytheism) such as document analysis, interviews and 
organizational observation. This was accompanied by explicit reflections on the prerequisites 
and conditions of conducting the particular research and enabled them to break with the idea 





her colleagues, the reflections allowed them to see business planning as a pedagogic practice 
and as a complex process involving activities which undermined the practitioners’ authority, 
in contrast to the common assumption that business planning is a neutral management 
technique or a coercive tool of control. 
In contrast to these two studies, many other practice-based works on strategy (e.g. Chia & 
Holt, 2009; Gomez, 2010; Johnson, Balogun & Beech, 2010; Whittington, 2003; 
Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006) are reflexive merely in terms of examining their research 
practices without paying attention to the underlying objective structures and individual 
dispositions. In other words, such works do not acknowledge the logic of practice that 
governs their own research practices, a process necessary for the genuinely reflexive stance 
described above (Grand et al. 2008; Jarzabkowski et al., 2010; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 
forthcoming). Only when practice-based strategy scholars are aware of the limitations 
inherent in the scholastic point of view, can they realize the limits that underlie their mode of 
knowledge. As Rasche and Chia note: 
‘The manner in which academically articulated accounts of strategy practice tend 
to create a schism between such accounts and the very practices they purport to 
explain is one of the most intractable problems of the research process. Such a 
schism can only be addressed and rectified through a careful examination of the 
dominant research dispositions and the nature and limitations of the resultant 
explanatory outcomes involved.’ (Rasche & Chia, 2009, p. 3) 
 
Thus, although many practice-based studies on strategy reflect on the scholastic stance, most 
of them still fall prey to the scholastic fallacies, because they do not engage in participant 
objectivation. In this sense, participant objectivation is the reflective scientific study of both 
“what strategists do” and the relation of researchers to strategists’ practices. Only if practice-
based researchers reflect on the practical logic of their own social practices as scholars they 
are able to grasp the logic of practice and overcome the scholastic fallacies. This is possible 
only to the extent that they objectify their relation to strategists. At the same time, however, 
scholars who objectify their relation to their research object in this way should not fall “[...] 
into a form of scholastic illusion of the omnipotence of thought if one were to believe it 
possible to take an absolute point of view of one’s own point of view” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 
119). Participant objectivation shows that individual and structural conditions – methodically 
controlled – constitute analytic resources and epistemic benefits (Bourdieu, 1990c, 2003) 
because they enable the researcher to construct scientific objects into which the relation of the 
researcher to the object – and thus the doxa and illusio – is not unconsciously projected 





scientific knowledge by including the distance between the practical and scholastic modes of 
knowledge in the scientific analysis. However, as Bourdieu emphasizes: 
‘Critical reflection on the limits of scientific knowledge is not intended to 
discredit scientific knowledge [...]; but rather to give it a solid basis by freeing it 
from the distortions arising from the epistemological and social conditions of its 
production. [It] aims simply to bring to light the theory of practice which 
scientific knowledge implicitly applies and so to make possible a truly scientific 
knowledge of practice and of the practical mode of knowledge.’ (Bourdieu, 
1990a, p. 27) 
 
Reflexivity through participant objectivation is crucial to any scientific study of the activities 
of strategists that aims to be relevant not only academically but also practically. If the 
scholastic biases are not explicitly acknowledged and addressed, it is unlikely that researchers 
will be sufficiently aware of their field-specific constraints and, as a result, their research 
results will not be of much value to the strategy practitioners that they study (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992). Participant objectivation, hence, aims at breaking through the scholastic 
view by endowing researchers with an adequate knowledge of that particular point of view, 
and thus at recognizing the logic of praxis within scholastic thoughts (Bourdieus 2003). 
3.6 Possibilities of practical relevance in face of the scholastic view 
The possibilities that the results of research can become practically relevant appear quite 
restricted if we accept the claim that strategy research and strategy praxis not only constitute 
separate fields with different structures but also, due to the scholastic point of view, produce 
different kinds of knowledge. Yet, in the context of social sciences, Bourdieu (Wacquant, 
2006) argued vehemently against the position of merely aiming to produce knowledge for 
scientific purposes only. He insisted that the social scientist has a chance and also a duty to 
produce knowledge that is also of practical relevance. As we saw earlier, according to 
Bourdieu (2003), the key to practical relevance is participant objectivation. 
The method of participant objectivation offers researchers a way of dealing with their 
inevitably scholastic views, permitting them to identify and react to the influence of those 
views on their research into managerial practices. It also allows them to lay bare the “logic of 
practice” of the observed management practices, i.e. to identify managerial practices as such 
and the particular conditions (i.e. objective structures and individual dispositions) under 
which they are enacted. In turn, this enables them to describe the possibilities and limitations 





Oakes and her colleagues (1998), yields insights into the concrete planning practices of 
managers and the particular conditions that enable or restrict these practices. At first sight, the 
insights of the research might appear like a mere iteration of the practitioners’ knowledge. 
Yet, this is not the case: these insights represent knowledge that is at the same time “less” and 
“more” than the knowledge of the practitioner. In the case of our example, it is “less,” in the 
sense that this scientific knowledge does not put the researchers into a position to enact the 
planning practices themselves; not least because they lack the necessary practical (largely also 
embodied) skills (Chia & Holt, 2006). However, it is also “more” in the sense that the 
practitioners are usually not aware of the particular objective structures and individual 
dispositions under which they enact their practices (Bourdieu, 2003). Even if they tried to 
identify these conditions they would lack the necessary skholè. 
Although this kind of research does not lead to “actionable knowledge” (Jarzabkowski & 
Wilson, 2006) in the sense of providing guidelines for acting (e.g. for conducting business 
planning), it can nevertheless be of great practical relevance to the strategy practitioner. If 
practitioners have access to the results of such research – which could be facilitated, for 
example, by people active in both fields – they can learn about the particular possibilities and 
constraints of the conditions within which they enact their practices. This would allow them 
to recognize alternative ways of performing their practices and thus offer them new choices. 
In other words, this kind of research can enable practitioners to improve their concrete work 
practices through a better understanding of the “logic of practice” that underlies their 
activities. 
Consequently, the knowledge that practice-based strategy researchers can provide to 
practitioners is not likely to be of an instrumental nature, that is, to prescribe particular 
courses of action that practitioners should follow (Nicolai & Seidl, 2010; Pelz, 1978). Instead, 
such knowledge would be of conceptual relevance, i.e. identifying how management praxis 
functions and what constrains it, and in this way would contribute particularly to the 
“uncovering [of] new or alternative routes of action” (Nicolai & Seidl, 2010). As such, it 
would not prescribe any particular course of action but merely make the practitioners aware of 
the available options. This conclusion echoes the study by Sandberg and Tsoukas, who found 
that researchers can “provide organizational practitioners with resources to look at their 
organizational practices in a different light and, based on that, be able to create new ways of 





A comparison of the Bourdieusian perspective with other approaches in the relevance 
literature reveals some basic similarities but also marked differences: the emphasis that our 
Bourdieusian approach places on the inevitably scholastic view of researchers as compared to 
the practical views of management practitioners bears strong similarities to the way in which 
the systemic-discursive approach conceptualizes the science-praxis relation. Although the two 
approaches might differ in the details of the description of how science and praxis operate, 
they concur in that there are fundamental differences between management science and 
management praxis (identified as differences in “field structures”, “systemic logics” or “rules 
of the game”), which result in fundamental differences between scientifically generated and 
practically generated knowledge. Because of those differences, a direct transfer of knowledge 
between the two fields is impossible. Both approaches argue that any attempt to eliminate the 
“distance” between management science and management praxis would lead to a destruction 
of management science as a science. 
Their similarities notwithstanding, the Bourdieusian approach and the systemic-discursive 
approach differ markedly in their assumptions regarding the relation between scientific rigor 
and practical relevance. While the systemic-discursive approach comes to the conclusion that 
there is a clear trade-off between rigor and relevance in management research (Kieser & 
Leiner, 2009; Nicolai, 2004; Seidl, 2007), our Bourdieusian approach argues that relevance 
can be achieved through rigor, i.e. that practical relevance can be actively created by the 
scientist and that it does not merely constitute a “fiction” (Nicolai 2004; Rasche & Behnam, 
2009) or a “productive misunderstanding” (Seidl, 2009). Hence, in contrast to the systemic-
discursive approach, which assumes that only practitioners can produce practical knowledge, 
we argue that scientists can also produce (a particular form of) practical knowledge through 
rigorous research. This position on the compatibility of rigor and relevance might initially 
sound similar to the technical-linear approach. However, this would be a severe 
misinterpretation: the two approaches differ markedly in both the concept of rigor and the 
concept of relevance. According to Bourdieu, it is only a particular form of rigor (i.e. rigor 
based on participant objectivation) that is associated with practical relevance. Otherwise, rigor 
– as perceived by the technical-linear approach – would clearly conflict with relevance, as a 
result of the scholastic view. In contrast to the technical-linear approach, we also have to 
dismiss the possibility of generating instrumentally relevant knowledge: instead, relevance 
has to be understood in terms of conceptually relevant knowledge. In this respect, the 
Bourdieusian perspective and the technical-linear approach could not be more opposite. 





produced by management science would need to be communicated effectively to 
practitioners, which presupposes an active effort on the researcher’s part. While space does 
not allow us to deal extensively with this aspect in the present paper, it was definitely of 
explicit concern to Bourdieu (Wacquant, 1989). 
3.7 Conclusion and contributions 
We started this paper with the question: to what extent is the claim about the particular 
practical relevance of practice-based strategy research justified? Drawing on a Bourdieusian 
perspective we argued that the practice-based approach to strategy typically produces 
knowledge that is distant from management praxis. Consequently, in the first instance the 
claim that practice-based strategy research is of particular relevance to practitioners seems 
unjustified. It is only when practice-based studies are based on a particularly demanding form 
of reflexivity, in which scholars of this area have so far rarely engaged, that these studies have 
the potential to generate practically relevant knowledge. Such knowledge, however, is likely 
to be relevant not in an instrumental sense, i.e. in the sense of prescribing particular courses of 
action, but rather in a conceptual sense, by allowing practitioners to gather information on the 
possibilities and constraints on strategy praxis. Thus, the overall answer to this paper’s 
research question can be put as follows: practice-based strategy research does have the 
potential to produce particularly relevant knowledge but (1) only in a conceptual, not in an 
instrumental sense and (2) only if it is based on a particular form of reflexivity. 
With this argument we make contributions to two sets of literature: first, our study contributes 
to the practice-based strategy literature, in that it discusses one of its central claims that 
practice-based strategy research leads to knowledge which is of practical relevance to 
management practitioners. In particular, we have pointed out the potential fallacies of the 
practice-based approach and shown how these fallacies can be avoided through participant 
objectivation. In this way, we contribute to the advancement of this line of strategy research 
by suggesting ways of increasing its potential to generate more valid scientific results, as well 
as to offer practitioners knowledge that is relevant to their strategy praxis. Secondly, we 
contribute to the epistemological literature on the relation between management science and 
praxis (the so-called “relevance literature”) by introducing and spelling out the practice-theory 
approach on relevance and its concrete implications for research, which had been called for in 
several recent programmatic papers (Golsorkhi et al., 2009; Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; 





the systemic-discursive approach, a particular form of scientific rigor can indeed be combined 
with practical relevance. More precisely, we have shown that practical relevance can only be 
achieved through a particular form of scientific rigor. Accordingly, it seems possible to 
adhere to a view of strategy research as an applied discipline without having to revert to the 
somewhat simple view of the technical-linear approach.  
This has also important implications for editorial and educational policies. As many studies 
have shown, academic journals (Kieser & Leiner, 2009) and post-graduate education 
(Baldrige, 2004; Starkey, 2001) are necessarily focused on scientific rigor rather than 
practical relevance – even though the written policy statements might claim otherwise 
(Nicolai & Seidl 2010). Yet, as our paper has shown, this emphasis on rigor might itself lead 
to an increase in practical relevance: if journal editors and university teachers start to consider 
participant objectivation a precondition of rigorous research, they will push for this form of 
reflexivity and – as a result – increase the practical relevance of that research. To be sure, this 
still leaves the problem of how to communicate scientific knowledge to the practitioners as 
they tend not to read scientific publications (Kieser & Leiner; 2009). 
To sum up, our study has shown that the divide between strategy scholars and strategy 
practitioners can be “bridged” epistemologically on the basis of a particular form of 
reflexivity on behalf of the scientist. However, „bridging”, here, does not mean doing away 
with the differentiation between the two fields, e.g. in the form of scholar-practitioner 
collaborations. Instead, bridging takes place without scientists or practitioners necessarily 
crossing fields. By engaging in “participant objectivation” researchers can capture the logic of 
strategy praxis and in this way lay bare the possibilities and constraints within which strategy 
practices are enacted. As such, the scientific knowledge can inform the practitioner about new 
or alternative routes of action. 
While we focused our paper particularly on practice-based strategy research, many of our 
arguments can certainly be extended to other areas of management science: every 
organization scholar inevitably adopts a scholastic view and therefore risks committing 
scholastic fallacies. Moreover, participant objectivation as a reflexive stance is not restricted 
to the practice-based approach but also applies to some extent to other approaches in the 
social sciences. In this sense, all organization scholars may benefit from an acknowledgement 
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4 The practical relevance of management research from 






Even though the literature on practical relevance holds that practical relevance is actively 
constructed by practitioners who make academic knowledge relevant according to their 
organizational contexts and existing knowledge, the practitioners' perspective on relevance 
has received very little attention from researchers interested in the practical relevance of 
management research. Drawing on practitioners' accounts of the relevance of academic 
concepts, this paper examines under what conditions practitioners consider academic 
knowledge as practically relevant. A theoretical model of practitioners’ relevance construction 
is developed that shows that practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant if they  
(1) match academic knowledge against their contextual problems and previous knowledge, (2) 
extend their knowledge by new instruments, constructs and scientific framing and (3) 
consider the value of academic knowledge for their particular contexts and professional 
practices. In contrast to the commonly held assumption that the ambiguity of academic 
knowledge increases the chances of being practically relevant, this study further shows that 
the ambiguity of academic knowledge can also decrease the chances that practitioners  
consider it as relevant if it provides multiple courses of action, which overwhelm practitioners 










Understanding how management research can achieve practical relevance is of central 
concern to management as an applied science. To date, the literature on practical relevance 
has focused mainly on how practical relevance can be achieved from a scholarly point of 
view, neglecting the essential view of practitioners on what constitutes relevant knowledge. 
Studies that acknowledge the constitutive role of the adopting system to consider academic 
knowledge as relevant have discussed the forms of relevance that management research can 
provide (Pelz, 1978; Nicolai & Seidl, 2010), the adoption and adaptation of academic 
knowledge (Rasche & Behnam, 2009; Seidl, 2007; Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010), and the role of 
the ambiguity of academic knowledge in increasing practical relevance (Astley & Zammuto, 
1992; Benders & Bijsterfeld, 2000). However, the particular ways in which practitioners 
consider academic knowledge as relevant has not been systematically examined. In particular, 
we do not know in what particular kinds of academic knowledge practitioners consider as 
relevant before they apply it to their organizational contexts and under what conditions they 
consider ambiguous academic knowledge as relevant. This perceived gap is particularly 
striking because these studies stress that “the particular ways in which research output affects 
management practice and the particular way in which it is understood are ultimately 
determined by the system of practice itself” (Kieser, Nicolai, & Seidl, 2015: 206). To address 
this gap, this study approaches the following research question: Under what conditions do 
practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant? 
To answer this question, this paper examines the practitioners’ perspective on relevance by 
drawing on their accounts of the relevance of academic concepts based on data from fifty-
three semi-structured interviews. Applying a qualitative method to examine practitioners’ 
individual interpretations and perceptions (Patton, 2005; Maitlis, 2005), a theoretical model of 
practitioners’ relevance construction is developed, which shows that practitioners consider 
academic knowledge as relevant if they (1) match academic knowledge against their 
contextual problems and previous knowledge, (2) extend their knowledge by new 
instruments, constructs and scientific framing and (3)  consider the value of academic 
knowledge for their organizational practices and contexts. This model offers two 
contributions to our understanding of practical relevance. First, understanding relevance from 
the practitioners' perspective, it is shown that even if practitioners consider academic 
knowledge as novel knowledge, they consider it as relevant only if they do consider academic 





study suggests that academic knowledge must allow practitioners to extend their knowledge 
and to consider its value in order to "lead to the change, modification, or confirmation of how 
managers think, talk and act” (Kieser, Nicolai, & Seidl, 2015: 144). As the compatibility of 
academic knowledge with practitioners’ context and knowledge is a necessary precondition 
for practitioners’ relevance construction, this condition tends to contribute to the reproduction 
of organizational structures and an organization’s inability to innovate. Second, drawing on 
the practitioners' perspective on relevance reveals that there are two sides to ambiguity. In line 
with previous studies (Astely & Zammuto, 1992; Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010), it is shown that 
the ambiguity of academic knowledge increases the likelihood that practitioners consider it as 
relevant because ambiguous academic knowledge facilitates the compatibility to a range of 
contexts and practices. However, ambiguous academic knowledge also decreases the 
likelihood that practitioners consider it as relevant if it provides multiple meaningful courses 
of action, which overwhelms practitioners with choosing the course of action that is most 
meaningful to them.  
The remainder of this paper is structured in five sections. The first section offers a review of 
the literature on the role of practice in constructing practical relevance. The second section 
explains the methodology for collecting and analysing the data. The third section presents the 
empirical results in five parts: (1)  matching academic knowledge against practitioners’ 
contexts and knowledge, (2) the dimensions of ambiguity facilitating matching academic 
knowledge against practitioners’ context and knowledge, (3) extending practitioners’ 
knowledge by instruments, constructs and scientific framing, (4)  practitioners' construction of 
the kinds of value, and (5) failures in the construction of relevance. The paper concludes with 
a discussion of the findings and opportunities for future research based on a reflection on the 
limitations of this paper. 
 
4.2 Theoretical background 
As management research has put particular emphasis on its status as an applied science, a 
huge body of literature has proliferated that gives rise to a variety of conceptualizations on 
how relevance is achieved. A large part of the relevance literature relies on a rather simple 
conceptualization of how relevance is achieved by assuming that knowledge becomes relevant 
if it is adequately produced (Gibbons et al., 1994; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; 





al., 2012; Gopinath & Hoffman, 1995; Oviatt & Miller, 1989; Starkey & Madan, 2001). Thus, 
most studies within the relevance literature "rely (implicitly or explicitly) on models based on 
the problematic notion of a simple and linear transfer of knowledge, [even though] these 
models cannot capture adequately the complexities of the utilization process" (Kieser, 
Nicolai, & Seidl, 2015: 72). However, few studies consider the complexities of how practical 
relevance is achieved by acknowledging the constitutive role of the adopting system in the 
construction of relevance. Although these studies draw on different sociological traditions, 
such as those of Luhmann, Wittgenstein or Bourdieu, they share three common ideas that 
challenge the fundamental assumptions of the linear model of knowledge transfer. First, in 
contrast to the assumption that academic knowledge is relevant if it can be directly and 
instrumentally used, some scholars show that academic knowledge provides various forms of 
relevance (Nicolai & Seidl, 2010; Pelz, 1978). Second, in contrast to the common assumption 
that management science can a priori define what is relevant, these studies stress that practical 
relevance can never be fully judged by the scientific domain as it necessarily needs to be 
adapted to the context of practice to prove it is practically relevant (Nicolai & Dautwiz, 2010; 
Rasche & Behnam, 2009). Third, contrary to the assumption that knowledge is relevant if it 
addresses concrete practical problems, scholars state that the ambiguity of concepts increases 
the likelihood of relevance (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Benders & van Bijsterveld, 2000). On 
the basis of these common ideas, three main topics can be discerned: the forms of relevance 
that management research can provide, the adoption and adaptation of academic knowledge 
and the role of ambiguity in creating relevance. 
 
4.2.1 Forms of relevance 
First, some scholars expand the view that academic knowledge is relevant only if it used 
instrumentally, i.e., if it directly influences managerial actions. They maintain that in addition 
to demonstrating instrumental relevance, academic knowledge can be conceptually and 
symbolically relevant (Knorr-Cetina, 1977; Nicolai & Seidl, 2010; Pelz, 1978). They speak of 
conceptual relevance if scientific research modifies how practitioners perceive or 
conceptualize their problems and of symbolic relevance when research is used to legitimate a 
course of action to oneself or to others (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Beyer & Trice, 1982). This 
classification has been further refined by Nicolai and Seidl (2010), who argue that research is 
of instrumental relevance if it takes the form of schemes that provide systematics for ordering, 
recipes to choose an action or forecasts. Generally, knowledge that is instrumentally relevant 





conceptually relevant if research provides linguistic constructs, contingencies that uncover 
new actions, or causal relations of which managers are usually unaware. Knowledge that is 
conceptually relevant changes the understanding of particular situations. Finally, academic 
knowledge can be symbolically relevant if it provides means of legitimation or rhetoric 
devices that provide symbolic language. Academic knowledge is symbolically relevant if it 
legitimizes a chosen course of action. Moreover, it has been argued that management research 
is more likely to be of conceptual and symbolic use rather than of instrumental use because of 
the contextual nature of management knowledge (e.g. Beyer, 1997; Rynes, Bartunek, & Daft, 
2001). 
These studies on the forms of relevance acknowledge that academic knowledge might be 
relevant to practice in different ways, which extends the common belief that relevance is 
identical to an instrumental use of academic knowledge (Bartunek & Rynes, 2014). However, 
the various forms of relevance have been examined only in the context of management 
science. Discussing what form of relevance can be expected from management science does 
not clarify in what way practitioners themselves consider academic knowledge as relevant. It 
is thus unclear whether practitioners conceive that academic knowledge helps them select a 
particular course of action, change their understanding or legitimize their actions. Thus, more 
research is needed that empirically examines the ways in which practitioners consider 
academic knowledge as relevant. 
 
4.2.2 Adaptation and adoption of academic knowledge 
Second, another group of studies examines the ways in which academic knowledge is adapted 
and adopted to management practice (Beyer & Trice, 1982). Their conceptualization of 
(academic and other) knowledge is based on the premise that "knowledge is only defined by 
the particular context into which it is embedded (Brown & Duguid, 1991), which means that 
knowledge cannot be considered independently of its context" (Kieser, Nicolai, & Seidl, 
2015: 73; Bartunek & Reynes, 2014; Corley & Gioia, 2011). This implies that academic 
knowledge cannot be directly applied to management practice but must be adjusted to the 
adopting system in order to be practically relevant (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Kieser & 
Leiner, 2009; Seidl, 2009). However, because academic knowledge will be adapted to 
management practice, it will become knowledge that is no longer regarded as purely academic 
knowledge (Kieser & Leiner, 2009; Rasche & Behnam, 2009; Seidl, 2007). From this 





is not a problem that can be resolved. However, this is not to say that these scholars 
completely dismiss the possibility that academic knowledge has an effect on management 
practice. They maintain that academic knowledge can produce “productive 
misunderstandings” (Seidl, 2007) or “fictions” (Rasche & Behnam, 2009). Productive 
misunderstanding refers to the phenomenon that practice cannot but reconstruct the meaning 
of academic knowledge in its own terms and context and "at the same time […] make use of 
the meaning material [...] as an external provocation to create internally something new" 
(Teubner, 2000: 48, cited in Seidl, 2007). Similarly, fictions refer to the need to adapt the 
academic knowledge to the domain of practice. By contrast, fictions also indicate that 
practitioners act as if academic knowledge were relevant prior to the actual application. 
Academic knowledge is "usually formulated at such a high level of generality that in the 
moment of application the relevance of research is still a fiction: Managers do not and cannot 
know yet whether knowledge is relevant; however, they can act as if the offered knowledge 
were relevant" (Rasche & Behnam, 2009: 249). Both productive misunderstandings and 
fictions are irritations to practice from which further "sensemaking processes can unfold" 
(Rasche & Behnam, 2009: 250). In other words, these irritations are modified, supplemented 
or even neglected according to a particular context. The resulting actions are not the outcome 
of a linear transfer between management science and practice or particularly relevant 
knowledge claims, but rather "the product of an internal organizational reconstruction of 
knowledge" (Rasche & Behnam, 2009: 50) according to the particular practical context.  
In this sense, scholars have shown that the meaning of the research content changes when it is 
adopted by management practice in order to become meaningful to a particular context 
(Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006; Seidl, 2007; 2009; Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010). Yet, the type 
of meaning created from academic knowledge is not completely random. Rather, the context 
into which research results become embedded thereby "restricts the range of possible 
meanings that it may attach to them" (Seidl, 2007: 207). In this sense, scholars indicate that 
academic knowledge is relevant only if it resonates with the context to which it is adapted 
(Seidl, 2007), organizational members' assumptions (Corburn, 2005) or their lived experience 
and interests (Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010). Generally, scholars examining the adaptation of 
academic knowledge show that relevance cannot be determined a priori by management 
science; but, the particular way in which academic knowledge is relevant to practice and 
understood by practitioners is an active process that is determined by the domain of practice 





Studies on the adoption and adaptation of academic knowledge emphasize that academic 
knowledge needs to be adapted to a specific context in order to be practically relevant. By 
stating that the particular way in which academic knowledge is practically relevant is 
determined by the adopting context itself, these studies implicitly assume that academic 
knowledge is relevant only when it is already adopted or applied to a particular organization. 
However, because practice has to "treat the knowledge as hypothetically relevant prior to the 
actual application" (Rasche & Behnam, 2009: 249) based on misunderstanding and fictions, it 
remains unclear how practitioners  construct the relevance of academic knowledge before 
they apply it to their respective contexts. Additionally, these studies do not examine in what 
way  academic knowledge resonates with practitioners' contexts or experiences and interests. 
Academic knowledge might resonate very differently, given that managers from diverse 
contexts draw on their individual experiences and knowledge. In this sense, we know very 
little about the ways in which practitioners consider academic knowledge that resonates with 
their individual contexts and experiences as practically relevant. Investigating this perceived 
gap would also allow for paying more attention to the "dynamics between academic and 
practical or experiential knowledge” (Kieser, Nicolai, & Seidl, 2015: 71) and the different 
forms of relevance that these dynamics entail. 
 
4.2.3 The role of ambiguity in the construction of relevance 
A third group of studies investigates the role of the ambiguity of academic knowledge to 
achieve practical relevance. Scholars examining the role of ambiguity either refer to linguistic 
ambiguity, i.e., the interpretive flexibility of academic concepts as such (Astley & Zammuto, 
1992; Benders & van Veen, 2001; Rasche & Behnam, 2009) or to contextual ambiguity, i.e. 
the plurality of a concept's uses (Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010). Context ambiguity can facilitate 
practical relevance because it allows for "a large variety of practices" (Nicolai & Dautwitz, 
2010: 886) that originates from the plurality of contexts in which a concept is used. By 
contrast, academic concepts that are linguistically ambiguous are more likely to be practically 
relevant because their "openness of meaning" (Powell, Lovallo, & Caringal, 2006: 175) or 
“interpretive viability” (Benders & Bijsterfeld, 2000: 50), leave room for interpretation in 
ways that are relevant to the interests of disparate groups of people (Astley &Zammuto, 
1992). In this sense, linguistically ambiguous scientific concepts speak "to different 
audiences, allowing each subgroup to interpret the theory in congenial, if mutually 





meaning of the concept that is beneficial to their interests" (Benders & van Veen, 2001: 38). 
In contrast to scholars who argue that academic knowledge is irrelevant to practice because 
research findings are vaguely worded (MacLean, MacIntosh, & Grant, 2002; Sandelands & 
Drazin, 1989) and do not address concrete practical problems or provide context-specific 
knowledge (Hambrick, 1994; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006; Huff & Huff, 2001; Hinings & 
Greenwood, 2002), these studies hold that linguistically ambiguous academic knowledge is 
more likely to be practically relevant (Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010). Although linguistic 
ambiguity “entails a loss of directly descriptive information and fails to capture the richness 
and complexity of phenomena encountered by practitioners in organizational settings […] it 
enhances its capacity to convey meaningful connotations […]. The reduction of theoretical 
language to highly specific, empirically descriptive terminology would destroy this source of 
meaning" (Astley & Zammuto, 1992: 445).  
Generally, studies examining the role of ambiguity in achieving relevance argue that in order 
“to be made to ‘fit’ the concrete organizational context” (Seidl, 2007: 208), academic 
concepts need to be open to many different contexts and many ways of using it in order to be 
practically relevant. Thereby, these studies assume that "insightful practitioners (…) 
understand the necessary ambiguity of scientific knowledge as an opportunity to contextualize 
this knowledge according to their specific circumstances" (Rasche & Behnam, 2009: 252; 
Ortmann & Salzman, 2002). However, these studies do not discuss under what conditions 
practitioners consider ambiguous academic knowledge as an opportunity to contextualize this 
knowledge. In this sense, it remains unclear in which ways practitioners construct the 
linguistic and context ambiguity of academic concepts as an opportunity to contextualize this 
knowledge and whether this increases the likelihood that practitioners consider academic 
knowledge as practically relevant.  
Overall, by examining how practical relevance can be achieved, these studies acknowledge 
the constitutive role of management practice in constructing the practical relevance of 
academic knowledge in light of practitioners’ particular contexts. Practical relevance is thus 
conceptualized as an active construction process by the knowledge "consumers" who make 
knowledge relevant according to their own contexts and existing knowledge. However, the 
particular ways in which practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant has not been 
systematically examined. This lack of knowledge creates two main problems: we cannot 
claim to know how practical relevance is achieved unless we examine (1) in what ways 





as relevant, and (2) under what conditions practitioners construct ambiguous knowledge as 
relevant. To respond to these perceived gaps, we need to empirically examine the ways in 
which practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant prior to application. Thus, this 
paper addresses the following research question: Under what conditions do practitioners 
consider academic knowledge as practically relevant? 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Research context 
To examine under what conditions practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant this 
study draws on the context of executive management education because it is often claimed 
that "the most obvious way that faculty research impacts practice is through education" 
(AACSB International, Impact of Research Task Force, 2007: 37). Additionally, there are 
three more reasons for the choice of this particular context. First, executive courses are 
typically directed towards equipping practitioners with academic knowledge that should 
enable them to better identify and evaluate appropriate interventions in response to 
managerial challenges (Burke & Rau, 2010; Vaara & Faÿ, 2012). In this sense, the context of 
executive management education is particularly suitable to examine the conditions under 
which practitioners consider academic knowledge  as relevant before it is applied to 
management practice. Second, compared to "ordinary" MBA courses, executive MBA 
(EMBA) courses differ in the audience they target as they are primarily aimed at executives 
with several years of professional or managerial experience (Conger & Xin, 2000; Vaara & 
Faÿ, 2012). Courses at the EMBA level thus provide an appropriate setting for studying the 
relevance of academic knowledge as practitioners’ professional experience allows them to 
judge whether scientific content might be of relevance to their professional contexts. Third, 
and in relation to the second point, executive teaching is typically conceptualized as a setting 
in which practitioners come to make a connection between management research and their 
own managerial experiences (Anderson, 2002; Conger & Xin, 2000; Tushman, et al., 2007). 
This context is thus suitable to study under what conditions practitioners make sense of 
academic knowledge in light of their experiences and whether academic knowledge resonates 






4.3.2 Data collection 
This study draws on a sample of 121 EMBA students in four different executive programmes. 
The sampling of the programmes is based on four criteria. First, I selected those programmes 
that obtained at least three accreditations among the Association to Advance Collegiate 
Schools of Business (AACSB), European Quality Improvement System (EQUIS), 
Association of MBAs (AMBA), Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA), and 
Foundation for International Business Administration Accreditation (FIBAA), in order to 
ensure the integration of "high-quality" research in these programmes (Adler & Harzing, 
2009). Second, I chose those courses that relate to the topic of strategy as they are typically 
seen as the “capstone” courses of management that integrate various different management 
disciplines (Baldridge, Floyd, & Markóczy, 2004; Bower, 2008; Grant, 2008). I assumed that 
the selection of courses on the same topic would allow me to compare practitioners' 
perceptions of similar concepts. Third, I selected those four courses that met the criteria of 
heterogeneous sampling (Yin, 2013; Patton, 1990). As indicated in Table 1, all courses draw 
on different teaching methods, i.e., the academic concepts were either illustrated in lectures, 












Requirements Duration Status in 
curriculum 






- Bachelor degree 
- 5 years managerial 
experience 
- 3 years leadership 
experience 
10 days  
(à 10h) 
Compulsary - Focus on case 
studies 













- University degree 
- 6 years managerial 
experience 
3 days  
(à 8h) 
Elective - Focus on group 
presentations 





Ømanagerial experience: 8 
years 





- University degree 
- 4 years managerial 
experience 
- if no university 




Compulsary - Focus on real-life 
cases 
- in addition lecturing 
14 Øage: 36 
Ømanagerial experience: 8 
years 














Elective - Focus on lectures 
-in addition case 
studies 
31 Øage: 36 
Ømanagerial experience: 9 
years 






The heterogeneity of these teaching methods counteracts the potential influence of the 
teaching method on practitioners' construction of relevance (Eisenhardt, 1991). It is thus 
possible to meaningfully compare practitioners' construction of relevance across the courses. 
Although all courses are different with regard to their teaching methods, they all draw on a 
theory-based teaching rationale, i.e., their orientation towards teaching academic concepts. 
This rationale is illustrated in the respective reading material, course announcements in the 
EMBA brochures, the courses' syllabi and the assessment and selection process of students. 
As indicated in Table 2, I selected students of an EMBA cohort according to the diversity of 
their former education, professional experience (at least five years or more), current position 
(lower and middle managers as well as members of the TMT and CEOs) and the type of 
organization with which they were affiliated, ranging from for-profit to non-profit and from 
large global firms to small regional firms. This sample allows the generalization of the 
findings to a wide variety of professional contexts as practitioners draw on diverse frames of 





















Table 3: Overview of Practitioners 
 






Natural sciences  18/53 








Lower managers 15/53 
Middle managers 26/53 
TMT/CEO 12/53 
Type of Organization 
For profit  
(regional, national and 
international) 41/53 
Non-profit 








* Note that some practitioners did not provide information on their age or education  
 
The design of this study was built on a qualitative method (Patton, 2005; Langley & 





as the constructions of relevance, especially when they refer to individuals’ interpretations 
and perceptions (Silverman, 2006; Maitlis, 2005). The advantage of a qualitative method is 
that informants act and talk in a natural way that is meaningful and culturally salient, which 
allows for rich and explanatory data (Langley, 1999; Huberman & Miles, 2002). 
 
Table 4: Overview of collected data 
 
 Main Data Source Secondary Data 
 
Number of 










Course 1 17 600 100 20 
Course 2 11 500 30 12 
Course 3 13 600 30 35 
Course 4 12 300 30 17 
Total 53 2000 190 84 
 
As indicated in Table 3, the main sources of data are fifty-three semi-structured interviews 
that typically lasted between a half hour and an hour. For these interviews, a semi-structured 
interview schedule was used, comprising a consistent set of prompts (i.e., practitioners' 
positions and relation to strategy, learnings, motivations and perceptions of the content) to 
which practitioners could respond in detail (Gioia & Thomas, 1996). Although interviewees 
do normally not directly account for their constructions in terms of questions and answers, 
they share stories that touch on their interpretations of academic concepts (Langley et al., 
2013; Rouleau, 2005; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The conducted interviews thus highlight 
stories about how the academic content is constructed as relevant in light of their current or 
past experiences: events, activities and professional circumstances related to the 
contextualization of academic knowledge. In the study of actors' social construction, it is 





relying on practitioners' construction of relevance of the academic content during the 
interviews (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989) and to gather the breadth of 
information needed to develop a relatively holistic picture of the relevance construction 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2014). Thus, I probed the main data with secondary data including 
recorded field notes of one-hundred ninety hours of non-participant observation of 
practitioners' reactions and interactions in the course, slides, articles, (text)books, evaluations 
of the courses and participants' notes and summaries (see Table 1 for an overview of all 
collected data).  
 
4.3.3 Data analysis 
An iterative approach was used to analyse the data, circulating back and forth between the 
empirical material and the literature (Huberman & Miles, 1994). This approach proceeded in 
three main stages. First, for each course, all interviews were coded using a qualitative content 
analysis on practitioners' construction of relevance (Maitlis, 2005; Langley & Abdallah, 
2011). Those constructions were identified when practitioners gave accounts of their opinions 
and understandings of a single academic concept, i.e., when they uttered that the concept 
would lead to a change, modification or confirmation of how they think, talk and act (Kieser, 
Nicolai, & Seidl, 2015; Nicolai & Seidl, 2010). Given the interest in the practical relevance of 
academic knowledge, I focused on those accounts explicitly referring to scientific concepts 
that have (at least rudimentary) roots in the scientific discourse (Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010), 
such as the core competence concept (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991), organizational design (Donaldson, 2001), strategic issue management 
(Ansoff, 1980), incentive systems (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006), non-market strategy (Baron, 
1995), creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1950) and weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). In 
addition, I informed the analysis from other angles and levels, such as the field notes of my 
observations, practitioners' notes and summaries, slides and readings. The aim of this first-
order phase of analysis was to identify the academic concepts that were considered as (ir-
)relevant and key categories that practitioners mentioned in relation to the practical relevance 
of academic concepts for each site. 
Second, and based on this analysis, I compared the categories across practitioners in different 
courses (Huberman & Miles, 2002) and subsumed and aggregated similar categories that were 
independent of the particular teaching method. This step of the analysis allowed me to 





main categories. The first category refers to the constructions of the professional context and 
individual knowledge. Thus, within this first category, I differentiated between contextual 
knowledge that I refer to as a "contextual need" or "contextual problem" and individual 
knowledge that I refer to as "experience" or "intuition". Whereas a contextual need and a 
contextual problem are always related to the particularities of practitioners' construction of 
their current contexts (e.g., the type of industry, type and size of organization, or context-
specific values and expected behaviour, the difficulties with these contexts, such as disruptive 
technologies, unproductive strategy meetings or a lack of identification with the corporate 
strategy), experience refers to either previously accumulated knowledge (e.g., through 
education or former positions) or knowledge accumulated during their current professional 
occupations (March, 2006; Hill & Houghton, 2001). Accounts were coded as referring to 
intuition when practitioners expressed hunches of directions or solutions based on "life-
learned rules and exceptions, dispositions and tendencies, balances and checks" (Minsky, 
1988: 22; Polanyi & Prosch, 1977).  
The second category refers to the types of knowledge that practitioners attributed to academic 
concepts. Taking Nicolai and Seidl's (2010) differentiation of forms of relevance as a device 
to group the types of knowledge, I differentiated between "instruments", "constructs" and 
"scientific framing". Academic concepts were coded as instruments if practitioners considered 
them as systematics of ordering, checklists, procedures or tools, I coded them as constructs if 
they were considered as new conceptualizations of situations or causal relations and as 
scientific framing if the concepts were considered as providing a scientific language for 
practitioners' thoughts, arguments and actions. The third category refers to the value, i.e., the 
forms of relevance, that, according to practitioners' consideration of different types of 
knowledge will or might entail. I identified three types of value that I termed "improvement", 
"innovation" and "legitimation". Practitioners' accounts were coded as improvement if they 
considered the instruments, constructs or scientific framing as an enhancement of their 
professional practices (e.g., the structure, communication or problem-solving capabilities) or 
of their understanding of a situation or problem. The accounts were coded as innovation if 
practitioners gave accounts that the academic concepts provided new courses of action, new 
ways of thinking or new understandings of previous perceptions. Legitimation refers to the 
confirmation of chosen and future actions and the appropriation of credibility of arguments or 
actions towards others.  
To check for inter-coder reliability and any inconsistencies in interpreting the data (Miles & 





two colleagues who were familiar with qualitative methods but who had no attachment to this 
study. Thus, I provided each independent coder with definitions of the categories and 
requested that they sort a selection of quotes from all sites to the categories. Then, I calculated 
the average agreement level of each coder with the overall coding scheme; the agreement 
level was 85.0 per cent, indicating a high level of agreement (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 
2013). Disagreements in coding served as the basis for discussions about how to strengthen 
the categories and thus improve the trustworthiness of the interpretations until a decision was 
reached about how to solve each discrepancy. 
In a third step, I traced the interplay between the contextual and individual factors, the types 
of knowledge and the types of value. For this, I developed a diagram to see how the 
conditions and types of value are linked. This analysis revealed two main conditions under 
which practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant that I refer to as "matching" and 
"extending". This rearrangement of categories revealed two dimensions of ambiguity that 
facilitate matching, that is, "context expansiveness" and "action expansiveness". In a final 
stage, I integrated the negative accounts of practitioners' relevance construction to counter-
check the validity of the identified conditions. This final stage of the analysis revealed three 
conditions that prevent practitioners from considering academic concepts as relevant, which I 
refer to as “not matching”, "not extending" and "no value". 
4.4 Findings 
In order to make it easier to follow the description of the findings, I provide the theoretical 
model of practitioners’ relevance construction (Figure 1) upfront. It gives an overview of the 
key concepts, abstracting from practitioners’ individual accounts of relevance. Starting with 
number one, Figure 1 depicts that practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant if 
they, first, match academic knowledge against their contextual problems and needs (1a), 
experiences (1b) or intuitions (1c). Academic knowledge that is considered as ambiguous, i.e., 
that is action expansive (2a) and context expansive (2b), facilitates that practitioners match it 
against their contextual problems and needs, experiences or intuitions. If practitioners match 
academic knowledge against their contexts and knowledge, they  can, second, extend their 
experiences or intuitions by  instruments (3a), constructs (3b) and scientific framing (3c). If 
practitioners extend their knowledge by instruments, constructs and/or scientific framing, they 





improvement (4b) and/or an innovation (4c). Only if they consider academic knowledge as 













These are the basic conditions of practitioners’ relevance construction. However, practitioners 
might also consider academic knowledge as irrelevant, thereby giving rise to three conditions 
of the failure of the construction of relevance. Practitioners do not consider academic 
knowledge as relevant if they are not able to match academic knowledge against their 
contextual problems and needs or their experiences or intuitions (6a). Additionally, academic 
knowledge is not considered relevant if it does not allow practitioners to extend their 
experiences or intuitions (6b). Lastly, practitioners may not consider academic knowledge as 
relevant if they match it against their contexts and knowledge and extend their knowledge but 
do not consider academic knowledge as valuable for their thinking and acting (6c). 
In this section, the findings will unfold in five parts: (1)  practitioners matching academic 
knowledge against their contextual problems, experiences or intuitions, (2) the dimensions of 
ambiguity facilitating matching, (3) practitioners extending their knowledge by instruments, 
constructs and scientific framing, (4) practitioners' construction of the kinds of value that 
academic knowledge provides and (5) the failures in the construction of relevance. To 
simplify the presentation of the findings, I illustrate the points with examples of practitioners’ 
accounts. Appendices 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide additional examples of all findings. 
 
4.4.1 Matching academic knowledge against practitioners’ contexts and 
knowledge 
The analysis revealed that practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant if they 
match academic knowledge against their contexts, experiences or intuition. In this sense, three 
variations of the this condition were identified: (1a) matching against contextual problems and 
needs, (1b) matching against experiences and (1c) matching against intuition.  
The first variation refers to matching academic concepts against contextual problems and 
needs. Contextual problems and needs can either refer to current or to future issues that 
practitioners will face. A representative example of matching against contextual needs is 
provided in the following quote describing that a practitioner matches Bebchuk and Fried's 
(2006) scientific concept of incentive systems against his need to be sensitized to potential 
problems caused by the launch of a new incentive system. The practitioner, the head of 
department of a manufacturer states: 
Specifically the concept of incentive systems was interesting for me [because] you get a 
kind of sensitivity again for the problem analysis because if you're in the daily business 





scheme and then it will be helpful to be sensitized to problems and to know what problems 
could come up during this launch. 
In this example, the practitioner matches the concept of incentive systems developed by 
Bebchuck and Fried (2006) against the need to be aware of difficulties that might come up 
during the change of an organization's incentive system. Because the concept explains how 
different incentive systems can change the organization, the practitioner is sensitized to 
potential problems in relation to the planned implementation of the new incentive system.  
In addition to matching against contextual needs, practitioners can also match academic 
knowledge against their contextual problems. The following illustration of matching against 
contextual problems refers to Porter's concept of competitive strategy (Porter, 1997), which is 
scientifically rooted in resource-based theory (Barney, 2001) and relates to Ansoff's terms of 
the "outside-in" and "inside-out view" of strategy (Ansoff, 1965). A marketing account 
manager of an insurance company describes the problem in her company as follows: 
(...) in my firm, we are too concerned about us instead of being concerned about the 
costumer. (...) inside-out is ok, but we also have to think about the environment. Thus 
outside-in would be a necessary switch for us because new technologies change the 
behaviour of the consumer and this perspective (...) has not yet penetrated our work. It 
would change our products and services and still won't rest on the thinking that we just 
differentiate through the quality of our services. 
This example shows that the practitioner matches the concept of competitive strategy (Porter, 
1997) against her organization's problem of being focused on the inside-out view of strategy 
(particularly the problem of the differentiation through the quality of insurance services), 
which might lead to losing market shares because costumers might obtain insurance products 
from other companies that develop new technologies. 
In addition to matching against  contextual needs and problems, practitioners can also match 
academic concepts against their experiences and intuition. Although contextual needs and 
problems also partly refer to practitioners’ experiences, matching against experiences relates 
to practitioners’ generalized experiences that are abstracted from their particular, current 
occupation. The following quote refers to the scientific concept of means-ends introduced by 
Herbert Simon (1978), which a marketing manager of a logistics company matches against his 
experiences of developing a strategy: 
The point is that you realize that every strategic issue that you add will have a follow-up 
element. That is cause-and-effect. Often in strategy you think about an issue but then you 





recommendation you should know what to get at and where it leads to. It provides 
relational and consequential thinking (...). 
In this example, the practitioner matches the concept of means-ends (Simon, 1978) against his 
general experience with developing strategy. In particular, he matches his experience with 
developing strategic issues against  the rationale of cause and effect or substantive rationality.  
Additionally, matching can also refer to practitioners matching academic concepts against 
their intuition. In this case, practitioners match academic concepts against hunches on 
directions, solutions or relationships. The following quote relates to Geroski's (2003) 
scientific concept of emerging markets, which a patent attorney matches against her intuitive 
way of analysing nascent markets: 
 (...) the concept provided a methodological way of analyzing the market and where we 
stand with innovation.(…). It probably would have been the way I analysed it had I not 
known this concept. (...) for instance when you are examining a market, let's say a nascent 
market (…) I would have analysed the technology, I would have analysed the market and 
then analysed the organization. (However, if I had not known the concept) I might have 
just jumbled all those ideas into one unorganized thought. 
This example shows that although the practitioner considers the concept of emerging markets 
(Geroski, 2003) as systematics with which to analyze such a market, she matches the 
dimensions of these systematics (i.e., technology, market and organization) against her 
intuitive way of having analysed an emerging market. Generally, this condition shows that 
practitioners construct academic knowledge as relevant if it is compatible with their specific 
contextual problems and needs, general experiences or intuition. Thus, matching against 
practitioners' context and knowledge is a precondition for practitioners relevance construction 
 
4.4.2 Dimensions of ambiguity facilitating matching 
In line with previous studies, the analysis revealed that the ambiguity of academic concepts 
facilitates the matching of academic concepts against practitioners’ contexts and knowledge . 
Academic concepts are ambiguous if they allow for multiple interpretations and provide 
equivocal definitions (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Benders & van Veen, 2001). Ambiguity 
facilitates the matching of academic concepts against practitioners' contextual needs, 
experiences and intuitions by allowing practitioners to make sense of the concepts in light of 





facilitating role of equivocal academic knowledge. However, one strategic marketing manager 
of a logistics company is aware of the role of ambiguity: 
(...) The meaning of the theory does not play such a huge role because it is necessary to 
bring everything in the right form for your own business and to differentiate application 
possibilities. (...) The theoretical concepts, like what is a goal, what is a competence, are a 
basis but it's up to you to apply it. 
This quote illustrates that the “interpretive viability” (Benders & Bijsterfeld, 2000: 50) of 
ambiguous academic concepts leaves scope for practitioners’ interpretations regarding how 
and in which contexts these concepts can be used. In this sense, two dimensions of ambiguity 
have been identified that particularly facilitate the matching of academic concepts against 
practitioners' needs, problems, experiences and intuitions: (2a) the action expansiveness and, 
(2b) the context expansiveness of academic concepts. 
First, in order to facilitate matching, academic knowledge has to be open to a broad range of 
actions, i.e. it needs to be action expansive. The chief physician of a hospital department 
indicates that the concept of issues management (Ansoff, 1980) allows for multiple 
approaches and courses of action, which are based on the concept's generalized procedure to 
develop strategy: 
There are multiple ways to structure a strategic process and there are multiple branch-
specific approaches and not everything is coloured with the same brush. I appreciate that 
there is no sure formula. 
 
Second, context expansiveness refers to the condition that academic concepts are open to a 
broad range of contexts in order to facilitate the matching of academic concepts against 
practitioners’ contexts and knowledge. In contrast to context ambiguity (Nicolai & Dautwitz, 
2010), which refers to a variety of ways in which a concept can be used, context 
expansiveness refers to the plurality of contexts in which academic concepts can be 
interpreted. In this sense, academic concepts provide general mechanisms that are compatible 
with and applicable to many different contexts. A federal government consultant describes 
this as follows: 
The transfer or the application depends on you. Not every concept is equally relevant. (...) 
And some concepts are helpful whether it's a small, medium-sized or a huge company or a 
government because the conceptual thinking is so rudimentary, like positioning, initiation 
and value creation. (...) In addition, these concepts relate to basic problems that are the 
same in all industries like, [e.g.,] strategy formulation and communication, top-down or 





This quote illustrates that if practitioners consider academic concepts as providing general 
mechanisms such as how to position a company in the market (Ansoff, 1980; Porter, 1997) or 
how to create value (Barney, 1991), they can relate the academic concepts to their diverse 
contexts because the academic concepts are compatible to basic problems and elementary 
conceptual strategic thinking. By contrast, academic concepts that are considered as providing 
mechanisms for particular contexts do not facilitate matching. This can be shown in the next 
quote, in which a managing director of a public broadcaster clearly indicates that the concept 
of foreign direct investments (Froot, 2008) is not compatible with his organizational context: 
(…) you can imagine that the concept of foreign direct investments in a media house 
governed by public law is not really applicable, right? 
Overall, ambiguous academic knowledge facilitates the matching of academic concepts 
against practitioners’ contexts and knowledge as it allows practitioners to make sense of it 
despite their concrete contexts and experiences. In this sense, it is more likely that 
practitioners match academic concepts against their contextual needs, problems, experiences 
and intuitions if academic concepts adhere to ambiguity in the form of context and action 
expansiveness.  
 
4.4.3 Extending practitioners’ knowledge 
The second condition of practitioners’ relevance construction, “extending”, illustrates that 
practitioners have to consider academic knowledge as novel knowledge in order to construct 
it as relevant. Extending allows practitioners to enhance their experiences and intuitions, to 
meet their needs and to provide potential solutions to their problems. The analysis revealed 
three variations in relation to extending: practitioners’ knowledge can be extended in the form 
of (3a) instruments, (3b) constructs and (3c) scientific framing. 
Relating to the first variation of extending, practitioners consider academic knowledge as new 
instruments. Academic knowledge in the form of instruments means that practitioners 
consider scientific concepts as new procedures, guidance or processes with which to choose 
among courses of action or as a systematics for ordering. The following example relates to the 
academic concept of strategic issue management (Ansoff, 1980) and illustrates that this 
concept is considered as a new instrument, which allows the practitioner to extend his 
intuition. The practitioner, a general manager of the business unit of car manufacturer states, 
However, the benefit was that it helps you with the core kind of reflection element. You're 





trying to get systematic about your insights and hopefully this more methodical reflection 
you might get your strategic issues better done in a project. 
This statement shows that the practitioner implicitly refers to the concept of strategic issue 
management (Ansoff, 1980), which he considers as an extension in form of a (reflective) 
procedure. This procedure allows him to extend his intuitive way of understanding strategy.  
Moreover, if academic knowledge are considered as new instruments, it allows practitioners 
to meet their professional needs. The following quote illustrates that the academic concept of 
global strategy developed by Ghemawat (2007) is considered as a new instrument to develop 
a global strategy that allows a senior director of a nanotechnology company to meet his need 
to present a global strategy to investors: 
One concept, I’ll apply it right now as I’m putting together some business plans with my 
company to start a subsidiary, so we’re going to be raising a lot of money in the next few 
months and part of that presentation is going to be explaining to investors how we’re 
going to penetrate globally. (...) Instead of just (...) presenting the story I believe now I’m 
going to be able to present it in a more precise (...) framework, so it gives you the 
discipline or the focus how (...) to package your ideas in a structured way and present 
them to other people in a logical well thought through fashion. To me, that's a very major 
advantage. 
This quote illustrates that in this case, the scientific concept of global strategy (Ghemawat, 
2007) allows the practitioner to extend his ability to present a global strategy by an instrument 
in form of a procedure, and to meet his need to coherently present the global strategy to other 
people. 
Relating to the second variation of extending, academic knowledge can be considered as new 
constructs, i.e. new conceptualizations or causal relations. The next quote shows that new 
constructs allow practitioners to extend their experiences. The practitioner, a CEO of a sugar 
cane factory, refers to the concept of non-market strategy initially developed by Baron (1995) 
and further examined by Geroski (2003). He indicates that he considers the concept as a new 
construct of strategy, which allows him to extend his experiences with a company's 
internationalization: 
(...) the market strategy is a very important thing to come in when our Australian company 
was coming to Switzerland. Switzerland is a very protective market and it's a very 
relationship-based market. (...) you may have the greatest and the latest product but you 
need to understand this mentality to sell to Swiss corporate. We were focussing on 
competitors, the suppliers, the drivers and the bargaining power and so forth. But through 





relationships, which comes to Switzerland, some official bureaucrats and what part the 
media is going to play and the NGOs. (...) We always thought let's go to the Swiss market 
and we know the players, we know the competition, we know the drivers, we know the 
market concentration (and) this is how we play the game. (...) the non-market side of the 
business (...) really opened that era where we were never exposed to it. 
The description of the practitioner's experiences with market strategy shows that the new 
construct of non-market strategy allowed him to extend his experiences.  
Relating to the third variation of extending, academic knowledge can also be considered as 
scientific framing, i.e., scientific language or jargon. The following quote refers to the concept 
of strategic issue management (Ansoff, 1980) and illustrates that a marketing account 
manager of an insurance company extends her experiences by scientific framing: 
Overall I got a better understanding how a strategy is developed in our firm and that it 
follows exactly the procedure. And now I have a name for that. 
Here, the practitioner considers the concept as providing the scientific terminology of 
strategic issue management, which allows her to extend her experiences with developing 
strategy.  
Lastly, practitioners can also extend their knowledge in different ways on the basis of a single 
academic concept. The following quote shows that a scientific concept is considered as a new 
construct as well as a scientific framing, which allows a practitioner to extend her intuition. In 
this example, a pattent attorney refers to the concept of emerging markets by Geroski (2003): 
I would say that it reaffirmed my intuitive way to look at a market [...]But I wouldn't have 
called it by this certain name,[emerging markets]. I wouldn't have had the names, and I 
wouldn't have been able to point to a diagram like the S-curve,[describing] that technology 
can advance exponentially.  
Generally, the extending condition shows that practitioners consider academic knowledge as 
instruments, constructs and/or scientific framing that allows them to consider potential 
solutions to their contextual problems, meets their needs, and to extend their experiences and 
intuitions. If practitioners do not consider academic knowledge as an extension of their 
knowledge, it is not considered as relevant (instances of failures relating to "not extending" 
are provided below). In the next section, I will show in what way practitioners consider 







4.4.4 Practitioners’ construction of value 
The analysis revealed that if practitioners match academic knowledge against their needs, 
problems, experiences and intuitions, and if they can extend their knowledge by instruments, 
constructs or scientific framing, they also need to consider academic knowledge as valuable 
for current or future organizational circumstances and practices in order to consider it as 
practically relevant. Regardless of whether academic knowledge is considered as an 
instrument, construct or scientific framing, practitioners can consider three different kinds of 
value: 4a) a legitimation, 4b) an improvement, or 4c) an innovation. 
First, academic concepts can be considered valuable because they provide legitimation. 
Legitimation refers to justifications of courses of action and argumentations towards others as 
well as to a confirmation of chosen actions. For example, a marketing account manager of an 
insurance company refers to the concept of core competences (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), 
which she considers as a construct of “success” that allows her to legitimize her decisions 
towards others: 
The positioning of a firm alone is not sufficient for success, but to gain advantage through 
the elements of skills, competences and resources. This helps me argue in my current 
situation, with the limited resources on the one hand, and the increasing sales figures on 
the other hand and to explain my decisions to my boss and my team. 
Second, academic knowledge can be considered valuable in the form of improvement. 
Improvement refers to practitioners' consideration that academic concepts provide 
instruments, constructs or scientific framing that allow them to improve their existing 
professional practices, organizational processes or general understandings of situations. Thus, 
improvement can relate to refinements of either individual practices and understandings or 
organizational structures and processes. In the following quote, the CIO of a 
telecommunications company refers to the scientific concept of transitional objects developed 
by De Geus (1988), which he considers as a procedure to improve the process of strategic 
development: 
I liked the concept of transitional object. Usually the CFO or CEO says something that he 
always says. And then you'll repeat every year the same. Applying this concept, this does 
not work anymore. The process prevents you from having empty platitudes in your strategy 
and that these platitudes show up in the goals and the priorities. The process forces you to 
get out of your protected space. [This way] the process better manages social aspects and 





This quote illustrates that the practitioner considers the concept of transitional objects (De 
Geus, 1988) as an instrument, which he matches against his experiences of developing 
strategy and “having empty platitudes”. In addition, this instrument allows him to extend his 
experiences with strategic development. This extension in turn allows him to improve “social 
aspects” of the strategy development process, i.e., the improvement of the commitment 
process of those affected with the development of strategy. 
In addition to being considered as improvement, academic knowledge can also be considered 
as valuable in terms of an innovation. In contrast to improvement, which relates to a 
refinement of existing courses of action and understandings, innovation refers to new ways of 
thinking or alternative routes of action. Additionally, academic knowledge can be considered 
valuable in different ways, e.g., it can be equally considered as innovation and improvement. 
For example, an IT analyst at an international bank refers to the scientific concept of strategic 
issue management (Ansoff, 1980), which she considers as an instrument that allows her to  
consider a new way of identifying problems (innovation) and simultaneously to enhance her 
understanding of the decisions of the top management team (improvement): 
 (...) there is a big gap in our corporate strategy and our business unit strategy. So what 
the process helps me is (...) to better understand how and what is happening in the IT 
department, how are they trying to achieve the core strategy, help the bank in that way and 
(also) seeing where they're going wrong. So having to apply the concept to the bank (...) 
was really good, because some of the things that have come out (...) enable you to say it's 
this problem, this problem (...). So it expanded my mind and now I view everything 
differently. This way you better understand why you're company is doing certain things 
and now I know how problems can be identified. (...) I want to show the (application of the 
concept) to the head of IT strategy consulting in the bank. Just to see what he would say on 
it. Because I think there's some points in here that have been neglected when I look at the 
overall IT strategy (...), and which I think are valid points. So I think (...) it would be so 
helpful, not just for me, but I'm sure (also) for the people that I work with (...). 
This quote illustrates that the practitioner matches the concept of strategic issue management 
against the problems of implementing a corporate strategy in the practitioner’s IT department. 
From the practitioner’s point of view, the concept is considered as a potential solution to this 
problem in the form of a procedure (instrument), which allows her to extend her view on her 
contextual problems. This procedure is considered valuable because it allows her, on one 
hand, to innovate her way of analysing strategic implementation problems and, on the other 





In addition, improvement and innovation can also be considered on the basis of scientific 
framing. Typically, scientific framing is considered valuable because it confirms or allows 
legitimizing courses of action; however, in some cases, it can also allow practitioners to 
improve their actions and understandings. The following quote refers to the concept of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), which the COO of an international airline 
considers as a scientific framing that allows her to better communicate with the CCO: 
If I have to present something to the board of governance or to a competent audience, I 
can use the word ‘absorptive capacity’ because it allows embedding my presentation into a 
more scientific terminology. (…) It might also improve the way I communicate with the 
CCO. 
 
Generally, academic knowledge is constructed as relevant if practitioners consider it as 
valuable for their situations, actions or thinking. In this sense, academic knowledge can be 
considered valuable or relevant because it allows practitioners to innovate, improve and/or 
legitimize their thinking and acting. Practitioners consider these kinds of value independently 
of the ways in which they extend their knowledge, i.e. independent of their consideration of 
academic knowledge as instrument, construct or scientific framing. In addition, academic 
concepts can be considered as relevant in multiple ways. For example, practitioners mostly 
consider academic knowledge as legitimation in combination with either innovation or 
improvement (see Appendix 6 for the numbers of combinations of all kinds of value). 
However, under certain conditions, practitioners consider academic knowledge as irrelevant. 
In the next section, I will refer to failures of practitioners’ relevance construction.  
 
4.4.5 Failures in the construction of relevance 
In the analysis, three conditions were identified that explain under what conditions 
practitioners do not consider academic knowledge as relevant: 5a) not matching, 5b) not 
extending and 5c) no value.  
First, practitioners do not consider academic knowledge as relevant if it does not allow them 
to match academic concepts against their contexts or knowledge. In these cases, academic 
knowledge is not compatible with the structures of their organizations, with their experiences 
or their intuitions. An HR manager of a confectionery manufacturer describes that the 
academic concept of procedural justice developed by Kim & Mauborgne (1995) is not 





My experience is that it's not true that we (achieve a commitment) that quickly. So I'm 
struggling to agree with that. Because in my company, I know what will happen: The 
moment someone opens the mouth and says something, you have eight other people jump 
into it. So I struggle to see this procedural justice happening in practice. (...) I see it as a 
Nordic thing, like that's the way they probably do it in Norway, where you go around the 
table, you share a voice, everyone says what (he or she) think(s), but then you still do what 
the boss says. 
This quote illustrates that practitioners consider academic knowledge as irrelevant if it does 
not allow practitioners to match it against their experiences. Similarly, academic knowledge is 
considered as irrelevant if it does not allow practitioners to match it against their contextual 
problems, needs and intuitions. 
Second, practitioners consider academic knowledge as irrelevant if academic concepts are not 
considered as novel knowledge. Put differently, if academic knowledge only allows for 
matching against practitioners’ contextual problems and needs or their experiences and 
intuitions, it will not be considered as relevant. Thus, practitioners have to extend their 
existing knowledge on the basis of academic knowledge to consider it as practically relevant. 
For example, a CCO of a pharmaceutical company states that the concept of absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) does allow her to extend her knowledge: 
I didn't learn new things. (…) For example, absorptive capacity, I knew what this is about 
and how one would do that (...). I got an exposure to all that (...) but do I need this? I don't 
know. (...) So I wouldn't say that now I got additional insights that I can apply (...) to my 
occupational context. 
The CCO describes that she already knew "what the concept is about" and how organizations 
would develop these capacities. In this sense, the concept does not allow to extend her 
knowledge, but solely matches with what she knew before; thus it is not considered relevant. 
Third, practitioners consider academic knowledge as irrelevant if it allows practitioners to 
match it against their contexts and knowledge and extends their knowledge but is not 
considered valuable for their professional practices or contextual problems. In this sense, 
practitioners extend their knowledge by instruments, constructs and scientific framing, but 
they do not consider it as valuable. In most cases, practitioners do not consider scientific 
concepts as valuable if they extend practitioners’ ability to deal with the complexity of 
decision making and thus prevent them from considering academic knowledge as an 
innovation, improvement or legitimation. This is particularly the case with academic concepts 





many causal relations that could be taken into account, practitioners are overwhelmed by their 
choice among these possibilities. Although constructs typically allow practitioners to match 
and extend their knowledge, the number of choices that constructs provide prevent 
practitioners from considering these constructs as value for their professional practice or their 
particular contextual problems. For example, an account manager of a media house refers to 
the scientific concept of strategic issue management (Ansoff, 1980), which he matches against 
his experiences of developing strategy and which allows him to extend his experiences with a 
construct of strategy. However, this construct is not considered relevant because it is not 
considered as an operating mechanism to choose among possible routes of action: 
Certainly this concept (…) really helps work out something different for the design of our 
process. (But) the problem is that (…) you have so many possibilities! Having tried to 
apply this concept, we realized that we have actually spent so much time discussing how it 
should work. You don't have any evidence that it's right. So what I was hoping to get is a 
procedure like when you distil schnapps: you start and at the end you have a concentrate 
and the machine determines the procedure. (Like) you make fire and then it vaporized and 
then it's concentrated. But here you can turn any lever and the result is completely 
different. And this doesn't give you the safety or the confidence of having developed an 
effective strategy. (…) So in effect strategy is about the gut feeling of a Steven Jobs or 
Richard Branson and (...) the rest is actually just rubbish.  
This quote illustrates that if academic concepts allow practitioners to consider multiple 
courses of actions, they are considered not only as irrelevant but also as common sense. The 
analysis reveals that practitioners typically do not consider academic knowledge as valuable if 
the concepts are ambiguous because they leave too much room for interpretation of their 
usage. Despite the finding that ambiguous concepts facilitate matching (as shown in the 
section above), the action expansiveness of ambiguous concepts can also impede practitioners 
from considering these concepts as relevant. 
Academic concepts can also be considered as partly valuable. Because academic concepts 
allow practitioners to extend their knowledge in multiple ways, such as for example, because 
they are considered as a scientific framings as well as a construct, these different extensions 
can be considered as valuable and not valuable. For example, a strategic marketing manager 
of a logistics company refers to the academic concept of means-ends (Simon, 1978), which he 
considers as a construct of strategy that, on the one hand, allows him to extend his 
experiences with designing strategic processes, which he considers as an innovation, in this 





experiences with scientific framing; however, this extension is considered as irrelevant as the 
practitioner does not consider it as value for the strategic design process: 
[The main point is] the design of the process of strategy, it's about connections, about 
logic, it's partly about maths. Maths, in the sense of action-reaction. This has a high 
practical value that I learn to contextualize and to evaluate in this sense. (...) The point is 
that you realize that every strategic issue that you add will have a follow-up element. (...) 
Often in strategy you think about an issue but then you stop and you don't think about the 
next steps (...). It provides a relational and consequential thinking. (...) Now I can call it 
means-ends but (in fact), it's action reaction or action result, that's how you talk in 
business.(...) the fact that it is called means to an end, it sounds so deceptive. (...) This 
means to an end is like, oh my God, you're thinking that maybe something is going to come 
from heaven. I don't understand why people call it like that; it's probably not something 
that I will apply to my vocabulary. 
This quote illustrates that because academic concepts allow practitioners’ to extend their 
knowledge in different ways, practitioners can simultaneously consider academic knowledge 
as relevant and irrelevant. 
Generally, practitioners consider academic knowledge as irrelevant if it solely matches their 
contexts and knowledge, if it does not allow practitioners to extend their knowledge or if it is 
not considered as valuable for their organizational contexts and professional practices. In 
most of the cases, academic knowledge is not considered as relevant because it does not allow 
practitioners to extend their knowledge or because it was not considered as valuable (see 
Appendix 6 of the number of failures for each condition). 
 
4.5 Discussion 
This paper examines under what conditions practitioners consider academic knowledge as 
practically relevant. On the basis of practitioners' accounts of relevance, a theoretical model 
of practitioners' relevance construction was developed that revealed three main insights. First, 
practitioners consider academic concepts as relevant only if practitioners match academic 
knowledge against their contexts and knowledge, extend their knowledge and consider the 
value of academic knowledge for their contexts and actions. Second, practitioners construct 
academic concepts as different types of knowledge, such as instruments, constructs and 
scientific framing, that allow them to improve, legitimize or innovate their thinking and 
acting. Third, although the ambiguity of academic knowledge increases the likelihood that 





irrelevance when ambiguous knowledge provides multiple courses of action. In the following 
section, these findings and their implications for understanding practical relevance are 
discussed, particularly (1) the extension of practitioners' knowledge and the consideration of 
value of academic knowledge as preconditions for practitioners' construction of practical 
relevance, (2) the differentiation of types of knowledge and kinds of value, and (3) the role of 
ambiguity in the construction of relevance. 
 
4.5.1 Extension of practitioners' knowledge and consideration of value as 
preconditions for practical relevance 
The literature on practical relevance proposes that academic knowledge needs to be adapted to 
a particular organizational context to be practically relevant. In this sense, scholars speak of 
"resonance" or "fit" to stress that practitioners consider academic concepts as practically 
relevant if these concepts are aligned with practitioners' particular organizational contexts 
(Seidl, 2007; Rasche & Behnam, 2009; Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010). The findings of this study 
confirm that practitioners' must consider academic knowledge as compatible with their 
contextual needs and problems in order to construct it as relevant. Thus, resonance in the form 
of matching academic concepts against practitioners' contexts and knowledge is an important 
precondition of constructing academic knowledge as relevant. However, the theoretical model 
of practitioners' relevance construction also extends this view by providing two additional 
conditions of constructing academic knowledge as relevant. 
First, this study shows that in order to consider academic knowledge as relevant, practitioners 
have to extend their knowledge by academic knowledge. As Rasche and Behnam (2009: 251) 
state, academic concepts "are non-contextualized and therefore require a competent filling 
according to the specific circumstances (...), a filling that also means modification and 
extension of existing knowledge claims". In this sense, academic knowledge has to allow 
practitioners to combine  their existing with novel, academic knowledge. Practitioners have to 
be able to match what they experience, know or face against academic knowledge while 
extending this existing knowledge by new instruments, constructs or scientific language. 
Conversely, this study shows that if practitioners solely match academic knowledge against 
their contextual problems, needs and existing knowledge, academic knowledge will be 
considered as irrelevant if practitioners cannot extend their knowledge. In other words, 
academic knowledge that does not extend what practitioners already knew or experienced 





Second, this study shows that beyond extending, practitioners must consider academic 
knowledge as valuable for their thinking and acting in order to construct it as relevant. This 
means that according to practitioners’ individual contextual problems and knowledge, 
academic knowledge provides particular extensions that need to be considered as value to be 
relevant to their situations. Conversely, this study shows that academic knowledge that is 
simply matched against practitioners' contexts and knowledge and simply extends 
practitioners' knowledge is still considered as irrelevant if practitioners do not consider it as 
value for their particular situations and professional practices.  
These findings have important implications for our understanding of practical relevance. First, 
complementing previous studies that argue that academic knowledge is relevant if it resonates 
with practitioners' particular contexts (Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010; Rasche & Behnam, 2009; 
Seidl, 2007), this study shows that resonance is an important precondition for practitioners' 
construction of relevance. But to be considered relevant, academic knowledge also needs to 
allow practitioners to extend their knowledge and to consider academic knowledge as 
valuable. Thus, in addition to resonance,  extending and the consideration of value are 
necessary conditions to construct academic knowledge as relevant. These conditions prove 
helpful in explaining why academic knowledge is considered  irrelevant even if it resonates 
with practitioners’ contexts. The theoretical model of practitioners’ relevance construction 
explains under what conditions practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant. It thus 
contributes to our understanding of how practitioners make sense of academic knowledge. 
Practitioners’ relevance construction, and, in particular, the precondition of matching 
practitioners’ contexts has important implications for organizational reproduction and change. 
As practitioners consider academic knowledge as relevant if it is compatible to their contexts 
and knowledge, practitioners' relevance construction tends to reproduce existing 
organizational structures in which practitioners' contextual problems and needs might be 
embedded. In this sense, practitioners' matching of academic knowledge against their existing 
organizational contexts might lead to reproducing these structures regardless of whether these 
structures are beneficial or obstructive to the functioning of the organization. Thus, because 
practitioners match academic knowledge against their contexts to construct relevance, this 
construction might hinder a fundamental change of the organizational context or an 





Secondly, the existing literature on practical relevance emphasizes that practical relevance is 
dependent on the particular context. This study shows that in addition to practitioners 
considering academic knowledge as relevant in light of their contexts, they also construct 
relevance in light of their individual experiences and intuition. Although some studies have 
shown that academic knowledge is relevant if it resonates with practitioners' lived experience 
(Corburn, 2005; Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010), this study shows that practical relevance also 
depends on whether their experiences and intuitive thinking can be valuably extended. Taking 
individual practitioners' individual knowledge into account allows us to understand that 
academic knowledge can be considered irrelevant if it does not allow practitioners to match 
academic knowledge against their contexts and knowledge, to extend their knowledge or to 
consider the value of academic knowledge in light of their practical knowledge. In this sense, 
the conditions of matching, extending and considering a value reveals the dynamics between 
academic and practical knowledge and the forms of relevance that these dynamics entail.  
In relation to this point, the study shows that in light of their different knowledge and 
contexts, practitioners differently construct the same academic knowledge as relevant. 
Because relevance requires an active construction on behalf of the practitioners in light of 
their particular contexts and previous knowledge, the practical relevance of particular 
academic knowledge cannot be generalized to all contexts and practitioners' individual 
interests. This implies that the conditions of matching, extending and the consideration of 
value apply to all contexts and individual situations but the particular ways in which 
practitioners match academic knowledge to their contexts and knowledge, extend their 
knowledge and consider academic knowledge as relevant depends on their idiosyncratic 
constructions of relevance.  
The conceptualization of relevance as an idiosyncratic construction also takes account of the 
"knowledge constitutive interests" (Habermas, 1973) that practitioners pursue in their 
relevance construction. In this sense, practitioners construct academic knowledge as relevant 
if it allows them to consider academic knowledge as value to pursue their personal interests, 
such as for example, legitimizing their decisions or improving their practices to exert power. 
This implies that practitioners' individual construction of relevance is not necessarily related 
to improving practice or considering a value for others, but might be even detrimental to other 
contexts or society at large.  In this sense, at best, practitioners’ relevance construction “may 





organizations; at worst, it may cement social imbalances and marginalization of powerless 
groups” (Jarzabkowski, Mohrman, Scherer, 2010: 1193)  
 
4.5.2 The differentiation of types of knowledge and kinds of value  
In line with prior research, the findings of this study confirm that practitioners construct 
instruments, constructs and scientific framing as the main types of knowledge that 
management science provides (Nicolai & Seidl, 2010; Beyer & Trice, 1982). However, 
previous studies on forms of relevance do not differentiate between practitioners’ construction 
of the types of knowledge that academic concepts provide to them and the different kinds of 
value that practitioners consider. Distinguishing types of knowledge and kinds of value 
contributes to the literature on forms of relevance in three main ways.  
First, the theoretical model of practitioners' relevance construction shows that in light of their 
particular contextual problems and previous knowledge, practitioners may consider 
instruments, constructs and scientific framing as sources to improve, innovate or legitimize 
their thoughts and actions. Whereas previous literature on the forms of relevance assume that 
instrumental knowledge helps practitioners to choose among courses of action, symbolic 
knowledge helps them to legitimize a chosen course of action and conceptual knowledge 
helps to better understand situations, this study shows that, from the practitioners’ 
perspective, a particular type of knowledge is not necessarily related to a particular kind of 
value.  
Second, differentiating between types of knowledge and kinds if value shows that 
practitioners consider different kinds of knowledge that academic knowledge provides but 
practitioners do not necessarily consider these kinds of knowledge as relevant. Prior literature 
on the forms of relevance depicts instruments, constructs and scientific framing as forms of 
practical relevance. However, the findings of this study show that these different forms of 
relevance, or types of knowledge as they are called here, are considered as relevant only if 
practitioners consider them as valuable for their contexts and professional practices. In this 
sense, different types of knowledge are not constructed as relevant as such but they need to be 
considered as valuable in order to be practically relevant. 
Lastly, the model of practitioners' relevance construction shows that practitioners often do not 
consider a single type of knowledge as relevant in one way. Instead, practitioners may 





knowledge can also be considered valuable in multiple ways. As previous studies on forms of 
relevance (Nicolai & Seidl, 2010; Pelz, 1978) do not discuss whether academic knowledge 
can be relevant in multiple ways, this study refines our understanding of practical relevance 
by showing that practitioners can consider a combination of types of knowledge and multiple 
kinds of value. This finding implies that academic knowledge is not simply constructed as 
relevant or irrelevant. By considering different types of knowledge at the same time, such as 
an instrument and a construct, practitioners can consider academic knowledge as equally 
relevant and irrelevant because one type of knowledge is considered as valuable, whereas the 
other may be considered as irrelevant. 
 
4.5.3 The ambiguous role of ambiguity  
In line with previous studies (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Rasche & Behnam, 2009; Seidl, 
2007) on the role of ambiguity in achieving relevance, this study shows that ambiguous 
academic knowledge facilitates practitioners’ matching of academic knowledge against their 
contexts by allowing them to consider academic knowledge as compatible to their diverse 
contexts and practices. Specifically, it is shown that ambiguous academic knowledge 
facilitates the matching against practitioners' contextual needs, problems, experiences and 
intuitions. In this sense, ambiguous scientific concepts allow actors to make sense of 
academic knowledge independent of their concrete contexts and experiences (Astley & 
Zammuto, 1992; Nicolai & Dautwitz, 2010). In addition to confirming previous studies’ 
findings, the theoretical model of practitioners' relevance construction also extends the 
existing view on the role of ambiguity by differentiating two dimensions of ambiguous 
academic knowledge.  
Examining the practitioners’ perspective on the practical relevance of academic concepts 
reveals that ambiguous academic concepts are action and context expansive. Whereas 
differentiating between action and context expansiveness does not affect practitioners’ 
matching of academic knowledge against their contexts and knowledge as both dimensions 
contribute to the compatibility of academic knowledge with practitioners’ contextual needs, 
problems, experiences and intuitions, this differentiation affects whether practitioners 
consider academic knowledge as valuable. Whereas the context expansiveness of ambiguous 
academic knowledge facilitates the construction of academic knowledge as valuable, action 
expansiveness of ambiguous knowledge does not. As the context expansiveness of ambiguous 





practitioners’ meaning making in light of their various contexts but allows the meaningful 
adaptation of knowledge to a plurality of contexts. In this sense, context expansiveness does 
not prevent practitioners from considering academic knowledge as valuable for their 
contextual problems and needs. By contrast, the action expansiveness of ambiguous 
knowledge does not facilitate considering academic knowledge as valuable. If ambiguous 
academic knowledge provides a range of possible courses of action or different ways of 
understanding a situation, as in the case of constructs, practitioners do not consider this type 
of knowledge as valuable because they are uncertain which of the potential routes of action is 
most meaningful or valuable for their contexts. As action expansiveness leaves the particular 
usage of academic concepts uncertain (Benders & van Bijsterveld, 2000), it does not prescribe 
which courses of action to follow. In this sense, practitioners are overwhelmed by the 
complexity that the choice between multiple routes of action implies. Thus, action 
expansiveness, on one hand, fosters practitioners' ability to envision multiple courses of 
action; however, on the other hand, it prevents practitioners to consider ambiguous academic 
knowledge that is action expansive as valuable. These two sides to ambiguity can also be 
applied to ambiguous academic concepts that are considered as scientific framing. To the 
extent that academic concepts are considered as multiple scientific justifications, these 
justifications might appear arbitrary, and consequently, they might not be considered as 
valuable (Nicolai & Seidl, 2010). 
Differentiating between the dimensions of action and context expansiveness of ambiguous 
academic knowledge shows that the role of ambiguity in contributing to practitioners’ 
construction of relevance is itself ambiguous. Previous studies implicitly assume that the 
more ambiguous the academic knowledge is, the greater is the opportunity for practitioners to 
make sense of academic knowledge in light of their particular contexts (Astley & Zammuto, 
1992; Rasche & Behnam, 2009; Seidl, 2007). However, by differentiating between action and 
context expansiveness, this study shows that ambiguous academic knowledge might be 
considered as irrelevant. Academic concepts that are action expansive increase the complexity 
of having to choose a course of action that is considered as most valuable for practitioners’ 
contexts and needs. Thus, academic knowledge may complicate practitioners' understanding 
of a situation (Bartunek, Gordon, & Weathersby, 1983); however, at the same time, this 
complication may lead to constructing academic knowledge as irrelevant. This is particularly 
the case with new constructs, as practitioners do not consider them as providing generalized 
rules or prescriptions to choose among courses of action (Nicolai & Seidl, 2010; Bartunek et 





management limits the possibility to generate standardized rules or prescriptions that allow 
for prescriptions of particular courses of action (Nicolai & Seidl, 2010; Pandza & Thorpe, 
2010; Whitley, 1984; Tourish, 2013). As Mintzberg (2005: 381) states, "managers can and 
should use dialogue to find answers to their questions instead of expecting readymade 
prescriptions. Prescriptions are most of all the job of practitioners themselves as they face an 
issue within a context". This study shows that in some cases, practitioners expect 
prescriptions or at least ambiguous academic concepts that deliver the ground on which such 
prescriptions can be developed. 
4.6 Limitations and future research 
The results of this study are based on a qualitative study of practitioners' construction of 
relevance, which places some limitations on this paper while opening up areas for future 
research. First, this study focuses on practitioners' construction of relevance in the context of 
executive education. This context provides practitioners with a particular kind of exposure to 
academic knowledge as academic knowledge was taught, discussed and reflected in the 
classroom. Thus, examining practitioners' construction of relevance in other settings might 
lead to different results if practitioners do not reflect and discuss academic knowledge before 
they are asked in what way they consider it as relevant. Future research could thus investigate 
practitioners' construction of relevance in other settings, such as, for example in more 
experimentally designed settings, in which practitioners could read articles published in 
academic journals and would then be asked whether the findings provided by these articles 
are considered as relevant. Specifically, future research could explore whether reading 
academic results affects practitioners' construction of ambiguous academic knowledge as 
relevant or their construction of the kinds of knowledge that management research provides. 
Second, this study is based on interviews to examine practitioners’ relevance construction. 
Qualitative interview methods are typically criticised for confronting interviewees with the 
“social desire” to be responsive to the interviewers needs (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). In this 
sense, interviewing practitioners about their relevance construction could be influenced by the 
prompts to reflect on the ways in which academic knowledge is relevant to them. This study 
counteracts this potential “bias” by integrating observational data in the analysis, however, 
future research could draw on different methods to examine practitioners’ relevance 





how managers ‘live’ and experience academic knowledge form the natives’ point of view 
(Geertz, 1993; Yanow, 2012).   
Future research could also explore the effect of practitioners’ relevance construction on their 
organizational practices. As some scholars claim that practitioners’ construction of relevance 
has "far-reaching effects on practical action” (Astley & Zammuto; 1992: 543), future work 
could investigate the particular ways in which practitioners’ construction influences their 
actions. This area for future research could address the following questions: In what way does 
the construction of the practical relevance of scientific concepts influence the actual 
legitimation, improvement or innovation of practitioners’ practices? How do different 
constructions of relevance impact practitioners' actions in applying an academic concept? And 
how does the plurality of constructions in organizational contexts influence practitioners’ 
decision to apply academic concepts?  
Another topic that could be further explored is the reproduction and change of organizational 
structures and practices on the basis of practitioners’ relevance construction. As mentioned 
earlier, practitioners match academic knowledge against their contexts and knowledge, which 
tends to reproduce organizational structures. In this sense, future research could investigate 
the possibilities of (fundamental) organizational change given that academic knowledge has 
to match an organizational context in order to be adopted. This topic could be investigated 
particularly in light of critical management scholars as "academic knowledge that is relevant 
influences the power balance in organizational practice" (Jarzabkowski, Mohrman, Scherer, 
2010: 1193), They argue that practical relevance leads to “championing the cause of the 
oppressed at the risk of further contributing to their domination” (Fournier & Grey, 2000: 26). 
Future research could thus explore specifically in what ways practitioners’ relevance 
construction contributes to the reproduction of the dominant power structures within 
organizational contexts. Additionally, it could be further explored in what ways practitioners’ 
relevance construction that serves their individual interests proves also socially useful 








Even though the literature on practical relevance emphasizes that practice itself ultimately 
determines whether academic knowledge is practically relevant, the particular ways in which 
practitioners construct relevance have not been examined yet. Analysing practitioners' 
accounts of the relevance of academic concepts, it was found that practitioners consider 
academic knowledge as relevant if they match academic knowledge against their 
organizational contexts and previous knowledge, extend their knowledge by instruments, 
constructs and scientific framing and consider academic knowledge as valuable for their 
contexts and actions. This study thus provides a novel understanding of relevance from the 
perspective of practitioners, which contributes to the literature on practical relevance in the 
two main ways. First, this study offers an understanding of the conditions under which 
practitioners construct academic knowledge as relevant before they apply it to their concrete 
contexts. Second, it contributes to the understanding of the limits of ambiguous academic 
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Supporting evidence for "matching" condition 
 





A managing editor of a public-service broadcaster describes the 
need to position a public-service broadcasting company towards an 
increasing number of competitors in the media industry: 
"In media industry positioning is particularly important 
because the question is how much (financial) support channels 
governed by public law will get in the future and how strong 
they are regulated or not. (...) The channels governed by public 
law didn't care about positioning or finding themselves in the 
market in the past. Nowadays they have to care about positioning 
because the market is just evolving. In the past there were just 
public channels so de facto there was no market. And then it was 
suddenly possible to watch the channels from another country 
(with the same language), i.e. there was an international rivalry. 
And then the private channels came up and so it became really 









A chief physician of a business unit in a hospital refers to the need 
of an approach to structure strategy: 
"I need to realize that in the public healthcare I won't instigate a 
discussion with the CEO whether we should follow Porter or 
another model. So it's rather important that I bring a 
perspective, an approach how to proceed or how to structure 
the process. Simply that you are able to show how you could 
structure a strategy process. (...) 






Porter, 1997)  
The CEO of the federal police department states the need to position 
his department:  
" (...) in administration we have to care much more about 
positioning. We still live from hand to mouth. (...) especially in 
crime fighting, the question is "do we fight against the Italian 
organized criminality or against the Russian or the Chinese or 
do we fight against the motorcycle gangs?" 







As senior physician refers to the need to talk to other departments 
in a hospital in the management language: 
"Before I thought we need that for the patients. But that's not my 
interest. The others will think of value creation and growth and so 
on. But if you have to work with these other administrative 
departments, you have to talk in their language. You can't talk 
Latin with them how I sometimes do with my colleagues." 













A chief physician of a hospital describes the problem of the current 
organizational structure in the hospital: 
"The public health care suffers from the silo thinking and it 
helped to see other organizational designs, (...) in which the 
structure is turned upside down. (...) In the medical sector that's 
extreme, we have a medical hospital, a surgical hospital, a 
gynaecological hospital e.g. and if we would turn that we could 
see what connects theses hospitals or what is the same across 











A business manager at the stock market explains the problem of 
being stuck in a strategy:  
"(...) many a times organisations are stuck in one strategy (and 
they claim that) this is the framework that we built, it’s worked 
for 20 or 30 years ago, it should work now.  It’s like (...) doing 
the same thing over and over again and that’s what Wall Street’s 
right now is currently on, it’s an insane path trying to figure out 
how to make money based on the old models. (...) Based on the 
framework I see the opportunity to actually start breaking that 
strategy that Wall Street has (...)." 
Matching 
contextual 
problem of being 






A project manager in a start-up company states the need to make 
forecasts: 
"The thing I found really interesting was that concept of having to 
be half a step in the future but like, not too far in the future so that 
the ideas should be not too crazy or too out there and I think that’s 
really useful because that’s sort of what we’re trying to do, it’s a 
new mine development, so we’re trying to predict where it’s going 
and what they’re going to need. (...)." 






Porter, 1997)  
A project manager at a consulting firm relates the concept of inside-
out and outside-in on strategy to his experiences with strategy 
development: 
"We often have strategy meetings where we intuitively applied 
the inside-out/outside-in perspective but the framework helps to 
do that in a more structured way and to pay attention to all possible 
aspects. (...) So e.g. usually we said these are our competences and 
this is the market and we will do something, but we never 
consciously asked ourselves: Does my firm adjust to the market or 







object (De Geus, 
1988) 
The CIO of a telecommunication company describes his experience 
with developing strategy relating it to the concept of transitional 
object: 
"Usually the CFO or CEO says something that he always says. 
And then you'll repeat every year the same. Applying this 














A HR director of a confectionery manufacturer describes his 
experiences with the process of strategy development in the 
following way: 
"I've facilitated strategy sessions but never like this. It's always 
been different. My starting point is always what has happened 
before, not like starting with a blank piece of paper, just saying, ok, 
tell me what you think about the future and the specific issues. (...) 
The process: going from generic issues, transforming this into 
strategy and then coming down to priorities, then to objectives and 
then into business calls and then again into corporate goals.  You go 
from very detailed stuff to very high level stuff down to detail again, 
which I believe is very good because the best strategists have both 











The CEO of a hotel relates the concept of to his experience with 
incentive systems: 
"Often you have an idealized picture of strategy regarding e.g. what 
corporations communicate in their mission statements. "The 
costumer is king" or "We are committed to our shareholders". But if 
you dig deeper in the topic and if you deal with incentive 
systems e.g. and compare this with your experiences, then you 
see that these are different worldviews. (...) The question is always 
whether the model comprises overall mechanisms and if I turn one 
thing then something should happen. If you have practical 
experience that's an advantage to see whether this (mechanism) 
could be related to one's own context. If you hear that right after 
school and you have never done a strategy, you might get a wrong 
impression or you're not able to relate that to something or apply 








The CEO of a sugar cane factory relates the concept of market 
strategy to his experience of implementing strategy: 
"(...) we did strategy implementation without this exposure for 
seven or eight years in Australia. Now we have learned market 
strategy. So we were initially beginning to apply this concept 
without knowing its real dynamics. Now we know "okay this is how 
this framework works, these are the pros and these are the cons; 
this is where we can apply this framework". And applying this 
concept we see already now significant change, especially in 









A project manager at a car manufacturing company  
"I always tell people that doing a lean or six sigma project, all that 
means is that I’m taking some of the tools that are in that toolbox, 
there are sort of classic projects where you go through one set of 
tools that have been linked together but in many projects I will take 
individual tools, where they’re applicable, and it’s the same thing 
here I feel that I’m being given a new set of tools that I can use 
and when I’m confronted with problems then I’ll be able to think 
about which tool is most applicable and then apply it."    
Matching 
experiences of 










A project manager at an international airport states that he would 
have known the relationships between strategic issues intuitively: 
"I have never developed a strategy myself but intuitively all the 
relationships between strategic initiation, change etc. were 









justice (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 
1995) 
The CEO of an IT consultancy refers the concept of procedural 
justice and links it to his intuition on managing people: 
"I think it is all about understanding people, the methodologies, and 
as much as we say that we cannot put people into boxes, I would 
now say you probably can. You can put them in jars and tip them in 
different boxes (...) and if you are able to understand that aspect, 
then you are able to kind of manage the whole situation better. 
Strategy, it is all about intuitive matters, like communication, it 
is about people, it is about the ability (...) to structure the way 
forward, creating a better plan for the business, but without people 
really that does not work." 
Matching 
intuition on 






A general manager at a stock exchange market describes that the 
concept of matches his intuition on strategic issues: 
"(...) the benefit was that it helps you with the core kind of reflection 
element. You're talking about strategic things that are more or 
less intuitive and common sense but you're trying to get 
systematic about your insights and hopefully this more methodical 





*Note that some concepts have been renamed by labels of more general concepts on the same topic to ensure 




Supporting evidence for "Dimensions of ambiguity" 
 







The HR director of a confectionery manufacturer describes that the 
concept of procedural justice does not comply with his organizational 
context 
"My experience is that it's not true that we do it that quickly. So I'm 
struggling to agree with that. Because in my company, I know what 
will happen: The moment someone opens the mouth and says 
something, you have eight other people jump into it. So I struggle 
to see this procedural justice happening in practice. (...) I see it as a 
Nordic thing, like that's the way they probably do it in Norway, where 
you go around the table, you share a voice, everyone says what they 












The co head of department of a bank states that the concept of creative 
destruction can be linked to many different contexts 
"(...) particularly interesting was the concept on creative 
destruction (...) because it could be applied to all kind of 
industries. I mean you see it at Microsoft and Nokia, and Apple and so 









The CEO of sugar cane factory states that he cannot relate the concept 
of value appropriation to his organizational context as it assumes a 
specific market structure that contradicts the emerging market 
structure, in which his company operates 
"(...) in the class everybody's been working for the last 15 or 20 years, 
there are many CEOs here and they also said that some of the 
concepts can never be applied at work. (For example) a lot of 
emerging markets are structured (differently). So you know, whilst 
we follow all this innovation with IP protection and stuff, you take it to 
some part of Asia and someone copies your design and that's it.  You 
can go to the court and try and enforce your patent rights, but it will 










The head of department and member of the executive board of a family 
business states that 
" (...) I work in an SME. However some concepts are very focused on 
strategies of large corporations, which is different from how a SME 
operates. There are two realities: there are strategies for large 
corporations in a large global economy and the strategies of niches 
players, like my corporations. And those realities are very different. (...) 
If you take positioning and analyse where you are in a Porter 
analysis, (like) who are my suppliers, what is the market and what 
are my cash cows etc., that is also valid for a SME. I would say that 
these kinds of concepts are interesting for every company, 





justice (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 
1995) 
A IT consultant describes that the concept of procedural justice does 
not allow for different kinds of actions as it assumes that people 
would sit together (face to face) to achieve commitment 
"(...) there are certain aspects that you also need to study, which is (...) 
technology, where it affects me, and other people at day to day basis. 
(...) and hence we should be focusing really on technological aspects of 
strategy. And by technological aspects I am not talking about software, 
I am not talking about hardware, I am talking about ways of thinking. 
You know, how can we deal with a specific situation, where 
technology can probably assist you, jump three hurdles as opposed to 
face to face or whatever it is (...). The global climate, the fact that 
(...) strategy right now is not a single (...), face to face type 
environment like (...) groups sitting together in a meeting for an 











A general manager of a business unit of car manufacturer describes 
that the concept allows for multiple courses of action and can thus be 
relevant to a range of professional practices 
" (…) the concept helps me seeing multiple ways, so in that sense 









A business manager at the stock market explains the concept of 
market institutions does not prescribe a particular course of action 
but provides a general perspective that allows for multiple 
interpretations 
"(the concept) doesn’t say, this is how it should be. One of my 
comments in class was "plug and trug", a "plug and trug" is basically a 
term put into a spreadsheet, let the numbers come out and this is how 
it’s supposed to be. (However this concept) relate to a broad 
thinking. (When) you’re supposed to provide an answer, it 







A project manager of a business consultancy states that the model 
allows for multiple courses of action to develop a strategy 
"(the concept) shows how you methodically develop a strategy, a 
model that helps you thinking in options. There is no right or 






Supporting evidence for "extending" condition 







A chief physician of a business unit in a hospital states that the need of 
an approach to structure strategy is extended by a systematic 
procedure to develop strategy: 
"So it's (...) important that I bring a perspective, an approach how 
to proceed or how to structure the process. Simply that you are able 
to show how you could structure a strategy process. (...). I have 
learned how to structure a strategy process. (..) That is, I can justify 
what are the steps in a strategy process. That there is a framework that 









A divisional director and president of the board of directors of an 
electric company describes that the problem of developing strategy in 
his firm is extended by a procedure how to develop strategy: 
"I see (...) that the process in our firm is casual and unrewarding. 
Now I know much better how we should develop our strategy. (..) 
So I think the framework is really helpful but (...) if I can apply the 













The CEO of an IT consultancy describes the extension of his need to 
change by the concept of procedural justice that provides a behavioural 
guidance: 
"(...) I am very dominant, and I tend to talk a lot, in case you have not 
noticed, (...) and so just for example the procedural justice thing, (...) 
it gave us a lot (like) learn to stop talking, learn to listen, it is vital 
for you to learn to listen. Especially when you are a consultant, (...) 
it is more important for you to talk a lot less and let other people 
talk, than you talking more. In my area, in IT, I am the one who does 
the talking pretty much in the majority of the cases. (But) I need to 
actually allow other people to talk. The inside, be it focused on the 








The senior director of a nanotechnology company states that the need 
to form alliances has been extended by a procedure for developing a 
global strategy: 
"Global strategy is very important in my business as there’s a lot of 
essential interaction between companies like mine that are in 
nanotechnology (...) and large multinational pharmaceutical 
companies, and biotechnology companies. So (...) it has been very 
helpful actually already in (...) having more robust well thought 
through approaches as we start to form alliances with some of 









A marketing account manager of a business unit of an insurance 
company describes that her need to argue her strategic decisions is 
extended by the causal relation between competitive advantage and 
success:"The positioning of a firm alone is not sufficient for 
success, but to gain advantage through the elements of skills, 
competences and resources. This helps me to argue in my current 
situation with the limited resources on the one hand and the increasing 










A project manager in a start-up company describes that the concept of 
entrepreneurial agency provides a new construct that extends the 
start-up's need to predict the future: 
"The thing I found really interesting (..) was (...) that concept of 
having to be half a step in the future but like, not too far in the 
future so that the ideas should be not too crazy or too out there 
and I think that’s really useful because that’s sort of what we’re 
trying to do, we’re kind of trying to predict, it’s a new mine 
development, so we’re trying to predict where it’s going and what 












A chief physician of a business unit in a hospital states that the need of 
an approach to structure strategy is extended by a systematic 
procedure to develop strategy: 
"The public health care suffers from the silo thinking and it helped 
to see different organizational designs (..) in which the structure is 
turned upside-down. (...) In the medical sector that's extreme, we have 
a medical hospital, a surgical hospital, a gynaecological hospital e.g. and 
if we would turn that we could see what connects theses hospitals or 
what is the same across hospitals, like in-patient and out-patient 
processes, administrative processes etc. But no one wants that because 
no one wants to lose his or her position as chief physician. But it will 
come and thus it's good to talk about it and to know the 










The CFO of an IT company describes the extension of his experiences 
with developing strategy by a checklist that is able to cover all 
important aspects: 
"Usually when you develop strategy (...) you start somewhere, e.g. 
with brainstorming and then you try to put everything in an order. 
Then you're not sure whether you have covered all aspects. (...) So the 
procedure helps to ask the right questions and helps seeing 
whether I use the right tools and the right starting point or the 
right information. So if you do strategy it's important not only to 
look at products but to ask where do I want to go overall and how 
is that part of the strategy process. (...) I know it from my own 
experience that you simply do a workshop in a room full of flipcharts 
and then you start. But the moderation is missing because of that the 









The CIO of a telecommunication company states that his experiences 
with the development of strategy are extended by a procedure to 
develop strategies: 
"I liked the concept of transitional object. Usually the CFO or CEO says 
something that he always says. And then you'll repeat every year the 
same. Applying this concept, this does not work anymore. The process 
prevents you from having empty platitudes in your strategy and 
that these platitudes show up in the goals and the priorities. The 
process forces you to get out of your protected space. (...) the process 
better manages social aspects and helps to better develop a strategy. It 










A marketing account manager of a business unit of an insurance 
company perceives that her experiences with strategy projects is 
extended by a procedure how to structure future projects: 
"I have worked in several strategy projects but I've never seen these 
steps and now I know what would be the ideal procedure. That 
doesn't mean that I will go exactly through all steps in detail in future 
projects but (...) I know how I could move or should move, and with 
which tools; and that helps me to better structure my work and also to 















A project manager at a consulting firm states that he extended his 
experiences of developing strategy by a construct of market-based and 
resource-based strategy development:  
"We often have strategy meetings where we applied the inside-out 
and outside-in perspective but (...) usually we said these are our 
competences and this is the market and we will do something, but we 
never consciously asked ourselves: Does my firm adjust to the 
market or does the market adjust to my firm? So I would like to go 








The strategic marketing manager of a logistics company describes the 
extension of his experiences of by a new construct of the strategy 
process through means-ends: 
"(The main point is) the design of the process of strategy, it's about 
connections, about logic, it's partly about maths. Maths in the sense of 
action-reaction. This has a high practical value that I learn to 
contextualize and to evaluate in this sense. (...) The point is that you 
realize that every strategic issue that you add will have a follow-
up element. That is cause-and-effect. Often in strategy you think 
about an issue but then you stop and you don't think about the 
next steps. So having this awareness that if you give a 
recommendation you should know what to get at and where does it 









The CCO of pharmaceutical company describes that her experiences of 
having to provide media reports on positioning are extended by the 
scientific jargon of competitive strategy: 
"Positioning in a market that's always a topic in my firm. But it's 
not a topic that I directly influence. However, now I know the right 










The CEO of a logistics company states that his intuitive way of 
developing strategic issues was extended by a checklist: 
"Mainly I acquired methodical knowledge, i.e. that I can 
methodically systematize, or standardize or industrialize strategic 
issues that I did before in a rather common sense way. (…) you 
know exactly with what you start at day one, day two, day three for a 
strategy development; so it gives you a comprehensive checklist and 









The CEO of a hotel describes the extension of his intuitive 
understanding of strategy by a new construct: 
"Our strategy was more costumer centred, like which products are 
important, do we need a spa and what kind of spa etc. The take away 
for me is that I always thought of strategy in terms of costumer 
relations but there are other factors, like suppliers and the whole 
environment and the location. I've learned to pay more attention 
to these factors and that it would help to analyse the situation 













A divisional director and president of the board of directors of an 
electric company states that his intuitive understanding of strategy was 
extended by a new construct: 
"I always thought strategy is a really big thing but now I realized 
that I can change something on our local level and on a small scale. 










A marketing account manager refers to the product-market matrix in 
terms of "outside-in view" and "inside-out view", which provides a new 
construct of strategy and the related scientific wording of an inside-out 
perspective on strategy  
What I dislike in my firm is that we are too concerned about us instead 
of being concerned about the costumer. (...) Now I have a new 
perspective and now I can name what I dislike. (...) what I would like to 
raise in my firm is that inside-out is ok, but we also have to think about 
the environment. Thus, outside-in would be a necessary switch for us 
because new technologies change the behaviour of the consumer and 
this perspective, e.g., has not yet penetrated our work. It would change 
our products and services and still won't rest on this thinking that we 







Supporting evidence for "Kinds of value" 





A marketing account manager of an insurance company states that the 
concept of strategic issue management improved the understanding of 
the strategy in her firm 
"Overall I got a better understanding how a strategy is developed 






The strategic marketing manager of a logistics company describes that 
his common sense understanding of core competences is improved  
"There is also another topic that I took away concerning e.g. what is 
distinctive? And that core competences rarely exist. Previously, 
everyone said "what is your core competence?", but now I would 
question that and ask "do you really have a core competence" as 
this is something very, very rare and special. So, you don't trifle 










The head of department of a car manufacturer describes that his 
sensitivity for the problem analysis is improved 
"Specifically, it was interesting for me to see what could be the 
problems or with what you have to be careful. (...) That you get a kind 
of sensitivity again for the problem analysis because if you're in the 





A general manager of a business unit of car manufacturer describes 
that the way he handles strategic issues is improved 
"You're talking about things that are more or less intuitive and 
common sense but you're trying to get systematic about your insights 
and hopefully this more methodical reflection you might get your 






The senior director of a nanotechnology company states that the 
concept of global strategy helped him improving formulating a 
business plan: 
"So the concepts that we learn here have been very helpful 
actually already in formulating different approaches, having more 
robust well thought through approaches as we start to form 





A divisional director and president of the board of directors of an 
electric company states that he got a new understanding of strategy 
"I always thought strategy is a really big thing but now I realized that 
I can change something on our local level and on a small scale. We 
are in a relatively small industry, so we are not able to live it up. (…) 





A consultant to a government states that he sees new ways of analyzing 
problem areas in his context 
"The concepts give me inputs (…) I think mostly it is the framework or 
the process how to develop a strategy, how to evaluate the reasons, 
why did it go wrong in this case and where are the problem areas. So it 
would help me to go through the whole process and analyze our 





A senior solution architect of a telecommunication company states that 
she has a new understanding of what the top management is doing and 
how they decide 
"Now I have an overall idea why they did it and why they took this 
direction of decision making. (…) So the concept helped me seeing 
what the top management is doing and understand how they are 





The CEO of a hotel describes that he got a new way of analyzing the 
situation as well as new way of thinking in terms of strategy 
"The take away for me is that I always thought of strategy in terms of 
costumer relations but there are other factors, like suppliers and the 
whole environment and the location. I've learned to pay more 
attention to these factors and that it would help to analyse the 
situation according to these factors. (...) So basically I've got some 











A HR director of a confectionery manufacturer describes that the 
concepts provides different, new courses of action to develop strategy 
"The concept allowed me to realize that there is a wide range of 
looking into things, not just the way it's done in my company (…) It's a 
good way of (...) putting everything together sometimes we (...) tend to 






The CEO of a sugar cane factory describes a new course of action (the 
diversification to non-markets) based on the concept of market 
strategy 
"But through this stack of insight (that I got through this concept), 
we began to diversify our attention to non-market.  Like, building 
relationship, which comes to Switzerland, some official bureaucrats 
and what part the media is going to play and the NGOs. (...) So I got 





A HR director of a confectionery manufacturer describes that the 
concept of strategic issue management provides a structure that allows 
him explaining his courses of action 
"The concept helps you to develop a strategy in a very sequenced 
structure way. (…) so that you can explain why you're doing things 





The CFO of an IT company describes that the concepts helps him to 
legitimize his procedure 
"So the concept helps to ask the right questions and helps seeing 
whether I use the right tools and the right starting point or the 
right information. So if you do strategy it's important not only to look 
at products but to ask where do I want to go overall and how is part of 







The CEO of a federal police department states that there is a need to 
position the federal administration. This need is extended by the 
outside-in view on strategy, which provides a confirmation of the 
existing police department's strategic direction  
(...) in the federal administration we have to care much more about 
positioning. We still live from hand to mouth.(...) I have learned that we 
need a focus (...) especially in crime fighting; the question is "do we 
fight against the Italian organized criminality or against the Russian or 
the Chinese or do we fight against the motorcycle gangs?" (...) so the 
concept confirmed my thinking(...). I see that we are not that far 
away. Eventually, we have approached strategy differently but overall 





A chief physician of a hospital describes that he can justify the steps of 
a strategy process 
"I have learned how to structure a strategy process (with the GMN). (..) 
That is, I can justify what are the steps in a strategy process. That 
there is a framework that shows you clearly how to proceed but it's 









A marketing manager of an insurance company describes an 
improvement of her professional practices as well as a legitimation of 
her decisions towards others 
"I have worked in several strategy projects but I've never seen these 
steps and now I know what would be the ideal procedure. That doesn't 
mean that I will go exactly through all steps in detail in future projects 
but I bear this process in mind; and I know how I could move or should 
move, and with which tools; and that helps me to better structure 
my work and also to better communicate or sell how I would like 





Supporting evidence for "Failures in the perception of relevance" 
No Concept Exemplary quotes Code 
37 
Procedural 
justice (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 
1995) 
A IT consultant describes that the concept of procedural justice does 
not allow for different kinds of actions as it assumes that people would 
sit together (face to face) to achieve commitment 
"(...) there are certain aspects that you also need to study, which is (...) 
technology, where it affects me, and other people at day to day basis. 
(...) and hence we should be focusing really on technological aspects of 
strategy. And by technological aspects I am not talking about software, 
I am not talking about hardware, I am talking about ways of thinking. 
You know, how can we deal with a specific situation, where 
technology can probably assist you, jump three hurdles as 
opposed to face to face or whatever it is (...). The global climate, 
the fact that (...) strategy right now is not a single (...), face to face 
type environment like (...) groups sitting together in a meeting for 









The managing director of a public broadcaster explains that the 
concept of foreign direct investment is not compatible with his 
organizational context 
"(…) you can imagine that the concept "foreign direct investment" 
















The CEO of sugar cane factory states that he cannot relate the concept 
of value appropriation to his organizational context as it assumes a 
specific market structure that contradicts the emerging market 
structure, in which his company operates 
"(...) in the class everybody's been working for the last 15 or 20 years, 
there are many CEOs here and they also said that some of the 
concepts can never be applied at work. (For example) a lot of 
emerging markets are  structured (differently). So you know, 
whilst we follow all this innovation with IP protection and stuff, you 
take it to some part of Asia and someone copies your design and that's 
it.  You can go to the court and try and enforce your patent rights, but it 










A project manager at a business consultancy states that the concept of 
value creation does not provide new insights. For him, value creation 
is thus more a craftsmanship than an academic concept 
" (...) regarding some topics, I was really disappointed, e.g. when we 
talked about value creation. In our firm we also do trainings how to 
create value and the concept provides exactly the same insights. 





A business unit manager of the army describes that the concept of 
issue management provides a process that can be matched to the own 
organizational strategy development process, but it does not provide 
additional insights, i.e. strategy development is more about experience 
and common sense than an academic concept 
"The concept enables you to match your own process to other 
possibilities to design the process and how it could be done differently, 
so it offers you possibilities to compare your own process with the 
scientifically or theoretically presented process. (...) Generally I have 
realized that there is no difference between how we do strategy 
in our firm and what the concept describes. (..) One of the most 
important things you learn is "it depends, it depends, it depends". (...) 
In strategy, you work a lot with the backpack (of experience) you 
already have. (...) If someone has professional experience and uses 






Porter, 1997)  
The head of the administration department of a hospital describes that 
because he already develop strategies he could not get new insights 
from the concept of positioning 
"(...) I've already developed strategies, so I didn't learned new 
concepts that went beyond my current patterns to do strategy. So 
the models, like positioning (...) weren't new to me (..). Although I 
think it's my job to apply some of the concepts myself, I expect that the 
model or concept provides something new and then it's my job to 
realize that in my own firm or to think about whether I can use this 





76 No specific 
A patent attorney of a law firm states that generally academic concepts 
relate to common sense, which makes it difficult to get out something 
new 
"Some of the concepts (...) seem a little laboured. So I had a hard time 
taking apart common sense versus a theory. I felt like a lot (...) was 
common sense and was just kind of packed into a theory that you 
could apply (…). Mostly it did not give me something new that I 





The CEO of an electric company states that if concepts provide many 
options it is difficult to decide which course of action should be taken 
"(...) the methods, like issue management (...) show that you have 
several options to be able to structure or formalize certain things. 
Because of that it's difficult to develop strategic issues as you have the 
feeling that we should actually go in this direction and in this direction. 
So having these templates do not help deciding what I should do 






Porter, 1997)  
A business unit manager of the army describes that the concept of 
positioning extends his experiences but it is not possible to make 
decisions or find solutions based on this model  
"(...) I've learned to proceed analytically if I'm concerned about the 
positioning e.g. but a synthesis of a possibilities is hardly possible. So 





The CEO of a logistics company refers implicitly to the concept of issue 
management that extended his intuition by new causes of action to 
develop strategy. At the same time it does not provide a basis for 
decision making 
"I would have thought that in strategy there are more rules concerning 
do's and don'ts but I see that strategy work is very detailed and that 
you have to question everything a thousand times from different 
angles to get as many options as possible. But then it's not clear how 
to make a right decision at the end. And I would be curious to 






Porter, 1997)  
The head of the administration department of a hospital describes that 
the concept of positioning extended his experiences by a guide to 
position in the market, however it provides too many factors that 
influence positioning that it is hard to decide which courses of action 
to take 
"(...) the question "what kind of market is that", so the decision in 
which market the firm is operating was important for me (...). For 
example, is it e.g. good to build capacities and these fundamental 
tendencies.(...)  You often hear that strategy is a difficult topic and 
which corporations have a good strategy or "my firm has a clear 
strategy or doesn't communicate it properly". And that shows that the 
topic is not as simple as assumed. (So) deciding how to develop a 
strategy is rather difficult because a strategy is so complex and 










The owner and CEO of a pharmaceutical consultancy describes that the 
concept of intended strategy extended her experiences by a causal 
relation on strategy and goals. However, it is not considered as 
relevant because it does not provide an added value for her clients 
"The most important learning is (...) that if I don't know my goals I 
can't reach them, ergo I have to define a strategy with goals (...). (...) I 
thought, (...) instead of deducing something purely from practice, I 
could back this a little up theoretically (using this concept). However, 
you get very pragmatically in your daily business because the clients 
expect that. They don't pay to get theoretically instructed but to get 
something out for their business. Thus, I probably won't use this 





A senior solution architect of a telecommunication company describes 
that the concept of issue management helps developing lists of 
different courses of actions but it does not provide a mechanism to 
make decisions 
"I found it quite hard to make a decision relying on this 
procedure. In other areas you have developed skills or improved the 
subject knowledge (…). Now I know how to develop a list, like one, 
two, three, four (...) to develop a strategy and once this is done, we 
develop another list. It's not like going back to the older list and then 
trying to improve it and change it for our beneficial. In this sense, I 





Number of instances of practitioners' accounts of all conditions 
  Total number of instances 102 
1a  Matching contextual problems and needs 26 
1b  Matching experiences 33 
1c  Matching intuition 17 
  Total number of instances of matching 76/102 (75%) 
5a  Not matching 24/102 (25%) 





2b  Action expansiveness 11 
  Total number of instances of dimensions of ambiguity 29/78 (37%) 
3a  Extending by instruments 40 
3b  Extending by constructs 24 
3c  Extending by scientific framing 7 
  Total number of instances of extending* 71/78 
  Total number of combinations of extending 16 
5b  Not extending 23/78 (30%) 
4a  Legitimation 23 
4b  Improvement 21 
4c  Innovation 22 
  Total number of instances of value* 66/71 
  Combinations 15 
5c  No value 20/71 (29%) 
  Total number of instances of failures of relevance perception 67 
*Note that one instance can relate to multiple forms of extensions and kinds of value, and 
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